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―Something for you here,‖ said my supervisor-to-be, Professor 
John Skinner, twelve years ago when handing me his copy of The 
Shadow Lines by Amitav Ghosh. I was at the time completing my 
advanced studies in the Department of English at the University 
of Turku and had visited him shortly before to ask if he had any 
ideas for my Pro Gradu thesis. I am still in the department of 
English at the University of Turku. And I am still mulling over 
novels by Amitav Ghosh. John did not get to see how prolonged 
a process he had helped to set in motion. Nevertheless, I am 
grateful to him for launching me into this orbit and for staying as 
my satellite for eight years. To anyone inclined towards reading 
this volume, I speak John‘s ominous words: Something for you 
here... 
The novels of Ghosh have followed me through a Pro 
Gradu thesis, a Licentiate thesis, periods as assistant and lecturer, 
and terms as a researcher in two Academy of Finland projects. 
They have accompanied me to a stint as a visiting researcher in 
the University of Aarhus, Denmark. They have also seen me 
through one marriage and witnessed the miraculous appearance 
of my two children. And now, finally, they have seen me squeeze 
them into a Doctoral thesis. 
I am indebted to my opponent, Professor Jopi Nyman from 
the University of Eastern Finland, for a thorough reading of my 
dissertion and for pointing out certain blind spots and structural 
weaknesses in the text. I am also thankful to Professor Nicholas 
Royle from the University of West Sussex for applying his 
expertise to my work. And I would like to express my gratitude 
to Colette Gattoni from the Centre for Language and 
Communication at the Åbo Akademi University for polishing up 
my language and style. 
I have several institutions and numerous people to thank 
for all these strange years of sound and fury. The monetary 
aspect of my work has been greatly enhanced by the Academy of 
Finland in the forms of a personal grant and research fellowships 
in projects funded by it. I have been granted scholarships by the 
Turku University Foundation and the Kone Foundation, for 
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which I am deeply grateful. My work has also been supported by 
Oskar Öflunds Stiftelse and the Turku University Foundation in 
the form of travel grants. 
While the first project I was involved in (Fragments of the 
Past: History, Fiction and Identity in the New English Literatures, 
2004-2007) was led by John, the second one, the one that enabled 
the completion of this dissertation (Silence as Voice: Reempowering 
the Disempowered in Contemporary English Literatures, 2008-2011) is 
led by Lydia Kokkola, who became my supervisor in 2007. I owe 
a great deal to her flexible mind and to her astounding ability to 
discern traces of reason amidst nearly incomprehensible babble. 
For all this time, I have been affiliated with the Department 
of English in the University of Turku, which has also employed 
me for several periods over the years. I would like to express my 
gratitude to Risto Hiltunen, who has supported me and my work 
in the department in numerous ways during the years. I am also 
grateful to Joel Kuortti, who was the opponent in my Licentiate 
defence in 2001, and whom I have come across several times over 
the years in conferences and seminars both in Finland and 
abroad. And I was honoured to make the acquaintance of the 
eminent Ghosh scholar and novelist Tabish Khair, who invited 
me to stay as a visiting researcher in the English department at 
the University of Aarhus in 2004. 
My awareness of the theoretical, philosophical and 
methodological aspects of the study of literature took a gigantic 
leap forward during the period I was a student in the 
Department of Comparative Literature at the University of 
Turku. I am deeply grateful to Liisa Steinby, Pirjo Ahokas and 
Marja-Leena Hakkarainen for steering me during those years: I 
was quite malleable at the time, and they managed to implant a 
small embryo of a researcher beneath my skin. I would also like 
to thank Kaisa Ilmonen for invaluable help in conference 
organizing and book editing. 
I have had the joy of going through two Academy projects 
and numerous conference trips with Janne Korkka, whose wistful 
vision of future I have proven to be correct: the pain will be 
exquisite! I have also worked in two projects as well as organized 
a conference and co-edited a book with Elina Valovirta, whose 
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many contributions to common enterprises I value. My other 
project associates over the years have been Raita Merivirta and 
Elina Siltanen. No worries; you‘ll be putting together your 
acknowledgements in no time.  
Whether working in the department or in the research unit 
maintained by it, I have continuously had stimulating people 
around me. Keith Battarbee has always been there with his 
immense knowledge of things pertaining to university 
administration, as well as to teaching and studying in the 
department. Eleven years ago I witnessed the defences of Sanna-
Kaisa Tanskanen and Matti Peikola filled with awe, and I still 
look up to them in admiration. Janne Skaffari and Pekka 
Lintunen have always been a solid part of my working 
environment although, or perhaps precisely because, our 
interaction has mainly centred on the coffee spaces in either the 
department or the research unit. Ira Hansen has kindly come to 
my aid in numerous practical problems that turned out not to be 
problems. I am also thankful to my more experienced collegues, 
Professor Emerita Marita Gustafsson and Lecturer Ellen Valle, 
who have moved on to enjoy their well earned retirements.  
Family relations play a significant role in all areas of life. In 
the context of academic endeavours, which are plagued by 
uncertainty and money applications and the bliss of academic 
freedom, family sometimes has to come up with all kinds of 
irregularities. In this vein, thanks are due to my ex-wife Sanna for 
her patience when the going was rough. And I am immensely 
grateful to my parents, who have unselfishly kept track of my 
gropings through life, both academic and otherwise. My children, 
Unna and Eemu, although not yet cognizant of dissertations or 
other matters academic, provide me both with immediate joy and 
a horizon to look at.  
And Annu, thank you for all your realities. I would not 
have gotten this far without them. 
 
 





Amitav Ghosh has kindly given me permission to publish 
excerpts from his novels and other works. The permission was 
granted by private communication on 31 March 2011.  
My quoting of Ghosh has also been officially approved by his 




Permissions to re-publish the six articles in this dissertation have 
been granted via e-mail by the copyright holders as follows: 
 
 
Amitav Ghosh‘s The Circle of Reason – dismantling the idea of 
purity. The Nordic Journal of English Studies.  
– by the Assistant Editor of NJES, Chloé Avril, on 3 April 2011 
 
The Shadow Lines: The world of experience and the language of 
meaning. In Prasad, Murari (ed). Amitav Ghosh’s The Shadow 
Lines: A Critical Companion. New Delhi: Pencraft International, 
208-224. 
- by the Editor, Murari Prasad, on 23 March 2011 
 
Connections beyond partitions - In an Antique Land of Amitav 
Ghosh. The Atlantic Literary Review 4:3. 87-107. 
- by Mr Harjeet Singh of Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 
on 30 March 2011 
 
The Calcutta Chromosome – the ethics of silence and knowledge. 
In Huttunen, Tuomas,  Kaisa Ilmonen, Janne Korkka & Elina 
Valovirta (eds). Seeking the Self: Encountering the other: Diasporic 
Narrative and the Ethics of Representation. Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 24-38. 
- by agreement with other co-editors 
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The ethics of representation in The Glass Palace by Amitav 
Ghosh. In Dwivedi, O. P. & Joel Kuortti (eds). Changing 
Nations/Changing Words: The Concept of Nation in the 
Transnational Era. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. 
- by the Co-Editor, Joel Kuortti, on 11 May 2011 
 
Language and ethics in The Hungry Tide by Amitav Ghosh. In 
Sankaran, Chitra (ed). History, Narrative, Testimony: Essays on 
Amitav Ghosh's Fictional Narratives. New York: SUNY Press. 
- by the Senior Acquisitions Editor of the State University of 








The sensitivity of Amitav Ghosh towards issues of political 
importance, as well as of cultural significance, is apparent among 
other things in his reaction to the information that his fifth novel, 
The Glass Palace (2000), had been nominated for the 2001 
Commonwealth Writers‘ Prize. This had happened without his 
knowledge, and Ghosh promptly withdrew the novel from the 
competition on the grounds that it linked an area of 
contemporary writing to realities of ―a disputed aspect of the 
past‖ instead of the realities of the present day (Ghosh 2002a, 35). 
Further, he saw that ‗the Commonwealth‘ was not an appropriate 
attribute for a cultural and literary group that included many 
other languages and realities beside those represented by the 
English language. To clarify this point, he has compared ‗the 
Commonwealth‘ to another, on the face of it rather hilarious, 
attribute of epistemic violence, which is no longer in use: 
 
During the Second World War, the Japanese called their 
empire in Southeast Asia - after this incredibly damaging 
and violent campaign in Southeast Asia - they called this 
entire region ‗The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere‘, as I‘m sure you‘re aware. Now, if someone came to 
me and said would you accept ‗The Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere Prize‘ would I accept? Of course I 
wouldn‘t! Why should I accept something, which is just a 
euphemism for some incredible violence that was done to 
the world that is now seeking to whitewash itself? (Ghosh 
in Sankaran 2005) 
 
Ghosh‘s withdrawal from the competition for the 
Commonwealth prize was widely noticed. As the attention 
accumulated, Ghosh ended up contacting many of the writers 
that had previously won the prize, assuring them that he had 
been making a philosophical point worth discussion, not trying 
to criticise them for accepting the prize. 
As John C. Hawley observes in his monograph on Ghosh 
(2005), and as I have pointed out in the context of the 
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representation of violence in the writing of Ghosh (Huttunen 
2008a & section III.3. of this dissertation), Ghosh seems to be 
intent on moving his readers beyond the ―aesthetic of 
indifference‖ in his narrative representations. One of the reasons 
why he is considered such an important writer is the fact that his 
narratives offer a sensitive and multifaceted view on the 
contemporary problems of the worlds he writes about. When 
asked to what extent his background as a historian, journalist and 
an anthropologist has affected his work and whether his novels 
are entirely a work of fiction, he answered as follows: 
 
For me, the value of the novel, as a form, is that it is able to 
incorporate elements of every aspect of life - history, 
natural history, rhetoric, politics, beliefs, religion, family, 
love, sexuality. As I see it, the novel is a meta-form that 
transcends the boundaries that circumscribe other kinds of 
writing, rendering meaningless the usual workaday 
distinctions between historian, journalist, anthropologist, 
etc. (Ghosh in Caswell 2004).  
 
This highlights one of the most characteristic features of his 
writing: its generic heterogeneity, or discursive inventiveness, 
which enables him to retain sensitivity to various kinds of 
discourses, voices and agents, while narrating into existence 
unforeseen connections between them. 
Amitav Ghosh was born in Calcutta in 1956. He is the son 
of a diplomat and former Lieutenant Colonel in the Indian army 
and a housewife. As a consequence of his father changing 
postings, he grew up in East Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Iran and India. 
His family originates from eastern Bengal and migrated to 
Calcutta before the Partition in 1947. Ghosh went to the Doon 
School in Dehra Dun and received a BA in History from St. 
Stephen‘s College, Delhi University in 1976. In 1978 he received 
an MA in Sociology from Delhi University. His doctorate, 
completed in 1982 at Oxford University, is in Social 
Anthropology. As part of his degree, he went to Tunisia to learn 
Arabic in 1979 and, in 1980, he conducted field work in Egypt for 
his doctorate. After completing his doctorate, Ghosh worked as a 
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journalist for The Indian Express in Delhi. Since then, he has acted 
as visiting fellow and professor in several universities around the 
world, while creating a bulk of work, including seven major 
novels and a large amount of journalism and cultural-political 
commentary in the form of articles and essays. 
The novels and other writing by Ghosh have been granted 
several major awards and have been nominated or short-listed 
for even more. He is regarded as one of the most important of the 
Indian writers in English of the post-Rushdie generations, and in 
the Bengali tradition within this larger category. His reputation is 
mainly due to the ambivalent nature of his fiction as both 
intellectually important and topical, whilst remaining immensely 
readable for the wider public. He has built a strong profile both 
as an academic and as a writer of journalism, cultural 
commentary and fiction. His novels, then, are blockbusters in 
America and on the Subcontinent, while being eagerly studied by 
the academia of both continents. The position of Ghosh among 
the reading public in Britain has not been as strong as within the 
academia there, but this is likely to change since his latest novel, 
Sea of Poppies (2008), was short-listed for the Man Booker Prize. 
This combination of academic viability and popular accessibility 
is rare and a very important one. It enables Ghosh to sensitively 
narrate politically and philosophically topical themes for all to 
read, without appearing to be pedantic or promulgating, and 
without appearing to endorse any of the views he voices. 
Broadly speaking, the themes examined by Ghosh both in 
his novels and in his essays and journalism include the following: 
the impact of colonial knowledge systems and discourses on 
formerly colonized people/s, societies and discourses; the 
ambivalent relationship of the same societies to modernity at 
large; the restoring of agency and voice to people traditionally 
regarded as the muted objects of ‗grand,‘ or colonial, narratives; 
the (re)construction of histories of the same people and the 
emphasizing of the heterogeneous nature of various discursive 
and other constellations. Ghosh has approached these themes in 
generically very inventive and heterogeneous novels, 
subversively manipulating literary genres stemming from 
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Western modernity to suit his goal of dismantling discursive 
constructions that the same modernity stands on. 
Rajagopalan Radhakrishnan examines Ghosh‘s writing in 
his volume, Theory in an Uneven World (2003). I will draw on 
Radhakrishnan‘s work on several occasions later, as it comes 
close to my own views on how theory and literary criticism 
should be written – especially in terms of ethics. In the preface to 
his book, Radhakrishnan explicates his idea of theory as follows: 
 
Theory here follows a deeply ethical impulse. Whereas 
merely historico-political blueprints of progress, 
development, and techno-globalization can afford to 
characterize ―unevenness‖ as the hapless shibboleth of 
―losers,‖ or justify it as an inevitable result of a world-
historical and hence unipolar capitalism, an ethically 
inspired and motivated theory dares to envision co-
operations and solidarities across the divide and the 
asymmetry. (2003, vi-vii) 
 
This dissertation focuses on Amitav Ghosh‘s narrative strategies 
for the ethical representation of co-operation and solidarity across 
myriad discursive divides and asymmetries in various 
circumstances. The primary purposes of this dissertation are to 
clarify how these representational strategies are constructed and 
how they function. This is done in the hope that such an ethically 
informed approach to narrative representation might alleviate the 
problems ensuing from the construction of discursive totalities 
and power relationships that help to maintain barriers between 
people/s from different backgrounds. 
As will become evident in the articles in this dissertation, 
the narratives by Ghosh construct epistemologies that transform 
the poststructuralist idea of language and discourse as power. 
They constitute a fictional counterpart to what the ethnographer, 
George Marcus, describes as an ethical, rather than power-
related, approach to cultural phenomena (1998, 57-78). Marcus 
maintains that this kind of approach, though cognizant of 
discourse as power, ―is not built explicitly around the trope of 
power, but rather of ethics, that is, the complex moral 
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relationship of the observer to the observed‖ (1998, 75). Ghosh‘s 
novels transform the relationship between self and the other, or 
observer and observed, into a two-directional act of knowing. 
The object of enquiry appears as an active agent who is in a 
relationship with the observer, instead of being a passive object of 
scrutiny. Further, the move away from ―structural appropriations 
of discourse formations‖ to exposing ―the quality of voices by 
means of meta-linguistic categories (such as narrative, trope, 
etc.)‖ (Marcus 1998, 66) resembles Ghosh‘s foregrounding of oral 
stories that are told by his characters. 
In addition to examining the representational strategies 
used to create connections between and within multicultural and 
multilingual societies and cultures, this dissertation approaches 
the issues of identity, agency, voice, silence and discursive 
appropriation in the fiction of Ghosh from an ethical viewpoint. 
In general, the articles in section IV are based on the 
philosophical investigations of Emmanuel Levinas. In Levinas‘s 
view, the other eludes the cognitive powers of the knowing 
subject. In other words, the other exists outside the ontology of 
traditional Western philosophy, which conceives of all being as 
objects that can be internalized by consciousness or grasped 
through an adequate representation. The self can only ‗know‘ 
things by projecting on them through language what it already 
contains in itself. Knowledge, then, is equal to linguistic 
appropriation of the object of knowing. Consequently, the other 
cannot strictly speaking be described in language, but is 
ultimately unreachable (Levinas 1969). For an introduction on the 
adaption of Levinas‘s thinking to novels by Ghosh, see III.1.2. 
The philosophical ideas of Levinas have their inspiration in 
the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger on the one hand, 
and on the religious traditions of Judaism on the other. During 
the 1930s and 1940s, his work mainly concentrated on the 
phenomenological concepts of the two aforementioned 
philosophers, but during the 1950s Levinas rejected 
phenomenology and turned to writings in the Jewish tradition as 
the inspiration for his delineation of the relationship between the 
self and the other. He rejected the ontological basis of the 
Western philosophy, comparing its way of conceiving of things 
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outside the self to the journeys of Ulysses: the Western self, as 
Ulysses, journeys far into the strange world outside at 
considerable risk, but eventually always returns back home, i.e. 
back to the self, which is the starting point for the realization of 
things outside. Against this way of conceiving of the self as both 
the point of departure and goal of every enterprise, he posits the 
journey of Abraham, who left for good towards the unknown 
Promised Land, never to return. Accordingly, Levinas is often 
seen as standing between two traditions stemming from the 
cultures of the Greeks and the Jews—Hellenistic and Judaistic. 
Levinas‘s method of concentrating on the way the self 
constructs itself in relationship to the other, and the way in which 
language and discourse distort the other resonate strongly with 
literatures that seek to represent the minorities and ‗silenced‘ 
groups of the world. Therefore, the ideas of Levinas provide 
fertile ground for literary criticism dedicated to the examination 
of literatures emanating from conditions of discursive oppression 
and obfuscation, like for instance postcolonial studies, ethnic-
minority studies, queer studies, or feminist studies. Literature 
and criticism concentrating on the representation/examination of 
multicultural societies brought about by the neo-colonial 
circumstances created by movements of global capital and 
people/s can also benefit from Levinas‘s thinking. And, in this 
particular instance, Levinas‘s thinking can in my opinion be 
successfully used to explicate how Amitav Ghosh dismantles and 
re-constructs the discourses rising from Western eras of 
Enlightenment, colonialism, modernism and postmodernism. The 
deconstruction of discursive totalities that are built on binary 
constructions is at the heart of both Levinas‘s and Ghosh‘s project 
towards the transcending of power-related discursivity. 
At this point, it is useful to briefly list certain elementary 
aspects of Levinas‘s philosophy of the other and the ethical. 
These aspects serve as the constitutive basis for his philosophy as 
a whole. First, Levinas‘s ethics is non-foundational. It does not 
endeavour to establish a secular, objective and universal morality 
on comfortable rational foundations. This aspect of his thinking is 
directed against the ontological foundation of the mainstream 
Western philosophy. Second, Levinas‘s philosophy does not set 
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forth cognition as the measure for everything that comes into 
contact with the self. Ethics is not an issue of knowledge: it does 
not lean on any categories, codes or principles which would exist 
prior to the ethical relation, in other words prior to the immediate 
encounter with that which lies outside us. Third, Levinas‘s ethics 
is non-ontological: it comprises an endeavour to think ‗otherwise 
than being‘, to quote the title of his second major work ([1974] 
1998). The ethical relation is not founded on static essences, 
identities or wholes that can be found just waiting there outside 
the self. Fourth, the ethical relation is immediate and singular. It 
demands responsiveness and responsibility towards what is at 
hand at any given moment. It thereby calls our attention to the 
immediate practical present. The self and the other are fluid and 
their relationship takes on different forms according to the 
particular circumstances at different moments. And these ethical 
instances serve to interrupt and inform essentialized linguistic 
totalities within the domains of the public and the political. 
The above tenets do not seem to correlate with what one 
would customarily connect with the word ‗ethics‘. Indeed, as 
Colin Davis has stated in his introduction to Levinas‘s thinking, it 
is difficult to see why Levinas is linked with ethics in the first 
place: 
 
His work fulfils none of the conditions by which ethical or 
meta-ethical philosophy might be recognized. He does not 
intervene in the classic debates between consequentialists 
and deontologists; he does not answer the Socratic question 
‗How should one achieve happiness?‘ or the Kantian ‗What 
ought I do?‘ Although he refers to Plato, he does not 
explicitly engage with the work of other fathers of ethics, 
such as Aristotle, Kant or Hobbes. He does not provide 
foundations or rules for morality, nor does he discuss 
virtue, or rights and duties, and he offers no account of the 
language and logic of ethical inquiry. (1996, 47) 
 
The last item in Davis‘s list is particularly intriguing from the 
point of view of literary studies. The study of literature is 
decidedly about language and representation, which in Levinas‘s 
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view cannot reach the ethical dimension of our existence. 
However, as will become evident in sections III.1.1. and III.1.2., it 
seems that especially fiction with its polyphonic and flexible 
representative strategies is a useful forum for referring to things 
ethical, by way of staging them, or hinting at them, or showing 
them without subordinating these objects of scrutiny to too much 
defining and thereby distorting language. Levinas‘s language in 
his own writing (especially in Otherwise than Being) ―maintains an 
ambiguity, or oscillation, between differing registers of language, 
that ensures the interruption of ontology‖ (Critchley 8). In a 
similar manner, Ghosh‘s narratives shatter the linguistic totalities 
of modernity through their differing registers of postructuralism 
and humanism, maintaining an open-ended ambivalence that 
both dismantles and re-constructs various totalizing discourses. 
The writing of Ghosh, I shall argue throughout this study, can be 
realized as a practical example of the coming together of 
deconstruction and Levinasian ethics. I hope to show that the 
aporia, or gap, between the registers he enacts opens up a 
dimension of alterity or transcendence that carries ethical 
significance.  
Seen against the background of Levinasian ethics Ghosh‘s 
narratives imply that in attempting to know the world we 
simultaneously change it by projecting onto it meanings 
conveyed by language and narration. In his narratives, the 
ultimate experience of truth (i.e. the ethical) is often represented 
by silence, which can never be gained through knowing, i.e. 
through language. Silence also represents the gap between the 
world and the words that are used to narrate it. For instance, in 
the ‗official‘ histories that were written by the colonizer, much 
remains unvoiced because colonial narration and ideology does 
not match the reality of the colonies. On another level, those left 
outside colonial history find it problematic to describe themselves 
and their realities through a language that is linked to discursive 
domination through imperial and neoimperial practise. Amitav 
Ghosh, who writes in English, tries to find ways for narrating the 
realities of people who are outside Western ideology through the 
language of this ideology. He aims at the ethical levelling and 
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subversion of the political and cultural power-relationships 
carried by language. 
Although Ghosh represents the world as socially 
constructed and creates discursive realities to examine the 
movements of power, he is also trying to find a way of escaping 
the realm of discourse controlled by the hegemonic Western 
mode of knowledge production and its ways of narrating the 
world. One of the possible ways of circumventing this powerful 
and deeply rooted ‗way of knowing‘ is to constitute transcendent, 
ethical realities that cannot be accessed through a specific 
language and discourse. Therefore, in meeting the other, we 
should try to remain open and responsive to it, rather than 
immediately attempting to define it from our own starting points. 
Alterity, meaning the unknowable and unreachable nature of the 
other, cannot be attained, but it can, and must, be approached. In 
Levinas‘s view, this ethical approaching of the other‘s alterity is 
our responsibility. The means by which this can be achieved 
include the use of a kind of ‗imaginative empathy‘ and 
reciprocity in the encounter with the other. 
Radhakrishan has examined these concerns as they appear 
in relation to the concepts of imagination and space in Ghosh‘s 
second novel, The Shadow Lines (1988). These same concerns are 
relevant in the context of all Ghosh‘s novels, and his writing in 
general. Space in Ghosh‘s narratives is manifested as a many-
faceted problematic that brings together time, place (imaginary 
and real dimensions), location (whether geographical or 
discursive) and identity (both personal and 
national/communal/collective). Radhakrishnan has come up 
with several insights that novels by Ghosh offer concerning this 
multi-dimensional collective (Radhakrishnan 2003, 27-28). Below 
I have paraphrased those insights that concentrate on the 
imagining of spaces and realities as a subversive and 
interconnecting act (See section II.2.1. for more extensive 
treatment of space in Ghosh‘s narration): 
 




- The process of imagining spaces brings to the fore both the 
need for fixed spaces and their limitations. 
- The transcending of these fixed spaces is globally 
motivated and locally executed. 
- Understanding the reality of any specific space does not 
require ‗inside‘ information: spaces are ―reciprocally ek-
static/exotopic‖ (2003, 27). 
- Through global empathy and ‗precise imagination‘ we can 
understand and experience realities other than our own. 
- The imagining of the other‘s reality based on violence and 
exoticism has to be distinguished from a dialogic 
imagination open to reciprocal and equal transcendence. 
 
In Radhakrishnan‘s view, these basic insights involving the use of 
a certain kind of ethical imagination in the envisioning of 
interhuman and interdiscursive relationships amount to 
 
a newness in and of the imagination. If only the world 
could be imagined that way! – new and emergent 
perceptions of nearness and distance; longdenied and 
repressed affirmations of solidarities and fellow-
heartedness in transgression of dominant relationships and 
axes of power; new and emergent identifications and 
recognitions in profound alienation from canonical-
dominant mystifications and fixations of identity. (2003, 
viii) 
 
The above themes inform my own examination of Ghosh‘s 
narratives to varying extents. What is expressed in packed 
language by Radhakrishnan above, shall unfold during the 
course of this dissertation as characteristic of Ghosh‘s ethically 
aware narrative representation, in which precise imagination has 
an essential role. 
Another examination of Ghosh‘s The Shadow Lines 
highlighting the use of precise imagination comes from Shameem 
Black (2006). She connects the use of imagination with a certain 
kind of cosmopolitanism, understanding the latter as ―the 
imaginative and ethical process of opening the self to the 
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strangeness of an expanding world‖ (45). This particular brand of 
imaginative and ethical cosmopolitanism ―offers a specific way of 
inhabiting the transnational and transcultural currents of 
globalization‖ (45). Black outlines ―the wonderful paradox of 
imagining precisely‖ in Ghosh as a special mode of 
comprehension:  
 
Conceptualizing others requires the leap beyond positivism 
that imagination connotes, but to offer more than a self-
serving fantasy of cultural difference, this practise of 
imagination demands a respect for the specificity and 
uniqueness of other lives. (2006, 54) 
 
Black foregrounds this ―rooted cosmopolitanism‖ as a way of 
simultaneously inhabiting the world and the home, the self and 
the other. This way of being in the contemporary world of 
globalization would be based on ―the desire to actively imagine 
rather than passively accept one‘s world‖ (2006, 50). 
As can be deduced from the above, the concept of 
imagination has been given a central role as the vehicle for the 
ethical transcending of monolithic discursive constructions in the 
new millennium. This is the case especially within the theoretical 
moorings of what has come to be referred to as the ‗ethical turn‘ 
in literary studies since the late 1990s (see section III.1.1. for a 
detailed charting of this phenomenon). In addition to insights 
provided by Radhakrishnan and Black, Ghosh‘s adaptation of 
imagination also resonates with Drucilla Cornell‘s idea of 
transcendental imagination. Cornell insists that ethics is 
inseparable from ―the full disruptive power of imagination‖ 
(1992, 35). For Cornell, as for Ghosh, I argue, imagination does 
not signify a moral power of ‗deep comprehension‘ of what is 
already there as it does when understood through humanism. 
Rather, imagination represents the power to transcend what is 
given and to admit and designate the possible. Cornell further 
sees imagination as enabling ―redemptive perspectives‖ which 
―displace and estrange the world‖ and make us ―aware that we 
are in exile‖ (16). In the core of the dissertation, I shall be 
concentrating on Ghosh‘s narrative representation of the ethical 
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relationship between the self and the other precisely as the 
displacing and estranging of the familiar and the expected. Here 
the other is conceived not only as the other human being, but also 
as another time/space, discourse, narrative technique, 
knowledge production strategy or literary genre. Nature and 
animals also function as the others of human beings in Ghosh‘s 
novels. 
The narratives by Ghosh are primarily about creating 
connections between various others without depriving any 
participant of their authentic voice and agency. Ghosh‘s 
technique is to present these others (be they individuals, 
communities or discourses) in a relationship and in contact with 
one another, while retaining their individual characteristics. The 
motifs Ghosh uses to explicate and symbolize the nature of these 
narrative relationships include precise imagination, the mirror-
window dyad, photography (image vs. language), the idea of 
simultaneous discovery/definition, silence vs. discourse and the 
transcending of language. The way each of these symbols of the 
relationship to the other functions will be explicated later in the 
articles. 
In the following section II, I shall introduce six novels by 
Ghosh through problematics evolving around the themes listed 
above. Although it lies in the background of many of the theories 
and viewpoints that come through here, the ethical approach is 
not specifically adopted to the novels before the end of the 
contextualizing section III. Section IV, the core of this 
dissertation, which comprises six articles on the introduced six 
novels, will then stand more ostensibly on the ideas of Levinasian 
ethics in relation to the representation of the other. Section V after 
the articles includes an overview on the critical reception of the 
novels before turning by way of conclusion into the examination 
of the ways in which the political comes through in Ghosh‘s 
narration. 
Parts of sections II, III.3. and III.4. are based on five articles I 
published during the years 2003-2009: 
 
2009. Ethics, language and the writing of Amitav Ghosh. In Borg-
Barthet, Stella (ed). A Sea of Encounters – Essays Towards a 
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Postcolonial Commonwealth. Cross/Cultures series (Vol. 117), 
Amsterdam/NY: Rodopi, 335-348. 
2008. Representations of riots in The Shadow Lines by Amitav 
Ghosh. In Bell, David & Gerald Porter (eds). Riots in 
Literature. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 93-107. 
2004. Representation of London in The Shadow Lines by Amitav 
Ghosh. Literary London: Interdisciplinary Studies in the 
Representation of London. 2:1. Available: http://homepages. 
gold.ac.uk/london-journal/index.html (29 Dec 2010) 
2003. Ethics of Multi-Sited Representation in the Fiction of 
Amitav Ghosh. The Atlantic Literary Review 3:4. 164-182. 
2003. Narration and Silence in the Works of Amitav Ghosh. World 
Literature Written in English 38:2. 28-43. 
 
And the six articles that form the actual core of this dissertation 
are: 
 
2011. [forthcoming] Amitav Ghosh‘s The Circle of Reason – 
dismantling the idea of purity. The Nordic Journal of English 
Studies. 
2011. [forthcoming] The ethics of representation in The Glass 
Palace by Amitav Ghosh. In Dwivedi, O. P. & Joel Kuortti 
(eds). Changing Nations/Changing Words: The Concept of 
Nation in the Transnational Era. New Delhi: Cambridge 
University Press, India. 
2011. [forthcoming] Language and ethics in The Hungry Tide by 
Amitav Ghosh. In Sankaran, Chitra (ed). History, Narrative, 
Testimony: Essays on Amitav Ghosh's Fictional Narratives. 
New York: SUNY Press. 
2008. The Shadow Lines: The world of experience and the language 
of meaning. In Prasad, Murari (ed). Amitav Ghosh’s The 




2008. The Calcutta Chromosome – the ethics of silence and 
knowledge. In Huttunen, Tuomas,  Kaisa Ilmonen, Janne 
Korkka & Elina Valovirta (eds). Seeking the Self: 
Encountering the other: Diasporic Narrative and the Ethics of 
Representation. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 24-38. 
2003. Connections beyond partitions - In an Antique Land of 
Amitav Ghosh. The Atlantic Literary Review 4:3. 87-107. 
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II. The novels 
 
The aim of this section is to introduce the novels that will be 
examined in later sections. Although I avoid overlapping with 
other sections as much as possible, regrettably a certain amount 
of repetition is unavoidable. There is some repetition within the 
article section (IV) and also between that section and others. In 
introducing the novels, I shall concentrate on themes that expand 
on those examined in the articles, while giving the reader a 
general view of the texts as regards the plot and the characters. 
This section then concentrates on themes that most 
obviously come up in the examined novels, instead of specifically 
tying these novels to ethical concerns. Consequently, my goal at 
this point is not so much to bind the novels to an ethically 
informed theoretical or methodological framework, as to 
introduce them before delineating the field of ethical study of 
literature and tying Ghosh‘s writing into it (sections III.1.1. & 
III.1.2.). In trying to bring forth the themes and motives peculiar 
to each novel, I apply a variety of theoretical views that clarify 
these issues, instead of subordinating them to any one theoretical 
model. In the articles, on the other hand, my primary concern is 
not thematical; there I am more interested in the ethically 
informed techniques used in the depiction of these themes and 
issues. Some of the subsections here are quite theoretically 
informed, while others are more descriptive in nature. Combined, 
they introduce the novels as well as the themes that run through 
Ghosh‘s oeuvre. Each sub-section introduces a new aspect of 
Ghosh‘s writing, to be found in some form in all his novels. 
16 
 
II.1. The Circle of Reason 
 
The first novel by Amitav Ghosh, The Circle of Reason, was 
published in 1986. It attracted some critical attention, including 
an endorsement from the influential critic and novelist Anthony 
Burgess. This work could be characterized as an episodic, 
picaresque novel in three parts (e.g. Mondal 2007, 7). The parts 
are linked by the protagonist, Alu, who flees the Indian 
authorities after being falsely accused of terrorist activity, the 
intelligence officer, Jyoti Das, who is trying to capture him and a 
book, The Life of Pasteur, by René Vallery-Radot. The general 
motif running through the novel is that of weaving as the method 
for creating connections by intertwining various discursive 
threads. 
In the first section, Alu lives in the village of Lalpukur with 
his uncle, Balaram. Balaram is devoted to science, or rather 
sciences, both mainstream and what could be characterized as 
marginalized ‗pseudo-sciences‘, like phrenology. His behaviour, 
accordingly, is both rational and irrational and his bizarre idea of 
scientific reason finally culminates in a feud with his neighbour, 
Bhudeb Roy, who stands for straight lines in accordance with the 
Western ideology of teleology and rational causal relationships 
instead of acknowledging that reason is circular. The feud takes 
on a political character in the eyes of the authorities and as a 
result Alu, who is the sole survivor of the tragic climax of this 
quarrel, is deemed a political extremist in the eyes of the police. 
In the second part, following his escape, Alu finds himself in the 
fictive Gulf emirate of Al-Ghazira, where he joins the multi-
lingual, multi-cultural and in every way motley crowd of illegal 
migrants/immigrants from Africa, Bangladesh, India and other 
Arab states. He lives in the house of Zindi, a former courtesan, 
and works as an illegal labourer. He miraculously survives the 
collapse of a large shopping-mall which he is helping to build. 
After the accident, Alu embarks on a mock socialist project to 
form a money-free commune in the Souq, the ancient market area 
where he and his fellow immigrants are staying. Again, his 
actions are regarded as hostile by the authorities, and the 
community is attacked. Alu once again makes a narrow escape 
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accompanied by Zindi, with Jyoti Das on their heels. The third 
part is set in the Algerian Sahara. The heart of Jyoti Das is no 
longer in the chase; he follows Alu and Zindi merely because it is 
expected of him. Alu, Zindi and Das all end up under the roof of 
an Indian doctor, Mrs Verma. Events culminate in Alu and 
Zindi‘s departure for India and Das abandoning his job and 
setting off for Europe. 
The Circle of Reason has a decidedly loose plot structure, but 
this is compensated for by an interlocking texture of recurring 
images and motifs, like for instance weaving and sewing 
machines, migrating birds, or the biography of Pasteur. The main 
metaphor of the narrative is weaving, which symbolizes the act of 
narrating or writing into existence stories and realities: 
 
So many words, so many things. On a loom a beam‘s name 
changes after every inch. Why? Every nail has a name, 
every twist of rope, every little eyelet, every twig of 
bamboo on the heddle. A loom is a 
dictionaryglossarythesaurus. Why? Words serve no 
purpose; nothing mechanical. No, it is because the weaver, 
in making cloth, makes words, too, and trespassing on the 
territory of the poets gives names to things the eye can‘t 
see. That is why the loom has given language more words, 
more metaphor, more idiom than all the world‘s armies of 
pen-wielders (The Circle of Reason 74) 
 
In another instance, the history of weaving is presented as the 
counter-history of Western history of scientific and technical 
development and expansion (The Circle of Reason 57-8). 
The novel shows how colonial power structures and 
knowledge production strategies become reproduced and 
subverted when applied in colonial and post-colonial 
circumstances. It also features the ways in which subaltern 
people both escape the grip of the political logic of the modern 
state and fall prey to it. Further, the narrative brings to the fore 
the ways in which diasporic and migrant connections escape the 
same logic. In the end, the novel shows how Reason is made to 
abandon its hegemonic position in the name of practical 
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everyday concerns in many-cultured human encounters 
comprising multiple customs and traditions. This happens 
through the dismantling of the discourses of modernist binary 
constructions (reason/religion, science/tradition, and so forth). I 
shall examine this process of the disintegration of linguistic 
totalities in the article on the novel (IV.1.) 
Although the novel features many cities and villages from 
India to Africa, places as such have relatively little significance 
for the sections featuring oral representations, or stories that 
come through in Ghosh‘s novels. In one of his essays Ghosh 
comments on the place-connectedness of the Western novel genre 
and sets it against such Eastern epics as The Thousand and One 
Nights, which give more value to story-telling than place: ―In 
these ways of storytelling, it is the story that gives places their 
meaning‖ (Ghosh 1998b), he states and compares them with 
Joyce‘s Dublin or American regionalists like Faulkner, whose 
works would be inconceivable without their specific locations. It 
seems that although the novel as a genre always needs a location, 
in these times of constant and rapid changes of place the story is 
of equal relevance, or even more important. At least this is so in 
Ghosh‘s way of writing. In his novels the stories can be freely and 
fluently adapted to various local circumstances that his texts also 
need to describe to become narrated as novels. In this way, he 
juxtaposes the Western novel genre with other ways of story-
telling (oral stories, poems etc.). And Ghosh‘s manner of giving 
weight to the settings of his novels is such that it emphasizes the 
connections, the relations between places and their 
interconnectedness, not only the separate or distinct places 
themselves. His description of place/s, then, can be seen as a 
strategy for connecting two different ways of representation: the 
delieation of grand schemes and the depiction of the local and 
particular.  
This representation of location, however, requires a certain 
kind of dislocation from the writer (in this case, Ghosh himself). 
In the following, he refers to the paradox of having to go through 




To write about one‘s surroundings is anything but natural: 
to even perceive one‘s immediate environment one must 
somehow distance oneself from it; to describe it one must 
assume a certain posture, a form of address. In other words, 
to locate oneself through prose, one must begin with an act 
of dislocation. [...]  
This then is the peculiar paradox of the novel: those of 
us who love novels often read them because of the 
eloquence with which they communicate a ‘sense of place‘. 
Yet the truth is that it is the very loss of a lived sense of 
place that makes their fictional representation possible. 
(Ghosh 1998b) 
 
The goal of Ghosh seems to be to merge the place-dependent 
representative model of the novel with the story–dependent 
models of poems and various types of oral stories. This strategy 
makes the construction of many-sited novels easier: if a certain 
place does not dominate a narrative, it becomes possible to 
narrate for instance the journey of the originally Western 
scientific idea of purity (symbolized by Pasteur‘s discovery of 
germs, and the carbolic acid used against them in The Circle of 
Reason) from an Indian village to an Arabian oil-town and on to 
the Algerian Sahara. In Ghosh‘s novels, places are significant as 
the crossing-points of various socio-cultural discourses and 
historical trajectories, but no original, pure society or place from 
which these discourses spring can be found in his texts. If 
something appears to be original and pure (nation, race, religion, 
identity), the narrative will soon reveal that purity to be an 
illusion. Of course, the change in the position (or even definition) 
of ‗place‘ is related to the changing world order. In the 
contemporary world, places are increasingly inhabited by people 
from a myriad of national, ethnic and cultural backgrounds, all 
denominators which have lost much of their place-related 
definitive power. 
The article on The Circle of Reason in section IV examines the 
way in which the narrative strategy of the novel dismantles the 
idea of binary constructions that Western modernity is based 
upon. It looks at the way the novel deconstructs the discursive 
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totalities of Western modernity, while remaining alert to 
questions of voice and agency, and the way in which the 
narrative constructs new connections by transcending those 
based on binary models. Towards the end, the article also 
introduces the concept of ‗ethical deconstruction,‘ which is meant 
to offer a two-directional, constructive, way of deconstructing 
that does not merely dismantle, but builds up something new in 
the same act. The following sub-section, however, is meant to 
offer overall insight into Ghosh‘s narrative strategy in general, by 
way of his first novel. 
 
II.1.1. The end of origins: Ghosh’s history of the present 
 
The title of this subsection contains a veiled reference to Michel 
Foucault‘s notion of genealogy. In general, the starting points for 
narration in all of Ghosh‘s novels are quite close to the way in 
which the genealogical approach functions. In an interview he 
gave in 1981, Foucault urged people to ―fight against the 
impoverishment of the relational fabric‖ (1997, 158). The 
interview was about homosexual relationships, but, in the words 
of Paul Rabinow, it  
 
might be transposable to others, albeit with some 
imagination and tenacity. The problem, as he [Foucault] 
saw it, was to create new social forms. Why not imagine 
new practises (and eventually new forms of law) that were 
not restricted to individual rights but began from a premise 
of giving new forms to relational activities? This work is not 
only ethical, it is also political; but it is politics without a 
program (Rabinov 1997, 37-8). 
 
As will become evident later, The Circle of Reason (as well as later 
novels by Ghosh) does attempt to create new forms of relational 
activities. The tendency of Ghosh‘s writing to move somewhere 
between the dimension of ethical relationships and the 
poststructuralist realm emphasizing difference and ‗discourse as 
power‘ has been commented on by several critics and will form 
the central area of examination in this dissertation. Parallel with 
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the search for interhuman relationships there is an awareness of 
the world as a narrative and discursive social construction where 
knowledge is produced discursively by those versed in the 
hegemonic language/discourse. 
Through the examination of subjects, objects and the 
relations between them at a particular moment in time (not so 
much through time), Foucault‘s genealogy is capable of becoming 
a kind of ‗history of the present.‘ In a similar vein, the narrative 
strategy in The Circle of Reason is not to examine the intermingling 
of discursive formations and practices through time, but rather to 
examine them as existing side by side at a particular moment in 
time. This breaks the idea of teleological cause-and-effect chains 
by denying that these phenomena are tied to certain points on a 
temporal continuum. In the novel we have for instance the 
ancient market area, the Souq, juxtaposed with the modern part 
of Al-Ghazira with its shopping centres governed by global 
capital based on oil. 
In contrast with traditional archaeology, genealogy 
concentrates on particular events rather than world-embracing 
systems. In the novel, world-embracing systems come into being 
as the natural off-springs of connections between particular 
circumstances. But, like archaeology, genealogy remains 
detached from the individual human intentions expressed within 
those particular events. Therefore it does not idealize or vindicate 
anyone, which Foucault saw as an asset compared to more 
traditional historiography. In the novel, the numerous alternative 
versions of the same events (for instance the collapse of the 
shopping centre, The Star) are narrated in a style which is 
characteristic of the discourse and narrator in question, but at no 
point does Ghosh prioritise any one of them. It can be said that in 
a way the narrative adopts a neutral position in relation to these 
various viewpoints by giving equal space to all of them. 
Neutrality in relation to the narrative strategy of the novel would 
then mean refusing to privilege any of the views that are 
represented. Genealogy further differs from archaeology in its 
focus on a much wider area of interaction. It is not restricted to 
the internal development of specific discourses, but examines the 
interaction ―between the proponents and the antagonists of any 
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discourse or discursive formation; between discursive formations 
and their functional milieux‖ (Faubion 1998, 33). In The Circle of 
Reason, discourses interact in several functional circumstances: 
proponents of the discourses of science, religion, socialism, 
capitalism, tradition and modernity are described in the settings 
of an Indian refugee village, an ancient market area (the Souq), a 
modern oil-town and a village in the Algerian Sahara. And the 
narration is certainly not restricted to the internal developments 
of these various discourses. On the contrary, the borders between 
the discourses vanish and they seem to merge into one another 
creating new relational fabrics. 
Whereas archaeology is capable of explaining historical 
discontinuities and ruptures only at the expense of historical 
continuities, Foucault‘s genealogy allows for the depiction of 
historical processes as neither continuous nor discontinuous, but 
as ―a multiplicity of timespans that entangle and envelop one 
another‖ (Foucault 1998, 430). In the words of Faubion (1998, 33), 
it allows one ―to conceive of history as a plurality of encounters 
and temporalities.‖ As will be seen in section II.2., this comes to 
the fore most clearly in Ghosh‘s second novel, The Shadow Lines 
(1988). The Circle of Reason comments on the continuity of 
historical processes, for instance, in a scene where Bhudeb Roy, 
who wants to close the village school, voices a call for straight 
lines. In a mock analogy of the change from the period of 
colonialism to neo-colonialism, he shouts: ―A new time beckons. 
The time to teach is over. The time has come to serve the people‖ 
(99). But despite the unselfish tone of this declaration, Bhudeb 
Roy is clearly motivated by money in much the same vein as the 
Western states which taught and promoted Western culture 
during the colonial period; a project they continued by ‗helping‘ 
the newly independent ‗third-world nations‘. In honour of the 
Western teleological model of history, Roy demands for straight 
lines in the manner of Europe, America and Japan. But this is not 
consistent with the strategy of the novel, where there are no 
straight lines. Its idea of history is circular and it relies more on 
―the details and accidents that accompany every beginning‖ 
(Foucault 1998, 373).  
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And, finally, genealogy does not search for origins, or the 
ultimate truths implied by the concept of origin. Behind every 
illusion of ‗origin‘ there lies more history and interaction. This is 
consistent with the strategy of the novel, where, as Robert Dixon 
(1996, 7) has pointed out, there are no pure origins. For instance, 
the village of Lalpukur in the first part does not represent 
original or pure traditional village life: it is inhabited by refugees 
fleeing the violence of the Partition and later the war that resulted 
in East-Pakistan becoming Bangladesh (pp. 59-60). And the Souq 
in the second part is the crossing-point of various ancient trade 
routes inhabited by people from a myriad of ethnic and linguistic 
backgrounds. 
All the themes that come to the fore in later writing by 
Ghosh are budding in this first novel in one way or another. The 
transcending of distinctions following from the idea of purity 
anticipates the more obvious thematization of partitions and 
borders in his next work of fiction, The Shadow Lines, where they 
are viewed from the points of view of politics, geography, 
imagination and historiography. The unnamed and undescribed 
first-person narrator of this second novel is, in a way, a more 
developed version of Alu, on the one hand providing a kind of 
nexus or crossing-point for different persons, events, places and 
stories, and on the other hand functioning as an active agent who 
gives these intersecting strands a configuration of his own. Yoti 
Das‘s interest in birds and the analogy between the migrating 
birds and the migrating characters in The Circle of Reason are 
reminiscent of the connection between Man and nature and 
animals that is developed further in The Hungry Tide (2004). And 
the fact that the travelling in this first novel mainly happens 
within the colonies is, in addition to being reminiscent of the 
strategy adopted in The Glass Palace (2000), consistent with the 
thematics of ignoring the Oriental/Occidental polarisations, or 
the typical postcolonial theme of migrating between the colonies 
and the West. An interest in science comes through quite 
prominently in all novels by Ghosh, but is most obviously 
thematised in The Calcutta Chromosome (1996), as is the motif of a 
quest (Yoti Das tailing Alu in The Circle of Reason). 
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Most of Ghosh‘s novels contain this theme of searching and 
finding/discovering something. But the most important and 
prominent theme in the writing of Ghosh is the transcending of 
the discursively constructed cultural differences, lines and 
borders for the good of common humanity and interaction. These 
differences may be conceived spatially, temporally or culturally, 
and they may be related to class, race or ethnicity, but the on-
going mission of Ghosh seems to be to indicate their 
constructedness and to bring to our awareness other ways of 
constructing the world based on ethically informed connections. 
 
II.2. The Shadow Lines 
 
Ghosh‘s second novel, The Shadow Lines (1988), has received more 
critical attention than his other, by no means unnoticed, novels. 
New editions of the novel designed for literary scholars and 
common readers alike are constantly released, especially in the 
Indian subcontinent. The Shadow Lines is listed in the curricula of 
several universities around the world. This novel has the most 
prominent position also in this dissertation, as it has in my other 
output, too. I have published three articles on The Shadow Lines, 
and the following introductory examination of the novel (II.2.1.) 
draws heavily on my earlier work (see Huttunen 2004). 
The Shadow Lines is strongly aware of the ideology of 
nationalism and its shortcomings in the subcontinent.1 In the 
background of the novel lies the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 
1984 and the violence and unrest that followed. The miraculous, 
close to magic-realist features and incidents typical of Ghosh‘s 
first novel are here replaced by tight plot structure and realist 
narration. In The Shadow Lines, Ghosh weaves temporal and 
spatial dimensions into a personal texture on which the 
anonymous narrator builds his identity. The novel narrates the 
                                                 
1 Literature on Partition and nationalism on the Subcontinent, both fictive and 
academic, forms an immensely large body of intellectual reflection far exceeding 
the scope of this dissertation. I shall therefore not dwell on this subject in any 
detail, except when Ghosh‘s writing absolutely demands it. For an ethically 
tinged examination of The Shadow Lines in connection with Indian nationalism 
and its religious and secular undertones, see Kumar (2008).   
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history of an Indian family that lives in Calcutta, but has its roots 
in Dhaka on the Pakistan side of the border. The experience of 
Partition and of living in the nation-state of India in the 1960s is 
presented through the symbolism of lines, be they political, 
communal or geographical, or lines dividing consciousness or 
identity. The intersecting histories of the family and their British 
acquaintances, the Price family, are narrated as stories that come 
into existence through the unnamed narrator of the book. Most of 
these stories are told by the narrator‘s grandmother; his Uncle 
Tridib; his cousins, Robi and Ila; and the family friend, May Price. 
The stories interweave life in Dhaka before Partition, life in 
London during the war, and the life the narrator leads in Calcutta 
during the 1960s and London of the 1970s. Through his narration 
of several stories representing differing worldviews and socio-
cultural discourses, the narrator attempts a kind of self-produced 
unity very much like the one Mahatma Gandhi had in mind for 
the diverse population of India. In addition, his critique of lines 
that produce divisions can be seen as directed at the discourse of 
secular nationalism that the prime-minister, Jawaharlar Nehru, 
stood for.  
From a narrative point of view, The Shadow Lines 
concentrates on the various ways of narrating/giving meaning to 
the world. It brings together fictive reconstructions of the past 
based on memory and official history based on ostensibly neutral 
facts. Ghosh highlights imagination as a way of transcending 
hegemonic official representations and challenging their 
neutrality. In this novel, Ghosh seems to concentrate more on the 
political and power-related aspects of language and narration. 
There is also a growing awareness of the relativity of the 
discursive realities that language constructs. Consequently, 
Ghosh appears to have moved on from his first, experimental, 
novel, which highlighted the power of narration as the creator of 
worlds and realities. In The Shadow Lines, it is more the 
shadowing, or muting and eclipsing, nature of these realities that 
is examined. 
The novel offers the reader several ways of 
experiencing/narrating the world. The narrator regards his 
imaginary reconstructions of the past as being more truthful than 
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the actual present. He lives through other people‘s stories. For 
him, the actual (as opposed to imaginary) present only serves as 
the impulse for the narrative reconstruction of memories. For his 
cousin Ila, the actual present is ‗the real.‘ Ila cannot see any 
reason for dwelling in the past or in the imagination. For her 
"words had nothing to do with an excitement stored in her 
senses" (The Shadow Lines 30). Then there is the way that official 
discourses, like the newspapers, narrate the world. When the 
narrator tries to write about the riots that killed Tridib, he finds 
himself struggling with silence. For him, this silence is equivalent 
to a lack of meaning. This reflects the inadequacies of official 
narratives, or descriptive and allegedly objective narration in 
general. Ghosh‘s message here is that we can only know the 
world through words. But words carry meanings, they carry 
power relationships and ideological overtones. For instance, the 
national discourse of the official reports in newspapers creates 
gaps, because the words and the world they are meant to 
describe do not always meet. The newspapers do not take the 
riots into the national narrative they support because this would 
mean giving them meaning. The communal and religious riots 
are left outside the national secularist narrative because this 
serves the interests of the national discourse. At the end of the 
novel, the narrator is finally able to give voice to this silence, 
when May Price relates the story of her own personal experiences 
of the circumstances surrounding Tridib‘s death. Here narration 
and imagination seem to function as tools for weaving together 
different worldviews and ideologies, as well as voicing the 
silences created by the nationalist discourse. The symbol for the 
encounter with the other, be that a person or the other half of the 
divided Indian identity on the other side of the border, is the 
mirror. These mirrors form into ‗mirror-windows‘ allowing the 
narrator to see out to other selves in addition to seeing his own 
image reflected. 
The way these mirror-windows, or ―looking-glass borders,‖ 
(The Shadow Lines 233) function in the novel, is explicated in the 
article (IV.2.) in the sub-section that examines the ethically 
represented transcendence of discourse through the use of the 
symbolism of mirrors and desire. The article as a whole addresses 
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the theme of the shadowy lines and over-lappings between the 
world of experience and the language of meaning. In the article, I 
argue that imagination has a vital function in creating ethically 
informed connections between these two ‗realities‘. The same 
topic is approached below through the concepts of space and 
location as they become narrated in the novel. Ghosh‘s views on 
the dislocation required from the writer narrating his/her 
immediate environment and on the place-centeredness of the 
Western novel versus the story-based narration of Eastern epics 
are also relevant here (see section II.1.).  
 
II.2.1. 'Knowledges' of London -- narrating space 
 
In his discussion of the "stage of imperialism," Fredric Jameson 
detects ―a growing contradiction between lived experience and 
structure, or between a phenomenological description of the life 
of an individual and a more properly structural model of the 
conditions of existence of that experience‖ (1991, 410). The levels 
of ―the immediate and limited experience of individuals‖ and the 
socio-cultural background governing that experience have drifted 
away from each other to the extent that they begin to ―constitute 
themselves into that opposition the classical dialectic describes as 
[…] essence and appearance, structure and lived experience‖ 
(1991, 410-411). In other words, the spheres of the actual reality of 
sense-perception, ―the immediate experience,‖ and of the socio-
cultural influences affecting the way in which this experience is 
realized, ―the structural model of the conditions of existence of 
that experience,‖ do not coincide. 
Serendipitously using London as his example, Jameson 
states: "the truth of [the] experience no longer coincides with the 
place in which it takes place. The truth of that limited daily 
experience of London lies, rather, in India or Jamaica or Hong 
Kong" (411). Although the original position and the direction of 
movement of the colonial and postcolonial migrant characters in 
the novel is opposite to those of the Western modernist writers of 
the colonial period to whom Jameson is referring, obvious 
parallels can be found between the two cases: they are both 
"bound up with the whole colonial system of the British Empire 
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that determines the very quality of the individual‘s subjective 
life" (Jameson 1991, 411). As indicated, the actual lived experience 
of the narrator in the novel is originally that of Calcutta of the 
early 1960s and later that of the London of the late 1970s. But, due 
to the early influence of stories told mainly by his cousin, Tridib, 
the form governing these actual experiences is mainly that of an 
imaginary London of 1939, or that of images of various far-away 
places which have come to him in the form of these stories. As 
concerns the imaginary past London and its frame of reference, 
the present perception, there is a cultural and temporal, as well as 
a geographical, gap between these dimensions to begin with, as 
the narrator lives in Calcutta and these influences come from a 
London of the past. Later on, the geographical difference is 
eliminated when the narrator moves to London, but the 
temporal, and consequently also the social, gap remains.  
Tridib is an archaeologist, who has spent an important 
period of his childhood in England, and who is in love with an 
English girl (or an image of one) whom he last saw as a baby. He 
prefers to perceive reality through the imagination rather than 
through his senses and is aware of the relativity of truth. 
According to him, everyone lives in a story, ―because stories are 
all there are to live in‖ (The Shadow Lines 184). It is just a question 
of which story one chooses. Tridib chooses to invent his own 
stories, to construct a reality of his own. In his view, a place does 
not merely exist, it has to be invented. And people have to invent 
their own realities and places, otherwise we will never be free of 
other people‘s inventions (The Shadow Lines 37). 
As a contrast to Tridib‘s influence in the novel, there is that 
exercised by another cousin, Ila. For Ila, who is the cosmopolitan 
daughter of a diplomat, places appear somewhat differently than 
they do to Tridib and the narrator, who has created detailed 
image-maps of these places he has never visited, and to whom 
they appear as both exciting and slightly romanticized. This 
emerges quite clearly in a conversation during one of Ila‘s visits 
to Calcutta. 
 
I began to tell her how I longed to visit Cairo, to see the 
world‘s first pointed arch in the mosque of Ibn Tulun, and 
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touch the stones of the Great Pyramid of Cheops. I had 
been talking for a while when I noticed that she wasn‘t 
listening to me; she was following a train of thought in her 
mind, frowning with concentration. I watched her, waiting 
eagerly to hear what she would have to say. Suddenly she 
clicked her fingers, gave herself a satisfied nod, and said 
aloud, inadvertently: Oh yes, Cairo, the ladies is way on the 
other side of the departure lounge. (The Shadow Lines 26) 
 
As the narrator puts it, for Ila ―Cairo was a place to piss in‖ (The 
Shadow Lines 27). This is an instance of migrant experience, 
surely, but very different from the kind the narrator dwells in. 
His experience is travelling in the mind, the imagination, while 
hers is travelling actually in person. The migrant subject does not 
have to move physically or geographically as Ila does, but he/she 
may be migrant on the social and cultural level like the narrator. 
He is migrant in his imagination, clinging to influences coming 
from outside (Dhaka, London, foreign places on maps) and 
reducing the actual reality to a minimum. 
If, for Tridib, present reality is of no consequence in itself, 
but appears merely as the stimulus for imaginary constructions, 
for Ila the actual is the real. One day in London Ila takes the 
narrator around the city to see used-clothes stalls and the 
vegetable market (The Shadow Lines 36). The narrator is bored, but 
gets excited when he recognizes the old location of the Left Book 
Club, where according to Tridib a member of the Price family had 
worked before the war. He drags Ila into the office and asks for 
confirmation, but the woman inside the store knows nothing of 
the days before the war. Ila is indignant and surprised at the 
narrator. For her, the building now looks like any musty old 
office. She is not in the least interested in the narrator‘s stories of 
the Price family or pre-war London. Ila‘s time dimension is the 
present, her world is the actual one and her way of travelling is 
physical: for her the current is real. She experiences the world 
through her senses, not through her imagination. For her, in 
consequence, a story is just ―a string of words that she would 
remember while they sounded funny and then forget‖ (The 
Shadow Lines 35). In contrast, Tridib experiences the world as 
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concretely in his imagination as Ila does through her senses, and 
for him words and stories form into experiences that are 
permanently available in his memory. The narrator, who is 
drawn to Tridib‘s way of handling reality, has problems of 
communication with Ila due to these very differences of 
worldview: 
 
I could not persuade her that a place does not merely exist, 
that it has to be invented in one‘s imagination; that her 
practical, bustling London was no less invented than mine, 
neither more nor less true, only very far apart. It was not 
her fault that she could not understand, for as Tridib often 
said of her, the inventions she lived in moved with her, so 
that although she had lived in many places, she had never 
travelled at all. (The Shadow Lines 27) 
 
When the narrator arrives in London and is taken to meet old 
Mrs Price for the first time, he astonishes the others by his 
knowledge of the city‘s geography. He is capable of finding the 
house without a map, although he has never visited the area 
before: 
 
It was easy enough on the A to Z street atlas of London that 
my father had brought me. I knew page 43, square 2, by 
heart: Lymington Road ought to have been right across the 
road from where we were. But now that we had reached 
the place I knew best, I was suddenly uncertain. The road 
opposite us was lined with terraces of cheerfully grimy red-
brick houses, stretching all the way down the lenght of the 
road. The houses were not as high or as angular as I had 
expected. (The Shadow Lines 63) 
 
As Meenakshi Mukherjee has observed, in the novel "the 
realignment of the sense of geography happens through an 
acknowledgement of the subjective space that all human beings 
inhabit" as well as by "plotting the different points of the globe on 
the accurately measured pages of the Bartholomew Atlas" with 
its Euclidian space (Mukherjee 2000, 135). The narrator has united 
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the lines and figures on the map he had examined in Calcutta 
with the images of the area he had created from Tridib‘s stories of 
war-time Lymington Road. But small discrepancies appear in 
combining these images with the real material London of the late 
70s: the houses do not look right. This is partly due to the relation 
between an image of a place never personally perceived and the 
real appearance of this place; they cannot be totally 
interchangeable. Also, the image of the narrator belongs to a 
different time dimension (that of 1939) than that of his first actual 
encounter with the real place. The physical aspect of the area may 
have changed during the forty odd years in between. However, 
this is not a problem for the narrator, who has his preferences: ―I 
wanted to know England not as I saw her, but in her finest hour - 
every place chooses its own, and to me it did not seem an 
accident that England had chosen hers in a war‖ (The Shadow 
Lines 62). England‘s finest hour occurred when Tridib visited 
London, or so it seems to the narrator, who cherishes the stories 
of war-time London and Lymington Road. 
On their way to Mrs Price‘s house, the narrator shows off 
by naming streets and buildings as they pass them. He claims 
that an incendiary bomb had fallen on a house called Lymington 
Mansions on Solent Road on October 1st, 1940, and destroyed the 
whole street. Robi insists that the Germans had developed that 
kind of bomb much later in the war. The narrator insists that his 
version is correct, because Tridib told him so. ―How was he to 
know? He was just a kid, nine years old. Every little bomb 
probably seemed like an earthquake to him,‖ says Robi (The 
Shadow Lines 60-1). Obviously, Robi is placing his 
historiographical information before that of Tridib‘s actual lived 
experience, which is the one the narrator believes. The question 
of authority regarding the two versions is left open; the argument 
does not continue. There has recently been a demand for the 
"provincialization" of European nationalist historiography by 
means of writing over it other kinds of narratives of human 
connections that rely on dreamt-up pasts for their validity.2 
                                                 
2 I am here referring especially to Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000, 49), who is 
affiliated with the Subaltern Studies group. This group, founded by Ranajit 
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Clearly here we have a dreamt-up version of the past of the 
Solent Road that is based on a quite peculiar chain of human 
connections. 
 Later Robi and the narrator go to take a look at the 
supposedly bombed-out Solent Road. The road, of course, looks 
like any other road in London. The narrator notices a small car at 
the side of the road and finds himself ―suddenly absorbed in the 
trappings of the lives that went with that car.‖ What is peculiar 
here is that he is not interested in the material present of Solent 
Road or the car. He has his images of the road in bombed-out 
condition and, on seeing the car, he immediately begins to 
imagine the lives of the people who use it. He comments on the 
present state of the road by saying that naturally he did not 
expect to see what Tridib had seen all those years earlier. He 
continues: ―But despite that, I still could not believe in the truth 
of what I did see […] it seemed to me still that Tridib had shown 
me something truer about Solent Road a long time ago in 
Calcutta‖ (The Shadow Lines 62). 
The narrator seems to be occupied with a phenomenon that 
Jameson links with modernism, both epistemologically and 
generically. He is in a situation in which "we can say that if 
individual experience is authentic, then it cannot be true; and that 
if a scientific or cognitive model of the same content is true, then 
it escapes individual experience" (Jameson 1991, 411). To begin 
with, the narrator refuses to integrate received (spatial as well as 
temporal) versions of London (the map of the city, the details of 
official history, even eye-sight) and his own imaginary 
construction, which he considers more truthful than the others. In 
a sense, he is presented as being superior to his British friends in 
this respect: as a member of a colonized group he has knowledge, 
and quite intimate knowledge at that, of the colonizers world. 
The same cannot be said in reverse. When May Price comes for a 
visit to Calcutta, she is frightened by the strange country and 
shuts herself in her hotel room.  
                                                                                                            
Guha in the early 1980s, aims to write anew the histories of the Subcontinent, 
highlighting the part the subaltern classes have played in the process. The group 
will be examined in more detail in section II.3.1. and the first article. 
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One evening Ila and Nick Price take the narrator to see the 
area that has become the Indian area of London. They walk along 
Brick Lane, which the narrator is eager to see because he 
remembers it as the street where Nick‘s uncle used to live before 
the war, when it was a Jewish area. Again, he is surprised at what 
he sees: "The first surprise that was waiting for me was that it 
wasn't a lane at all […] I had no means of recognizing the place I 
saw; it did not belong anywhere I had ever been" (The Shadow 
Lines 100). He had imagined the street to look like the lanes he 
had seen in Oxford, but what he finds is buzzing district 
thronged with people speaking "in a dozen dialects of Bengali" 
and Indian shops with Bengali neon-signs. When Nick points out 
a building that used to be a synagogue in the Jewish period of the 
area, he exclaims that Nick‘s uncle and his friends lived in its 
vicinity before the war. Nick appears incredulous, and the 
narrator leads them to the building where Alan Tresawsen 
allegedly lived. The narrator describes the windows of the house, 
one of which is boarded over with wooden planks. The other one 
is open and they can discern edges of curtains inside. The 
narrative continues: "That was the window of Dan‘s bedroom, I 
decided" (The Shadow Lines 103). An aside to the Brick Lane and 
the lives of people there in the year 1940 follows, triggered by the 
sight of the house. The dimensions of the imaginary 1940 and the 
actual present 1979 are juxtaposed in the narration. At the same 
time, Brick Lane is presented both as the Jewish area of the War 
period and as the Indian area of the 70s. 
The narrator clearly prefers his imaginary past London to 
the actual present one. Through this preference, the imaginary 
past comes to coincide with Jameson‘s ―essence‖, the primary 
contents of his consciousness, or ―the structural model of the 
conditions of existence‖ of the actual present. The actual present 
experience through sense-perception is Jameson‘s ―appearance‖, 
which in the context of the narrator serves mainly to trigger the 
―essence‖, the imaginary past. Consequently, the Solent Road, the 
Taj Travel Agency, or the room in Mrs Price‘s house of the 1970s 
(―appearance‖, immediate lived experience) bring forth the 
―structural model‖ of realizing them, which is the imaginary 
London of 1939 (―essence‖, the structural model of the existence 
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of lived experience). As with Jameson‘s theory, the social and 
cultural forms governing these two types of experiences do not 
coincide, but conflict at the levels of time, place and the nature of 
reality (imaginary constructions vs. actual sense-perception).  
Jameson‘s account of urban experience is reminiscent of the 
narrator‘s experience of London: 
 
[The] conception of city experience - its dialectic between 
the here and now of immediate perception and the 
imaginative or imaginary sense of the city as an absent 
totality - presents something like a spatial analogue of 
Althusser‘s great formulation of ideology itself, as ―the 
Imaginary representation of the subject‘s relationship to his 
or her Real conditions of existence.‖ (Jameson 1991, 415) 
 
The narrator also uses London for a very specific kind of "spatial 
analogue", to borrow Jameson‘s phrase. He counts the miles he 
wanders in the streets of London towards Stockwell to see Ila, 
with whom he has fallen in love. As he is incapable of finding a 
linguistic metaphor for the state of love ("And yet between that 
and its metaphors there is no more connection than there is 
between a word, such as mat, and the thing itself" (96)), he resorts 
to a spatial one. The route he has taken through London and the 
miles he has walked function as a metaphor for his love for Ila.  
The placing of the imaginary before the actual indicates that 
the narrator has primarily an imaginary identification with 
London. In line with Althusser‘s characterization of ideology, he 
has created an imaginary relationship to the real existing London. 
It is just that this representation is temporarily quite far apart 
from the real conditions of existence. As stated, Jameson links the 
phenomenon of a growing contradiction between lived 
experience and the socio-cultural conditions for the existence of 
this experience with colonialism and the physical and cultural 
movements caused by it. He also argues that new poetic 
strategies will spring from this contradictory experience: 
 
There comes into being, then, a situation in which we can 
say that if individual experience is authentic, then it cannot 
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be true; and that if a scientific or cognitive model of the 
same content is true, then it escapes individual experience. 
It is evident that this new situation poses tremendous and 
crippling problems for a work of art; and I have argued that 
it is as an attempt to square this circle and to invent new 
and elaborate formal strategies for overcoming this 
dilemma that modernism or, perhaps better, the various 
modernisms as such emerge: in forms that inscribe a new 
sense of the absent global colonial system on the very 
syntax of poetic language itself, a new play of absence and 
presence that at its most simplified will be haunted by the 
exotic and be tattooed with foreign place names, and at its 
most intense will involve the invention of remarkable new 
languages and forms. (Jameson 1991, 411) 
 
As the narrator acknowledges, he has created his own secret map 
of the world, ―a map of which only I knew the keys and co-
ordinates, but which was not for that reason any more imaginary 
than the code of a safe is to a banker‖ (The Shadow Lines 196). This 
map of the world is one response to Radhakrishnan‘s call for 
postmodern spaces that are imagined "in excess of and in 
advance of […] actual history in the name of experiences that are 
real but lacking in legitimacy" (2003, 61). The representation of 
London in the novel consists of several levels: the past is 
represented through an amalgamation of official history and 
personal imagination, and the present through maps and eye-
sight. Radhakrishnan continues: "each of these […] realities must 
imagine its own discursive-epistemic space as a form of openness 
to one another‘s persuasion" (2003, 61). What has to be avoided is 
the situation where one version speaks for all, or where all the 
versions are "islands unto themselves" (2003, 61). I would say that 
the novel as a whole forms a space in which all the above-
mentioned spatial representations of London are given room 
without vindicating or prioritising any of them. The swift and 
fluent switches between different times and representations in 
the narrative underline the impression that these various 
representations are dissolving into each other and, as a result, 
producing a whole which retains the specifics of each of its 
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components. In other words, a whole within which the various 
spatial representations do not exist as "islands unto themselves", 
but rather are open to one another‘s persuasion. In relation to 
history, the novel further provides an example of holding 
"history, the discipline, and other forms of memory together so 
that they can help in the interrogation of each other, to work out 
the ways these immiscible forms of recalling the past are 
juxtaposed" (Chakrabarty 2000, 93-94). 
The merging of various spatial and temporal dimensions 
into a heterogeneous whole is at its most obvious in the scene 
where, shortly after Ila‘s marriage to Nick Price, the narrator and 
Ila go down to the cellar of Mrs Price‘s house in London, where 
Ila tells him that Nick has been unfaithful to her. It is the same 
cellar in which Tridib sat during the war in the event of air raids, 
the same place Ila had drawn in the dust under the large table in 
Raibajar long ago, and the place where Ila had recently realized 
that the narrator was in love with her. Sitting on a camp bed 
beside the weeping Ila, the narrator contemplates the 
miscellaneous stuff in the cellar: 
 
Slowly, as I looked around me, those scattered objects 
seemed to lose their definition in the harsh, flat light of the 
naked bulb; one of their dimensions seemed to dissolve: 
they flattened themselves against the walls; the trunks 
seemed to be hanging like paintings on the walls. Those 
empty corners filled up with remembered forms, with the 
ghosts who had been handed down to me by time: the 
ghost of the nine-year-old Tridib, sitting on a camp bed, just 
as I was, his small face intent, listening to the bombs; (---) 
the ghost of the eight-year-old Ila, sitting with me under 
that vast table in Raibajar. They were all around me, we 
were together at last, not ghosts at all: the ghostliness was 
merely the absence of time and distance - for that is all that 
a ghost is, a presence displaced in time. (The Shadow Lines 
183) 
 
Different versions of the same space, those of imaginary London 
in 1939, Raibajar in the early 1960s and actual London in the late 
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1970s, are united and mixed simultaneously in the narrator‘s 
perception of the cellar. His experience of the cellar includes all 
these dimensions. The actual three-dimensional material world 
loses a dimension (―one of their dimensions seemed to dissolve‖) 
and its place is taken by the dimension of the imaginary past 
(―those empty corners filled up with remembered forms‖). 
According to Jameson‘s model, a typically modernist 
problematics of the dissociation of essence and appearance is 
solved in The Shadow Lines through the construction of a typically 
postmodern spatial vision. Realities that ―stem from different 
zones of time or from unrelated compartments of the social and 
material universe‖ (Jameson 1991, 373) have been united and a 
―mode of perception‖ has been achieved, which seems ―to 
operate by way of the simultaneous preservation of […] 
incompatibles, a kind of incommensurability-vision that does not 
pull the eyes back to focus but provisionally entertains the 
tension of their multiple coordinates.‖ (Jameson 1991, 372). These 
―multiple coordinates‖ of the cellar are the imaginary and the 
actual, and the past and the present.  
The Shadow Lines does not reinforce the Western notion of 
an individual subject or consciousness through which the world 
is realized. In addition to the level of individual subjectivity, 
there seems to be a longing for an ethical inter-subjective space 
transcending the boundaries of separate subjectivities. As 
Meenakshi Mukherjee has observed, although the narrator 
appears to be a "lucid reflector", he also functions as an "agentive 
site" for other lives (and for other spatial versions, for that 
matter): 
  
The transparency of the unnamed and undescribed narrator 
lets different persons, events, places luminously enter his 
story, and find new configuration there; or, altering the 
metaphor, it is possible to see the narrator‘s consciousness 
as a porous space that absorbs other lives and other 
experiences until they leak into each other to reveal a 




The novel does not engage in typically postmodern 
epistemological problematics, although, as shown above, in some 
respects it can be said to make use of postmodern narrative 
technique to ethically transcend the modernist condition of 
alienation between essence and appearance in the Jamesonian 
sense. It is precisely this openness to ‖unrelated compartments of 
the social and material universe‖(Jameson 313), referred to 
already in the introduction in connection with Radhakrishnan 
and Black, that constitutes the ethical dimension of this narrative. 
In relation to space, then, The Shadow Lines is occupied with 
the transcending of differences and the establishing of 
connections between various representational models and 
epistemologies. As should be obvious by now, the insights by 
Radhakrishnan on the intertwined usage of space and 
imagination in the novel (see introduction) are quite correct. 
Places have to be imagined for them to become real. The 
contradiction between actual and imaginary in the novel can 
surely be seen as a typical instance of both discursive and 
epistemological alienation characteristic of the 
colonial/postcolonial condition. But the juxtaposition and final 
merging of various 'knowledges' of London in the narration 
aspires to more than mere description of the dispersed colonial 
identity. This many-layered representation tries to overcome the 
discursive power politics whereby the narrative version of official 
historiography takes precedence over personal memories, or 
according to which actual sense-perception is more truthful than 
imaginary constructions. But the novel is not an attempt to effect 
a reversal of these binaries. It is more an instance of the ethical 
provincialization of these monolithic, or universal, 
representations and epistemologies, in order to reveal other 
realities and ways of realizing the world eclipsed by them.  
Accordingly, the narrative gives us the London of 
nationalist history, and of actual present sense-perception, but 
also the London of personal imagination and an imaginary past 
that was constructed mainly in the Calcutta of the 1960s. The 
result of mixing these various narrative strands is a 
representation of London that brings together the nationalist 
version and London as it appears to subjects of the 
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Commonwealth, whether seen in person or through the 
imagination. The novel represents the invention of new narrative 
forms resulting from the discrepancy in social and geographical 
locations of the actual object and the circumstances for its 
realization anticipated by Jameson (1991, 411). Whether seen 
predominantly as the product of postcoloniality or globalization 
(which are linked as cultural processes), the novel seems to 
present a feasible way of narrating the contemporary 
cosmopolitan experience of space. 
The various spatial dimensions (whether real or imaginary) 
are interwoven into a narrative structure which maintains 
ethically informed connections between these different 
dimensions. As I argue in the article on the novel (IV.2.), there is 
an ethical openness in the encounter and intermixing of these 
spaces. They are not left as separate islands, or merely juxtaposed 
to gain the effect of highlighting their differences. The differences 
between various imaginary and real spatial dimensions are 
related as an obvious part of their ‗being‘, while the actual goal is 
to transcend these differences without discarding the 
idiosyncratic features of different dimensions. The next major 
work by Ghosh, In an Antique Land, also relies on juxtaposing 
temporal and spatial dimensions, albeit in a manner different 
from that put forward in The Shadow Lines. The aim in this 
narrative with multiple time-lines and geographical locations is 
to bring forth both the common features and differences between 
the various times and places it presents. 
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II.3. In an Antique Land 
 
In his third book length volume, In an Antique Land (1992), Ghosh 
connects the sciences of historiography, ethnography and 
philology with the representational strategies of fiction. At the 
same instant, he also compiles meta-scientific dimensions by 
tracking the journey of the mediaeval documents the narrator is 
researching from Cairo to various museums in the West during 
1800s (meta-history). He also offers self-reflexive comments by 
the narrator on his relationship with the villagers he is supposed 
to be ‗studying‘ (meta-ethnography). 
In an Antique Land is a generic mixture weaving together 
the representative techniques of historiography, ethnography, 
travelogue and diary-writing. The narrator of the book (I am not 
sure whether this work can rightfully be referred to as a novel) 
brings together elements of anthropological field work in Egypt 
and India, the history of a Hindu slave of a Jewish merchant in 
the 11th century, and Ghosh‘s personal diary written during the 
fieldwork. At the same time, the book also functions as a 
travelogue. In a way, the narrator provides a meta-
anthropological commentary on anthropological field work with 
his self-reflexive comments on his own attitudes and feelings 
when meeting the villagers, and a history of history by following 
the movements of the medieval documents of the Cairo Geniza 
from Egypt to the various museums in the West. By constructing 
these kinds of meta-narratives, Ghosh tries to present the reader 
with those areas of reality that would be eclipsed by writing that 
adheres exclusively to one genre or paradigm. The narrative 
structure of the book is fragmentary, with passages on the 
medieval slave Bomma and the history of the region alternating 
with passages on late 20th century Egyptian villages and India.  
Through the narrative juxtaposition of the area of the 
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean of the 11th century with 
Egyptian villages and the India of the 1980s, Ghosh examines the 
theme of globalization, or modernization. The heterogeneous 
trading society of the medieval Mediterranean and Indian Ocean 
was brought to an end by the Spanish and Portuguese expansion 
in the 15th century. In the 1980s, Egypt went through an 
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exploitative period of colonialism and became fertile ground for 
global capital to feed on. In general, both societies can be 
characterized as multicultural, but there are major differences in 
the nature of their multiculturalisms. Ghosh presents history as a 
process in which the world partitioned, giving rise to Western 
hegemony. In the mediaeval era, it was possible for a Hindu 
slave to serve a Jewish merchant, who took part in Muslim 
ceremonies and magic cults. As Doris Bachmann-Medick has 
observed, this happened in circumstances that enabled 
syncretistic religiosity and ―a reciprocal influence of religions on 
one another‖ (10). In the modern multiculturalism managed by 
global capital with Western economy, science and war-machinery 
as its representatives, such tolerance is out of the question. 
Where The Shadow Lines was immensely popular in the 
Subcontinent, In an Antique Land with its fashionable merging of 
narrative models gave Ghosh access to the international literary 
stage. In the mediaeval trajectory of the narrative, the narrator 
appears as a historian and in the ‗modern‘ trajectory of 1980s and 
1990s as an ethnographer. This work also marks the beginning of 
his more straightforward critique of colonialism and its 
continuing impact. As Mondal (2007, 12) observes, the first two 
novels feature the effects of colonialism in the forms of the 
relationships between Indians and Britons, or the presence of 
Partition, as well as in the consequences it has had on a mind 
formed under the influence of the colonial education system (e.g. 
Balaram). But these are implicit critiques in the sense that in these 
cases, the purpose is more that of balancing the power of colonial 
discourses by de-centralizing them through the ethical revealing 
and narrating of the internal dynamics of non-European worlds 
and realities that have been pushed to the margins of Eurocentric 
narratives. The idea is more to reveal other histories besides the 
Eurocenric ones. But In an Antique Land draws attention to 
today‘s political problems between Hindus and Muslims, or Jews 
and Arabs, caused by the ruptures brought about by colonialism 
and the all-invading power of modern knowledge production 
models. 
While my article in section IV on In an Antique Land does 
not ostensibly adopt Levinasian ethics, the approach adopted in it 
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is nevertheless strictly in line with the theories of the ethical that 
enter the more recent articles. Towards the end, the article, which 
as its main theme has the transcending of the partitions created 
by the monolithic discourses of modernism, reacts to the 
ambivalence between liberal humanism and post-structuralism 
evident in this volume, as well as Ghosh‘s writing in general. In 
the following introductory section, I shall examine the manner in 
which Ghosh‘s postmodernist narrative constructs the 
subjectivity of the slave, Bomma, from textual traces, and then 
‗strategically‘ essentialises it into a subaltern subject. I do this 
against the background of Radhakrishnan‘s discussion of 
postmodernism, essentialism and the postcolonial subaltern 
subject. 
 
II.3.1. Modernism, postmodernism and the subaltern 
subject 
 
Postmodernism began to emerge among the English-speaking 
intellectuals and artists of the Subcontinent in the early 1980s. 
Postmodernist ideas stood for an emphasis on difference and self-
reflexivity as well as meta-discursive critique of representation as 
such. Postmodernism was ideologically opposed to grand 
narratives and the concept of state, which was regarded as a 
modernist structure in need of dismantling. Thus 
postmodernism, and specifically the poststructuralist variant of 
it, became a useful tool for placing the unsuccessful modernist 
discourses of Indian nationality under scrutiny. It has to be 
emphasized, however, that India as a postcolonial entity adopted 
not so much the ideology of postmodernism as its methods, which 
were largely used for the replacing and de-centering of the 
influences and totalities of modernism. The Anglophone 
intellectuals were dealing with a postcolonial situation, and were 
attempting to form meaningful narrative of themselves by 
wielding postmodern methods against modernist tenets.  
The emphasis on discursive self-reflexivity and a meta-
discursive relationship to his own writing that come through in 
In an Antique Land are among the most apparent postmodernist 
features of Ghosh‘s work on an ideological level. Representations 
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of the past are an integral part of his oeuvre. In the context of 
history, his message seems to be that fiction may be as good, if 
not better, a basis for representing the past as historiography, 
which is seriously inhibited by its own discursive form and logic. 
The same is true of the scientific discourse in general. Science and 
its sub-branches stemming from the Enlightenment and 
modernity (with Ghosh, notably history, medicine, anthropology 
and ethnography) are woven together with fictional 
representation. Moreover, Ghosh‘s works usually contain meta-
fictional and meta-scientific levels that comment on the nature of 
discourse in general or on the writing of fictional or scientific text. 
In In an Antique Land, he makes this technique an integral part of 
his argument. 
Amitav Ghosh has a close relationship both to the ideology 
and the writing of the Subaltern Studies group,3 as well as to 
many of the scholars affiliated with it. He has also published in 
the group‘s series, Subaltern Studies.4 The many years he spent 
with other members of the group in St Stephen‘s college in Delhi, 
as well as the general intellectual climate in the Subcontinent of 
1980s are clearly evident in Amitav Ghosh‘s thinking. 
Widespread concern with the crisis of nationalism and the 
general confusion of the era welcomed the assimilation of 
postmodernist tenets and opposed the modernist legacy. It seems 
that Ghosh‘s manner of constructing subjectivities in his 
narratives is quite close to the ‗strategic essentialism‘ coined by 
Spivak (1988). Although she did deconstruct the subaltern subject 
as it had been built by many of the Subaltern Studies group‘s 
members, she was not too concerned about its essentialist and 
positivist characteristics, but saw them as an asset in so far as 
they were used strategically for political purposes. In her 
research the subject in the end appears as a politically functional 
                                                 
3 For a description of the group‘s ideology, see the first article (IV.I.). 
4 What later expanded into In an Antique Land, was originally published as a 
straightforwardly historiographic text in the series. ‘The Slave of MS. H.6’ in 
Partha Chatterjee & Gyanendra Pandey (Eds.) Subaltern Studies: Writing on Asian 
History and Society, Vol. VII, New Delhi: Oxford UP, 1992, pp. 159-220. 
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mixture of deconstructive (postmodern) and essentialising, or 
positivising (modernist) ideas.5  
Rosalind O‘Hanlon is another critic who has examined the 
group‘s writings. In her view, the reconstructions of subaltern 
histories by some representatives of the group allow the 
traditional Western subject to enter their discourse:  
 
At the very moment of this assault upon Western 
historicism, the classic figure of Western humanism—the 
self-originating, self-determining individual, who is at once 
a subject in his possession of a sovereign consciousness 
whose defining quality is reason, and an agent in his power 
of freedom—is readmitted through the back door in the 
figure of the subaltern himself. (O‘Hanlon 1988, 191) 
 
O‘Hanlon ends up by arguing that the writing of subaltern 
histories requires great skill and subtlety if slippage into 
essentialist humanism is to be avoided. Narrative subtlety and 
skill are usually recognized as the characteristics of the writer of 
fiction, not historiography. But given the fact that they are both 
narration, O‘Hanlon‘s argument supports the adoption of the 
traditional techniques of historiography when writing fiction and 
vice versa, as Ghosh does in In an Antique Land. In O‘Hanlon‘s 
view, the most important thing in these constructions of 
subaltern subjectivity is to forget the myth of origins as a means 
of legitimation. The Cartesian ideas that the subject is self-
constituting and that a being which has its origin outside itself is 
not a proper being to begin with has to be discarded. Only then is 
it possible to move on to the idea that histories and subjectivities 
are constructed from fragments that ―do not contain the signs of 
any essential belonging inscribed in them.‖ O‘Hanlon further 
argues that this kind of skill, ―the ability to argue for a 
distinctiveness of practice without slipping into a metaphysics of 
presence‖ is difficult to develop (1988, 197). The ability of Ghosh 
to navigate along the fine line between essentialism and total 
                                                 




dispersal in his textual constructions of subaltern subjects has 
been noted by Robert Dixon, who argues that ―Ghosh develops a 
style of writing that is sufficiently nuanced and elusive to sustain 
the ―theoretical fiction‖ of a recovery of presence without 
actually falling back to essentialism‖ (1996, 16). 
In his critique of postmodernism, Radhakrishnan lists the 
ways in which the identity problematic has been ―brought to the 
third world on the postmodern platter‖ (2003, 14). In his view, 
the question of identity has come across to the subaltern people 
as a backward, unfashionable, quest through postmodernism. In 
a sense, the subaltern is forced to choose between a relevant but 
reactionary (modernist) project and a fashionable subjectivity that 
is hollow and devoid of any experiential basis (postmodernist 
subject). Further, among the subaltern groups, the subjectivity 
problematic is both urgent and morbid: these people have to 
adopt an alien (colonial, or Western) epistemology to develop 
self-understanding. And this adoption of alien epistemology 
results in a situation, where ―identity is divorced from the 
agential authority of specific narrative projects and their 
hegemonizing strategies‖ (2003, 14). As a result, subaltern 
identity and its discourse are epistemically evacuated. They are 
alienated from their prerogative to make truth claims: the truth 
claims would come ―from the Self of the dominant West‖ (2003, 
14). On the question of essences, or essentialism, approached 
above, Radhakrishnan notes that, as a Western construct, 
deconstruction totally misunderstands the burden of the idea of 
essence as it affects those disempowered by colonialism (2003, 
15). It also fails to understand the need for ‗strategic essentialism,‘ 
as discussed by Spivak. He further observes that essentialism is 
actually very much a modernist phenomenon and propounds a 
link, or a continuum, with modernism and its preoccupation with 
history and origins (2003, 16). Finally, he considers the term 
‗strategic essentialism‘ to be redundant, because essentialism is 
always strategic in and by its very nature, and ―the recourse to 
essences is a matter of strategy to gain control over processes of 
history along agential lines‖ (2003, 17). 
Reiterating Spivak‘s idea of the subaltern subject as 
something that cannot be regarded as having an a priori essence, 
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waiting to become activated into agency after discovery can 
readily be applied to the character of Ghosh‘s slave, Bomma, in In 
an Antique Land. The narrator constructs the subjectivity of 
Bomma as a two-dimensional narrative process. On the one hand, 
he combines and imaginatively interprets and interweaves the 
textual traces from the scraps of manuscripts he has found in 
museums and institutions around the world through his 
narrative process; on the other hand, he relates his search for 
these documents. He also includes an erudite Notes-section, 
which bears witness to the empirical philological and linguistic 
research he has also conducted on the documents. Clearly, this 
subaltern subject that is put together from textual traces (that is, 
traces both physically as scraps of paper and discursively as 
textual fragments) is not an already existing essence made 
agential after being discovered. Rather, it (or he) becomes 
agential in the very process of being narrated into existence. 
Bomma decidedly belongs to O‘Hanlon‘s subjectivities that are 
constructed from fragments that ―do not contain the signs of any 
essential belonging inscribed in them.‖ The idea that the subject 
is self-constituting and that a being which has its origin outside 
itself is not a proper being to begin with (O‘Hanlon 1988, 197) has 
clearly been discarded. 
 Spivak concludes that the subaltern subject would benefit 
from the use of strategic essentialism, the ―use of positivist 
essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest‖ (Spivak 
1988: 205). Radhakrishnan‘s ―recourse to essences [as] a matter of 
strategy to gain control over processes of history along agential 
lines‖ (2003, 17) refers to the same thing. The identity of Bomma 
is narratively built upon traces by the narrator, both practically 
(his search for the manuscript scraps) and theoretically (a 
poststructuralist subject as a crossing point of textual traces). But 
this is not all there is to this subject. It is by no means two-
dimensional. Radhakrishnan criticizes the postmodern 
―essentialism-narrative nexus‖ for its polarity: it offers either 
essentialism or a mere subjectless process. What is missing, in his 
view, is the politics of representation (2003, 19). This seems to be 
what Spivak, too, is asking for when she voices a call for the 
adoption of essentialism in a political interest.  
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So far, I have sketched the formation of Bomma‘s 
subjectivity as a narrative process that combines textual traces. 
But history, like identity, is a narrative construction, and thus a 
product of a deeply imaginative and interpretative process. It is 
not a place for fact-based empiricism. What happens when Ghosh 
narrates Bomma into existence is that the textual traces are glued 
to one another through imaginative principles, so that together 
they form the meanings the narrator wants to create. In Ghosh‘s 
narration, this process results in an ethico-political subject. As 
Radhakrishnan explains, 
 
―Value‖ thus presides over the narrative project (also, the 
identity project), both as an epistemological and as an 
ethico-political imperative. The imperative is 
epistemological insofar as the ―subjects‖ involved in the 
process need to be able to think of their intended identity as 
a worthy object of knowledge, and ethico-political since the 
value is also related to questions of representation, 
hegemony, authenticity, correctness, and fairness. (2003, 18) 
 
I shall examine the way Bomma‘s identity is narrated also in the 
article in section IV.3. The ethico-political nature of Bomma‘s, if I 
may, essentialised, subaltern identity can, however, be briefly 
outlined as follows: The narrator‘s construction of Bomma is 
clearly meant to disturb the colonial historiographical legacy: it 
creates a subaltern subject, a slave, who lived in the era before the 
European expansion and the appearance of colonialism and its 
dividing epistemology of modernism. Further, Bomma represents 
a world that was inter-connected by trade in a manner quite far 
from the capital-dictated connections of Western modernism or 
globalization. Bomma also represents an ethical call for syncretic 
connections between such geographical places, people/s, social 
classes and religions that nowadays seem quite distinct as the 
outcome of the partitioning of the world after Western expansion. 
Further, the narrative is self-reflexively open about the way this 
subject is created through its meta-narrative of tracing the 
manuscripts that have been spread around the world.  
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In the prologue to In an Antique Land, the narrator 
juxtaposes the presence in the Middle East of ―the greatest 
Crusador army ever assembled‖ of 1148 and the German and 
Allied forces of the World War two of 1942 (In an Antigue Land 
15). Amidst the military manoeuvrings of the summer of 1942, an 
article examining letters from the year 1148 appears in a Hebrew 
journal in Jerusalem. The article contains a mention of a letter 
written by a merchant in Aden: ―Within this tornado of grand 
designs and historical destinies, Khalaf ibn Ishaq‘s letter seems to 
open a trapdoor into a vast network of foxholes where real life 
continues uninterrupted‖ (In an Antique Land 15-16). These 
foxholes provide a route to the realm of the ethical: Towards its 
end, the letter has a mention of a slave belonging to the 
addressee, Ben Yiju in Mangalore, India:  
 
That is all: no more than a name and a greeting. But the 
reference comes to us from a moment in time when the only 
people for whom we can even begin to imagine properly 
human, individual, existences are the literal and the 
consequential, the wazirs and the sultans, the chroniclers 
and the priests—the people who had the power to inscribe 
themselves physically upon time. (IAL 16-17) 
 
But in the case of Khalaf Ibn Ishaq, it is merely a chance accident 
―that those barely discernible traces that ordinary people leave 
upon the world happen to be preserved.‖ (17). And then, the 
even more imperceptible trace of Bomma appears at the end of 
the letter. The epistemologically and materially postmodernist as 
well as the ‗essentialising‘ ethico-political components of 
Bomma‘s subjectivity are neatly represented in the above 
quotations from the prologue: We have ―a trapdoor into a vast 
network of foxholes‖ (postmodernist) ―where real life continues 
uninterrupted‖ (material). The block quotation above is an 
indirect reference to the ethico-political drive behind the 
construction of Bomma‘s subjectivity: Bomma as a subject is 
directed against this prevalent discourse on ―the consequential, 
the wazirs and the sultans, the chroniclers and the priests—the 
people who had the power to inscribe themselves physically 
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upon time‖ (In an Antique Land 16-17). And then there is the 
coming together of epistemologically postmodernist (more 
specifically post-structuralist) ―barely discernible traces‖ with the 
ethico-politically informed ―ordinary people leave upon the 
world happen to be preserved‖ with its emphasis on the 
haphazard way in which people who fall outside the powerful 
discourse of the ruling classes are acknowledged.  
All in all, the process of constructing Bomma is quite post-
structuralist in nature. It is postmodern both physically, or 
materially, as the process of finding and collating the scraps of 
manuscripts and epistemologically as the process of connecting 
textual traces. But it is equally ethical in its creation of 
imaginative formations transcending this discursive realm. 
However, the outcome of this process is a subject in his own 
right, not an epistemically void knot amidst discourses. Bomma 
is not an example of the postmodern ―epistemological 
revolutions at the expense of organicity and the solidarities of 
representational politics‖ (2003, 19) that Radhakrishnan sees as 
ill-befitting the needs of postcoloniality. In an Antique Land as a 
whole is an example of ethical solidarity between 
representational strategies as it combines several discourses into 
an unprecedented ethico-political whole. And the way Bomma is 
narrated a historical trajectory of his own intervowen with that of 
Ben Yiju makes him appear quite organic and, for a want of better 
term, essentialised subject with an ethico-political meaning and 
purpose of his own. Bomma as an essence is a token of the 
strategy to obtain ―control over processes of history along 
agential lines‖ (Radhakrishnan 2003, 17). As the narrator says in 
the book, Ben Yiju and his slave, Bomma, are preserved as ―tiny 
threads, woven into the borders of a gigantic tapestry‖ (In an 
Antique Land 95). They represent small agential lines in the 
borders of the processes of history. 
Throughout Ghosh‘s work there is an interest in the nature 
of language and the ways in which it moulds and determines our 
ways of comprehending and experiencing things. The notion of 
subject is constructed in representation through discursive 
connections with other people and the world. The identity that 
comes through in Ghosh‘s texts is not, then, a solid and detached 
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essentialist entity in the modernist manner. Neither is it its own 
origin. It is closer to the fluid and changing discursive 
construction in the postmodern sense. Consequently, identity is a 
fiction. But, contrary to the modernist definition of fictive as the 
opposite of real and truthful, the identity in Ghosh‘s writings is 
not an unreal fiction. Paradoxically, it is real just because it is 
both politically discursive and ethically imaginary. This is so 
because discourse and language construct the world for us, and 
we have to combine the passive reception of this construction by 
actively inventing our own versions. By this means we can arrive 
at a truth that is equally discursive and ethical. And despite its 
discursive component, this identity is not merely an itinerant 
knot in the universe of discursive fragments: this ‗essentialized‘ 
subaltern subject does have real material and ethico-political 
viability through the historical trajectory that is imaginatively 
narrated into existence simultaneously with it. This would make 
it quite close to the kind of subject delineated by Spivak, 
O‘Hanlon and Radhakrishnan above. 
Concerning the ideologies stemming from modernism and 
the Enlightenment, Ghosh promotes humanism and syncretism, 
but, as was seen above, is opposed to most other discursive 
constructions pertaining to modernity. He is also quite 
vehemently opposed to nationalism, precisely as a political 
entity. Ghosh, then, has an eclectic relationship to both 
postmodernism and liberal humanism. He endorses the 
postmodernist views on the nature of discourses and the ways in 
which reality is constructed by them. But his concept of the 
subject is both modernist and postmodernist: it is discursively 
constructed and can sometimes be realized as an agentive site, or 
a meeting place of various outside discourses. But his subjects are 
not two-dimensional. They do have a socio-cultural location and 
a historical trajectory which essentialise them in the modernist 
manner. And they are essentialized in view of certain political 
purpose. Then again his subjects are not self-generated individual 
detached observers of outside reality in the modernist sense, but 
they exist only in close relationship and connection with others as 




II.4. The Calcutta Chromosome 
 
The fourth novel by Ghosh, The Calcutta Chromosome (1996), 
returns to the problematics of scientific, philosophical and 
colonial knowledge production that were first taken up in The 
Circle of Reason. Like his previous work, In an Antique Land, this 
deconstruction of colonial medical history is a generic mixture, 
blending techniques from science fiction, the thriller, detective 
novel, ghost stories and historiography. The narrative takes as its 
starting point Ronald Ross‘s 1898 discovery of the role of 
mosquitoes in the spreading of malaria. The hegemonic version 
of Ross‘s research and achievements provided by colonial 
medical history (the ‗political‘, the hegemonic discourse) is 
narrated through his diary and the stories of Murugan, an 
American scientist who has studied Ross‘s career. This version is 
deconstructed through another version featuring a group of 
illiterate coolies manoeuvring Ross‘s research. This group 
worships the Goddess of Silence, embodied by the character of 
Mangala in the late 1890s story-line. They act according to the 
principles of silence and secrecy, and represent the ethical drive 
in the narrative, interrupting and deconstructing the hegemonic 
version of colonial medical history. Their way of going about 
things avoids becoming defined by colonial scientific knowledge 
production strategies. This way neither they, nor anything they 
do, can be ‗known‘, i.e., it cannot be appropriated into scientific 
or other discourses. The work of this group is directed at the 
transferring of personality traits from one person to another in a 
kind of joined effort of Western science and the transmigration of 
souls. The temporal dimensions of the narrative comprise past, 
present and future. The social scale is varied. The Calcuttan social 
hierarchy of the 1990s, for instance, is narrated from bottom to 
the top, with meticulous descriptions of the households and 
living conditions of the different social classes. The reader is also 
given a glimpse of the multicultural New York of the future and, 
of course, the colonial past of India with the illiterate coolies and 
colonial administrators and scientists is depicted in detail. 
In a sense, the novel presents questions concerning religion 
and the epistemological nature of god/goddess as counterparts 
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of science, its methodologies and the idea of rational knowledge. 
The question of discursive knowledge has been addressed as ―the 
spirit of knowingness‖ from an ethical viewpoint by Cora 
Diamond, who writes of the feeling of mystery in our lives:  
 
There is far more to things, to life, than what we know or 
understand. Such a feeling is tied to a rejection of the spirit 
of knowingness often found in abstract moral and social 
theorizing, a spirit which may recognize the existence of 
phenomena not yet satisfactorily explained or dealt with, 
but which is reductive in its idea of our relation to the 
world, and in what it takes understanding and knowledge 
to be, a spirit that is often ‗restless‘ in its supposed wisdom, 
eager to re-order human lives in accordance with its 
rational plans. (Diamond 1998, 51-52, orig. emphasis) 
 
This reads almost like a description of the character of Ronald 
Ross as he is depicted in the novel. It is also reminiscent of Farley, 
who happens to see Mangala‘s ritual with the syphilitics in 
process, but dismisses it as quackery because he cannot do 
otherwise within his discursive scientific frame. Farley‘s 
conscience demands that he reveal to those people that they are 
being fooled by Mangala, ―to expose the falsehoods that she and 
her minions had concocted to deceive those simple people. It was 
his duty, he knew, to tell them that mankind knew no cure for 
their condition‖ (The Calcutta Chromosome 149). The idea that 
Mangala could be ahead of science, indeed that anything but 
science could ever find a cure for syphilis, is beyond Farley‘s 
rational worldview, which is largely directed by the spirit of 
knowingness, as delineated by Diamond above. 
In her study on the human urge for transcendence into a 
god, Martha Nussbaum (1990, 365-391) reminds us that the life of 
a god would be decidedly non-human. The ancient Greek gods, 
for instance, do not share the distinctive characteristics of the 
human life. They do not have the ―forms of dependency and 
neediness that lead humans to reach out for others‖ (1990, 373-4). 
They lack many of the limits and defects that are an essential part 
of human life. They have no diseases, they do not need to exert 
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themselves to get what they want, and no unforeseen trouble 
comes their way. They have no physical or intellectual 
restrictions. And, above all, they are immortal. Compared to 
them, human life is ―a brief, chancy, and in many ways miserable 
existence‖ (1990, 371). The idea of divinity is equal to the idea of 
human transcendence into an existence without the constraints of 
human life. But gods, unlike humans, are not political beings. As 
Nussbaum observes, this is the feature that separates humans 
from gods on the one hand and from animals on the other: 
―politics is about using human intelligence to support human 
neediness; so to be truly political you have to have both elements. 
Beasts fail on one count, gods on the other‖ (1990, 373). 
Mangala‘s project in The Calcutta Chromosome brings 
together gods, humans and animals, as well as features a kind of 
transcendence. The concept of god in the novel is clearly closer to 
Christ than the Greek gods: Christ, like Mangala, shares the 
human and godly features, has in a sense lived the non-
transcendent life and consequently has understanding of 
suffering and death. Nussbaum sees this dualism as one of the 
most important characteristics of Christianity. After the Greek 
gods, the human dimension of Christianity has ―turned us back 
to our own world with new attention and concern‖ (1990, 375) In 
the novel the relationship between the Goddess of Silence and 
Mangala is characteristically left undefined: it is difficult to say 
whether Silence is the Goddess and Mangala some kind of high 
priestess, or whether they are both realizations, or versions, of the 
same Goddess, sharing godly and human features. Mangala and 
her congregation are also strongly reminiscent of the concept of 
God and the notion of religion as defined by Levinas. I shall 
examine hte novel in relationship with Levinasian philosophy in 
the article in IV.I.  
Although it does not dwell on them, the novel features 
several religious dualistic doctrines (The Calcutta Chromosome 
212). One of them is the Nestorian doctrine that insists on the 
separateness of the human and divine aspects of Christ. Another 
dualistic system mentioned in the novel is the Manichean one. As 
John Thieme observes, in his treatment of dualistic systems like 
Manicheanism, Ghosh goes beyond the usual scope of 
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postcolonial theory (see eg. Abdul Jan Mohamed) which typically 
holds that Manicheanism represents Western discourse that 
constructs binary relationships in which the colonial subject is 
always the inferior of the two participants. Thieme reminds us 
that originally Manicheanism was heretic according to the 
Augustinian theology, which was monistic and denied the 
separate existence of evil besides the omnipresence of God. 
Consequently, Thieme interprets the function of dualistic systems 
(including Manicheanism) in the novel to be one of ―an Eastern 
challenge to the exclusiveness of Western discourses that deny 
the other‘s capacity for utterance‖ (Thieme 2000, 286). This is 
consistent with silence as religion in the narrative, as well as with 
the discursive omnipresence of the Western history of science. 
These religious doctrines surface in the context of the 
archaeological excavations conducted by the Hungarian Countess 
Pongrácz, who has become the follower of the teachings of 
Valentinus. In the novel the divine and human features of 
Mangala do not seem to be distinct, and they certainly are not 
antagonistic: she is represented equally as a god and a human 
being in the narrative. The narrative also links Mangala and her 
initiates with an ancient Valentinian cult and its version of 
cosmology, ―in which the ultimate deities are the Abyss and the 
Silence, the one being male and the other female, the one 
representing mind and the other truth‖ (The Calcutta Chromosome 
212). Valentinus was the gnostic philosopher from Alexandria 
who brought dualistic religious beliefs to Rome in the second 
century A.D.  
In addition to questions of ethically transcending the 
borders between gods and sciences, or religions and scientific 
methodologies, or silence and knowledge, the novel presents the 
description of parallel realities and social spaces as a means of 
forming connections over differing realties and ways of 
being/living. Parallel realities and space come to the fore for the 
first time in The Shadow Lines, where different spatial and 
temporal dimensions intertwine in the narrator‘s mind and 
narrative. I have already examined the narrator‘s personal 
concept of city-space in that novel. In The Calcutta Chromosome, 
space comes through predominantly as social space. On one 
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level, the novel narrates connections across the various class 
differences of the Calcutta of the 1990s, at the same time 
providing meticulous descriptions of the various homes, or 
‗conditions of inhabitance,‘ of the characters. In the following, I 
look at these themes of parallel realities and social spaces by way 
of introduction to the novel. The actual article (IV.4.) concentrates 
more on the problematic of silence as knowledge and knowledge 
as silence, as it examines the way in which this novel ethically 
subverts and dismantles the ways in which modernist discourses 
have set the world for us. 
 
II.4.1. Parallel realities and social space 
 
 In The Calcutta Chromosome, the World Wide Web takes on the 
function of weaving as the creator of connections. The Web and 
the railway stations, on which people keep appearing and 
disappearing, function as crossing points between different, 
albeit parallel, realities. When in In an Antique Land the researcher 
(re)constructs the story and identity of the slave Bomma from 
ancient textual fragments that have been dispersed around the 
museums of the world, Antar in this later novel is going through 
the paraphernalia of everyday human life with his computer, 
Ava. Ava finds a battered ID card that it fails to recognize. This 
elusive trace leads to Murugan, who in turn has found 
traces/fragments of the secret group he is trying to find. The 
problematics of how to narrate what these fragments, or traces, 
represent in a discourse that by its nature excludes its target of 
representation is in the background of both novels. 
The two networks of railroads and the World Wide Web 
connect spaces, as well as dimensions of reality. The places where 
people enter or exit these two systems are railway stations and 
personal computers (PCs). Both of these networks also ‗host‘ 
different dimensions of reality, as becomes evident in the writer 
Phulboni‘s story of the small and empty Renupur station with its 
siding that runs parallel to the main line, or at the ending of the 
novel, where a crowd of voices appears from Antar‘s computer to 
help him into another reality. The significant railway stations in 
the narrative, in addition to the already mentioned Renupur, are 
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Sealdah Station in Calcutta and Penn Station in New York. 
People are seen appearing or disappearing at these stations all 
through the novel. Railway stations are also places that all kinds 
of people visit, as is evident from the motley group of regulars in 
the doughnut shop at Penn Station. As put by Martin Leer, they 
also function like ―a kind of real-world Internet portals‖ (Leer 
2001, 55). And they seem to share some features of Internet chat-
sites, with people gathering in the cafes, or doughnut shops, to 
gossip. 
The scene that most apparently features the existence and 
overlapping of parallel realities is the story relating Phulboni‘s 
experiences in the Renupur station. The story itself, although 
thematically an essential part of the novel as a whole, appears 
somewhat separate from it on the narrative level. The varied 
influences behind the story include the Indian tradition of 
‗railway stories,‘ examined by Leer with specific reference to The 
Calcutta Chromosome (Leer 2001); a story by Rabindranath Tagore, 
translated by Ghosh as ―The Hunger of Stones‖ (in Ghosh 2002); 
The Signalman, a story by Charles Dickens; and the stories by 
Paneshwarnath Renu.6 In Phulboni‘s story the mysterious 
Laakhan, who functions as the intermediary between alternative 
realities, appears in the station where Phulboni is sleeping. He 
has come to signal in a train from another reality with his lamp. 
Phulboni, like Grigson before him, follows the signal lamp and is 
almost killed by the train that suddenly appears from the dark on 
the rusty and overgrown siding. As Leer points out, railroads in 
India have not obliterated regional differences, but they have 
created new ways of passage that enable a ‗Laakhan‘ to board a 
train at a certain station and appear as ‗Lutchman‘ at another 
station when leaving the train. This makes the person in question 
harder to pin down for the authorities (Leer 2001, 58). But clearly 
here railroads and stations also provide a passage, or mode of 
connection, between parallel dimensions of reality.  
The overlapping of these realities is apparent on at least 
two more occasions, which both happen to people who have had 
                                                 
6 See Chambers (2009) for clarification of the complex intertextual relationships 
behind this ‗story inside a story‘.  
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malaria, and which have to do with sleeping and/or feverish 
hallucinations: when he receives a phone call from Tara/Mrs 
Aratounian/Mangala (responding to the future, 1990s and 1890s 
embodiments respectively), Antar has the feeling that she is 
actually in the same space with him (The Calcutta Chromosome 
223-4). On another occasion, Murugan has a strange dream in 
which a test tube is broken when it falls onto the floor. He wakes 
up and finds on the floor ―an inch-long shard of thin glass, 
probably from some kind of tube‖ (The Calcutta Chromosome 158). 
In a similar vein, John Thieme sees the novel‘s ―near-repetition of 
variant forms of the same situation‖ (eg. Phulboni and Grigson 
both following the lantern and almost getting killed by the train, 
or the versions of Phulboni‘s story (The Calcutta Chromosome 228)) 
as destroying the idea of essentialist discursive versions of events 
(Thieme 2004, 265). Leer sees this as an instance of a 
chronotopological switch in the narrative that allows for ―stories 
to coexist on different levels as each others‘ ghosts – as happens 
both in genetic processes and in cyberspace‖ (Leer 2001, 59). 
Consequently, this delineation of parallel realities/spaces in The 
Calcutta Chromosome is also evident at the level of narrative 
strategy, which is in this respect reminiscent of the narration of 
The Shadow Lines (especially the scene in the cellar examined in 
section II.2.1.). 
As Suchitra Mathur points out, the congregation of silence 
performs its rituals and other actions in what could be described 
as intermediate spaces: ―the outhouses, anterooms, ramshackle 
houses under construction, and private apartments, where the 
actual work of ―interpersonal transference‖ takes place, are 
neither completely outside the dominant socio-political structure, 
nor completely controlled by it‖ (Mathur 2004, 133). A neat 
depiction of the paradoxical closeness of the 
public/dominant/visible and secret/ethical/invisible spaces is 
evident in the scene where Murugan finds the clay figurine in the 
refuse area behind the memorial arch of Ross. The figurine 
occupies the same space as the arch: it is actually hidden inside 
the memorial arch, albeit at its back, in a small hole which is 
practically imperceptible. Again, this seems to imply that these 
‗images,‘ the vast memorial arch denoting visible political 
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discourse and the tiny figurine referring to invisible ethical 
reality, represent synchronous dimensions of reality that exist in 
the same space, as was the case with the Renupur siding and the 
main railway line. 
The novel also thematizes aspects of space other than the 
parallel existence of dimensions of reality and their crossing 
points. Khair has commented on the "shrinkage" of space in 
Indian literatures in English that goes for both social and 
geographical meanings of the word:  
 
The shrinkage of space lies not only in Babu fictions‘ self-
confinement to middle-class areas of experience and the 
privileging of bourgeois and/or cosmopolitan – especially 
Babu-cosmopolitan – realities […]. On a higher level of 
abstraction, it marks the coalition of India and even Indian 
realities abroad into a homogeneus space of narration 
which, partly with the help of a stylized (and staged) 
language, denies the distances between these forcibly 
coalesced spaces. (2001, 324) 
 
I have already examined Ghosh‘s representation of space in the 
context of The Shadow Lines. In The Calcutta Chromosome, his 
narration is also acutely aware of problems of representing space, 
geographically as in his second novel, but, as noted above, 
primarily socially. Geographically, the novel covers a wide area 
of space. Countries as diverse as the USA, India, Egypt and 
Sudan (Africa), Hungary, Sweden and Finland (Europe), and the 
Soviet Union and Armenia are mentioned. The novel also 
features characters coming from these areas, one of the most 
exotic of these being Madame Salminen, who appears to be a 
Finn. The way the specific discursive, or linguistic, features in the 
characters‘ prosodies are depicted in the text has been examined 
by Khair (2001), whose chapter on the novel is a substantial 
contribution to the research on Ghosh in general. Suffice it to note 
here that each character is given their own discursive space in the 
narrative, transcended by the use of English as the connecting 
language of narration.  
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The diversity of social space in the novel is evident in its 
description of the domestic surroundings of characters belonging 
to various social classes. The apartments of Antar (pp. 14-17), 
Sonali (pp. 95-99), and Urmila (pp. 129-134), as well as the guest 
house of Mrs. Aratounian (pp. 79-81) and the estate of Romen 
Haldar (pp. 185-188) are all described in detail, while even a 
glimpse of a British bungalow from early twentieth century India 
is provided. It is perhaps significant that much of the narrative 
happens in the private spaces of peoples‘ homes, in addition to 
the ‗intermediary‘ spaces occupied by Mangala‘s group 
(outhouse, construction site, etc.). One of the few decidedly 
public places in the novel, besides railway stations, is the 
Rabindra Sadan auditorium, where Murugan meets Urmila and 
Sonali and where Phulboni is voicing his desperate plea to 
become included in the congregation of Silence and in the 
approaching ‗crossing‘. 
Antar, who lives alone and works from home, lives in a 
future suburban area of New York. The building he lives in has 
previously been lively, full of rented private apartments, but is 
now being increasingly taken over by various businesses that use 
it for storage space. Antar is glad to get out after his day of work, 
―to step out of that bleak, cold building, encaged in its scaffolding 
of rusty steel fire escapes; to get away from the metallic echo of 
its stairways and corridors‖ (The Calcutta Chromosome 14). Sonali 
is a well-to-do film star and reporter, who obviously would not 
have to work for money. She lives alone in a new expensive, 
upper-class neighbourhood, but, although clearly a 
representative of upper classes, she shares her private space with 
a boy from the ‗coolie‘ classes. The gap-toothed boy (the future 
embodiment of Laakhan/Haldar) is not strictly speaking a 
servant, but does some cleaning and cooking in compensation for 
rent. Sonali‘s apartment is expensive but without taste: it is 
characterized as ―grotesque‖ with its ―marble floors, the ornate 
gilt mirrors on the walls, the tall palms in the corners, in their 
polished brass planters. It wasn‘t like anything you expected to 
see in Calcutta, except in a five-star hotel.‖ (The Clacutta 
Chromosome 95) Urmila, who is a young and ambitious reporter, 
lives with her extended family in a relatively poor, lower middle-
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class conditions. There is not enough space in the apartment, and 
Urmila‘s mother keeps pressing her to get married and stay at 
home, instead of acting like a modern single working woman. 
Urmila is supposed to be the one taking care of all the daily 
household tasks, in addition to her work as a reporter. She sleeps 
on a campbed in the corridor outside the cockroach-infested 
kitchen. And Haldar, who has a relationship with Sonali, is a rich 
developer, who owns a mansion with a pillared portico. Finally, 
there is the 1990s embodiment of Mangala, the old Mrs. 
Aratounian, who has turned her nursery into a guest-house. The 
guest-house is on Robinson Street, which is ―lined with large 
modern blocks of flats and a few old-fashioned colonial 
mansions.‖ Aratounian‘s guest-house is ―a massive four-story 
edifice, studded with graceful columned balconies‖ (The Calcutta 
Chromosome 80). 
In the novel the scale of ‗houses‘, which range from derelict 
outhouses and ramshackle construction sites via colonial 
mansions to modern estates and apartments, reflects the wide 
social scale and diversity of its characters and the Calcuttan 
society as a whole. This disrupts the dominant method of 
depicting social life as pertaining to middle-class circumstances 
in Indian English fiction (see Khair 2001). The connections the 
narrative forms between these characters from widely different 
backgrounds would be unusual in real life. But behind these 
connections functions the chromosome, which in this context 
implies the ethical reaching across differences of class and other 
qualifiers of social position. Whatever the real-life credibility of 
the relationships established in the novel, it clearly does not 
belong to the brand of Indian fiction in English that concentrates 
on the description of the social spaces and ideologies of the 
middle-classes, or of the cosmopolitan ‗babu‘ experience, 
delineated by Khair. 
At the level of narrative technique, the novel is a mixture, 
which forms connections between literary genres. The most 
obvious elements deployed in it come from the genre of science 
fiction. Chambers characterizes the novel as falling within the 
general definition of science fiction on account of its mixture of 
fantastic and real. There are also theories borrowed from current 
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scientific thinking, such as genetics and cloning technologies, and 
these are used to support the main impossible premise of the 
narrative: the idea of interpersonal transference (Chambers 2003, 
59). But there are also elements of cyberpunk, and of the 
Victorian and Edwardian variants of detective stories, as well as 
features of what Khair describes as ―a central genre of babu 
adolescence.‖ According to Khair, this is ―the tradition of the 
three Hs: Holmes, Hitchcock and the Hardy Boys‖ (see Khair 
2001, 327) that has been common among the babu classes of 
India. However, in the novel these narrative techniques are put to 
a use that differs from that of their original context and function. 
As an example of this, Khair has listed some of the differences 
between The Calcutta Chromosome and cyberpunk as a genre. I 
shall briefly repeat some these differences here: 
 
For one, Ghosh‘s vision of the future, unlike that of 
cyberpunk, is not that of a dystopia. Second, Ghosh‘s 
cyberspace is an appendage of lived life, not its substitute. 
[…] Third, cyberspace is not central to Ghosh‘s narration: 
humans are. Technology is not a fetish for the lack of 
humanity. The contacts established through computers are 
human contacts, not disembodied data. […] Ghosh‘s 
narration of subaltern subversion, in its physical enactment 
and strong social consciousness, also saves his novel from 
becoming the sort of ‗consumer-oriented, technologically 
dependent libertarianism‘ that cyberpunk often seems to be. 
(Khair 2001, 331-332) 
 
The future in the narrative certainly represents an ethical utopia 
in the Levinasian sense of reaching the ethical interpersonality, 
rather than any kind of dystopia. Indeed, it seems that Ghosh 
uses the cyberpunk elements in his narrative to create a society 
based on establishing agency and connections where they have 
not traditionally been discerned. The purpose of the article on 
this novel is to show that these elements (the chromosome and 
the way it works and is transmitted) serve to transform the 
power-relationships among social classes and genders ethically, 
and eventually even to transcend the limits of the discursively 
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constructed totality of the self into a silent society based on 
ethical relationships. 
 
II.5. The Glass Palace 
 
Leaving the intense introspections evident in The Shadow Lines for 
the sweeping horizons of historical epic, The Glass Palace (2000) 
describes the histories of the teak and the rubber trade, the 
Burmese royal family, the British Indian Army, the Indian 
National Army and the overall joined history of India, Burma 
and Malaysia from 1880s to 1990s. As is customary of Ghosh, 
these histories are conveyed by characters stemming from 
varying social backgrounds. This time, the characters in general 
come through as caricatures of the ideologies they represent. The 
stock of characters includes among others the rapacious and 
opportunistic businessman Rajkumar; Uma, the housewife who 
turns into an idealist activist; the Western-trained middle-class 
bureaucrat The Collector; the inward-turned humanist 
photographer Dinu and the happy-go-lucky (to begin with) 
soldier, Arjun. The physical characteristics of these characters 
conform to the ideologies they represent. 
After the generic inventiveness and technical brilliance of 
the preceding two novels (In an Antique Land & The Calcutta 
Chromosome) this fifth novel follows straightforward linear 
narration in line with the classic realist historical novel. The Glass 
Palace is epic, like his latest novel, The Sea of Poppies (2008), and it 
is written in straightforward realist narration, like The Hungry 
Tide (2004) that followed it. This seems to signal a shift in Ghosh‘s 
narrative technique. There is a conversion into a strikingly placid 
style after the linguistic fireworks of The Calcutta Chromosome, 
which abounds in differing narrative styles and variations that 
indicate the idiosyncratic features of the parlances of the various 
characters. This has been commented on by Shameem Black, who 
sees this new style as an instance of a ―flattened aesthetic‖ meant 
to make the linguistically diverse characters sound alike. This 
allows different readers to imagine linguistic difference for 
themselves without the confusing markers of sociocultural 
difference in the text (Black 2010, 166). I would say that this 
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change in narrative style corresponds to a change in the emphasis 
of concern from the narrative appropriation of the target of 
representation to that of readerly openness. The meticulous 
fidelity to the socio-cultural varieties of English of the earlier 
novel has transformed into a simplified and minimalistic mode of 
writing, allowing the implied readers from differing backgrounds 
to form an imaginative understanding of the text. Thereby the 
Western reader, for instance, is not continuously distracted by the 
sociocultural signifiers of Burmese, Hindustani, Tamil, Bengali or 
Japanese that form the list of prevalent implied languages in the 
novel. 
Black has calculated that the narration of the novel 
documents the language choices of its characters on over seventy-
five occasions (2010, 172). She also observes that these allusions 
are in many cases compiled in a manner that assures the reader of 
their possibility in real life. Consequently, in a scene unfolding 
for instance between a Westernized Bengali and a Malayan 
Tamil, it is made clear that the conversation proceeds in the 
lingua franca of either Hindustani or English (Black 2010, 173). 
This highlights Ghosh‘s rejection of popular means for 
representing sociolinguistic amalgamation in novels, such as 
magic realism and chutneyed English, or mixed argot, used by 
Salman Rushdie. 
The novel presents all the languages filtered through it 
according to a consisted method that Ghosh and his editor 
developed together. When a foreign word appears in the text for 
the first time, it is printed in italics. The subsequent instances of 
the same word are printed in a typeface similar to the rest of the 
English prose. In most instances, the first appearance of a foreign 
word is either explained or is understandable from the context. 
The later instances of the same word are free of any explanatory 
material. As a consequence, the bits and pieces of foreign 
languages are smoothly incorporated into both visual and 
narrative registers of the novel after their first appearance. As 
Black concludes, this method of writing ―refrains from 
privileging any single foreign language and opens up English 
equally to all of their claims on expressive power‖ (Black 2010, 
175). Through this method Ghosh tries to ethically alleviate the 
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social and political power-relationships between different 
languages and to make his narrative accessible to as many 
multiple readers as possible. 
The novel proceeds mainly through the examination of 
various ideas through discussions, in which differing ideologies 
are pitted against each other in an ethical manner that prioritises 
or vindicates none of them. Yet such juxtapositioning brings into 
view the pros and cons of each way of seeing the world more 
clearly and reaches towards a synthesis of viewpoints where each 
view is allowed to retain its voice and stance while they are 
brought into a meaningful relationship with each other. The 
debates address, among other things, nationalism, which is one of 
the major concerns in this novel. The discussions are not 
superfluous to the narrative; they cannot be over-looked in 
favour of the actual story line. In The Glass Palace, meaning lies 
not in individual utterances, but in their dialogical negotiations, 
the emphasis being on the manifold entirety of the plurality of 
viewpoints. The stances of most of the major figures become 
gradually modified during the course of the narrative through 
mutual interaction. Themes like theory and experience, duty and 
emotion etc., tend to become interwoven to muddle the borders 
between polemics and praxis.  
Between the discussions the reader finds meticulous 
descriptions of the practical procedures of the teak and rubber 
trade, and descriptions of the private lives of the various 
characters. The impact of colonial commerce (the trade in teak, 
rubber and petroleum) and the spreading of Western consumer 
goods and technology (anthropological interest in cameras, cars 
and aeroplanes) come through in meticulous detail, while the 
narrative charts the vicissitudes of four families over four 
generations. The intersecting lives of the Burmese Royal family, 
the family of the business man and timber merchant, Rajkumar, 
and the families of Saya John and Uma Dey are woven together 
from previously unaddressed angles on the interconnected 
histories of India, Malaysia and Burma. The action in the novel is 
centred in Burma, but it features diasporas to India, the eastern 




Among the many debates (e.g. about colonialism and 
women, Gandhi and the Ghadar party, Congress vs. the anti-
Fascist position on the Second World War etc.) the one that is 
most resonant relates to the moral dilemma of the Indian officers 
in the British Army, some of whom later deserted to form the 
INA ( Indian National Army). The article on the novel (IV.5.) 
examines more closely the way in which these discussions 
function, while the existential problem of the Indian officers in 
the British army is examined in the following sub-section. This 
problematic situation was largely created by the disabling 
discursive self-alienation brought about by the colonial 
discourses. 
 
II.5.1. Self-alienation and totalitarianism – colonial and 
totalitarian discourses 
 
One of the central themes in The Glass Palace is the way colonial 
discourses (primarily the military discourse) have moulded the 
subaltern identity and resulted in severe alienation. Self-
alienation is apparent in the characters of the soldier, Arjun, who 
has been moulded into a war-machine in the hands of British 
military discourse and in the character of the Collector, a Britain-
trained colonial administrator. Both these characters are 
destroyed: they end up in a dead end in their existential 
moorings and kill themselves. Arjun, the more prominent of 
these figures, can initially express himself only within the 
discourse of the military culture. As he finally realizes his 
condition as a puppet of this colonial discourse and manages to 
create some distance from it, he is left with nothing. He has 
nowhere to place his allegiances, so to speak, no language that 
would help him build a new self with other affiliations. This is 
consistent with Radhakrishnan‘s statement, introduced in the 
section on In an Antique Land, that in the colonial context, the 
subjectivity problematic is both urgent and morbid: people have 
to adopt an alien epistemology to develop a self-understanding. 
Further, the discursively colonized people are alienated from 
their prerogative to make truth claims: their truth claims 
inevitably come ―from the Self of the dominant West‖ in the 
66 
 
discourse of the West (Radhakrishnan 2003, 14). Arjun becomes 
the victim of the discursive and political component of his 
subjectivity, which in the colonial context is often strong enough 
to annihilate the imaginary ethical side of human existence that is 
neede to balance the forces that mould us. 
Arjun does finally recognizes this self-alienation, but his 
acts of self-assertion result in failure. Arjun‘s self-understanding, 
his image of himself, is radically altered through a discussion 
with his batman, Kishan Singh. Kishan Singh talks about the fear 
that makes the two of them hide as they do at that very moment: 
is it the fear of the Japanese or the British? Or is it the fear of 
themselves, the fear of the shadow of the gun instead of the gun 
itself. The allusion here is to the British military forces and the 
British Indian Army as the ‗shadow‘ of these. Like the characters 
in The Calcutta Chromosome, Arjun is almost delirious with fever, 
and ends up having hallucinatory visions that sadly reveal to him 
a reality he did not know existed.  
 
For a moment, it seemed to Arjun that Kishan Singh was 
talking about something very exotic, a creature of fantasy: a 
terror that made you remould yourself, that made you 
change your idea of your place in the world—to the point 
where you lost your awareness of the fear that had formed 
you. The idea of such a magnitude of terror seemed 
absurd—like reports of the finding of creatures that were 
known to be extinct. (The Glass Palace 430) 
 
Arjun then concludes that the difference between officers and 
other ranks was that the common soldiers had no way of 
reaching and comprehending the instincts that made them act. 
They had no linguistic means of shaping their self-awareness, no 
access to the ethical. Therefore their fate was to remain strangers 
to themselves, always at the mercy of the directions of others. But 
in the same instant he arrives at this conclusion, the topsy-turvy 
way he has conceived of himself and his servant suddenly dawns 




He had a sudden, hallucinatory vision. Both he and Kishan 
Singh were in it, but transfigured: they were both lumps of 
clay, whirling on potters‘ wheels. He, Arjun, was the first to 
have been touched by the unseen potter; a hand had come 
down on him, touched him, passed over to another; he had 
been formed, shaped—he had become a thing unto itself—
no longer aware of the pressure of the potter‘s hand, 
unconscious even that it had come his way. Elsewhere, 
Kishan Singh was still turning on the wheel, still unformed, 
damp, malleable mud. It was this formlessness that was the 
core of his defence against the potter and his shaping touch. 
(The Glass Palace 430-31) 
 
Here the decidedly discursive power-mechanisms of British 
colonialism in identity formation are represented through the 
metaphor of image or vision. The image of the potter‘s thumb 
(the colonial discourse) and the clay (the colonial subject) is 
recurrent in Ghosh‘s novels, but nowhere else is it applied to the 
effect it orchestrates in this passage. Arjun begins to realize that it 
is in fact he, not his servant, who has ingeniously and 
inconspicuously been formed (or, as he later reflects, de-formed) 
by the British military and other discourses without him noticing 
the process, which Kishan Singh has actually been capable of 
resisting. Arjun finds himself at a loss: 
 
He had never thought of his life as different from any other; 
he had never experienced the slightest doubt about his 
personal sovereignty; never imagined himself to be dealing 
with anything other than the full range of human choice. 
But if it were true that his life had somehow been moulded 
by acts of power of which he was unaware—then it would 
follow that he had never acted of his own volition; never 
had a moment of true self-consciousness. Eveything he had 
ever assumed about himself was a lie, an illusion. And if 





Arjun finally decides to place his loyalties not with the Japanese 
like his friend Hardy, but with India, and joins the Indian 
National Army. After the Allied forces win the decisive victory 
over the Japanese, the last remnants of INA continue fighting in 
the jungles of Burma. Arjun is with these last remaining soldiers 
when Dinu meets him in a deserted village. When Dinu wonders 
why the INA is still fighting although the Allied forces have 
beaten the Japanese, Arjun answers that he did not join the 
Japanese, but the Indian army, which still has a cause for fighting 
the Allied forces.  
When Dinu observes that they have no hope, Arjun‘s 
answer is desperate: 
 
‗Did we ever have a hope?‘ he said. ‗We rebelled against an 
Empire that has shaped everything in our lives; coloured 
everything in the world as we know it. It is a huge, indelible 
stain which has tainted all of us. We cannot destroy it 
without destroying ourselves. And that, I suppose, is where 
I am…‘ (The Glass Palace 518) 
 
This scene, implying that the monster of the Empire will live on 
inside its creations which therefore have to be destroyed is one of 
the most hopeless in Ghosh‘s whole oeuvre. Arjun feels that he 
and the likes of him must die in order to completely destroy the 
Empire. For Dinu, Arjun‘s way of thinking represents ―the 
greatest danger.‖ In his view, Arjun chooses the stand where ―in 
resisting the powers that form us, we allow them to gain control 
of all meaning; this is their moment of victory: it is in this way 
that they inflict their final and most terrible defeat‖ (The Glass 
Palace 518-19). This reflects Ghosh‘s view on language and 
discourse as dangerous at large: they define their objects in 
certain ways, and their ingenuous processes of definition and 
knowledge production are very difficult to escape from. This is 
why the transcending of cultural and ideological definitions, or 
even the whole dimension of discursively constructed 
knowledge, through ethically formed personal imaginary 
identifications is so important in his narratives. As Ghosh has 
observed, Indians have to cope with ―the absolute fact of defeat 
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and the absolute fact of trying to articulate defeat to yourself and 
trying to build a culture around the centrality of defeat‖ (Ghosh 
in Aldama 89). Ghosh is here referring to the tremendous power 
of the discourses of modernity on identity formation in the 
colonial context. This could be extended to cover the failure of 
India as a whole under the modernist discourse of nationalism. 
This can, then, be seen as an instance of the pessimistic mood that 
tends to haunt the literatures stemming from the tradition of the 
Bengali Renaissance. 
The novel also reacts to the existence of totalitarian regimes. 
The military regime in the modern state of Myanmar comes 
under scrutiny towards the end of the novel, when Jaya goes to 
Myanmar to search for Dinu, who has opened a photo studio 
there. The limited scope of the discursive reach of the regime is 
nicely illustrated in the scene where Daw Thin Thin Aye goes to 
meet the government censor who has read a story written by her. 
The officer tells her that she does not know how to write 
Burmese. He complains that he has spent a lot of time correcting 
the manuscript, which is now full of red pencil marks. After 
pronouncing that it is not his job to teach people how to write, he 
tells Daw Thin Thin Aye to take her paper and leave. In the bus, 
the perplexed writer takes a look at the manuscript: ―His 
vocabulary, she realized, was that of a child; he was barely 
literate. He had run his pencil over everything he hadn‘t 
understood – puns, allusions, archaisms‖ (The Glass Palace 536). 
The implication here is, of course, that in addition to occupying a 
very narrow discursive-ideological space, the representatives of 
the government discourse are not interested in finding out about 
things that are beyond them: they clearly presume that the way 
they see things is the only correct way. There is nothing else to 
understand: everything else is banality. 
 In a manner reminiscent of the silent group in The Calcutta 
Chromosome, the people at the meetings Dinu arranges in his 
studio communicate outside the discursive world of the regime 
and therefore the spies sent to the meetings cannot understand 
what is going on. In both cases, then, subaltern agency exists, and 
can only exist, in an ethical dimension outside the discursive 
reality of the hegemonic group. But there are obvious situational 
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differences between these groups. Whereas the silent group in the 
earlier novel is trying to escape the ideology of western 
modernity and its imperialistic-scientific discourse, the people 
gathering at the photo studio are trying to avoid a brutal military 
regime which has turned everything into politics. As a 
consequence of this superficial view of reality, the regime cannot 
react to things beyond political conspiracies and organizational 
matters. These, on the other hand, it sees everywhere, which has 
led to a preposterously extensive system of control.  
Consequently, the ideology of western modernity with its 
inherent scientific and colonialist discourses seems to be a far 
more complex construction to resist or overcome than the 
oppressive politics of the totalitarian regime in Myanmar, 
although modernity does not have ostensible control over people 
in the manner of the regime. The discourses of modernity shape 
subjects and identities without them noticing it, as was the case 
with Arjun. This ideological system actually destroys Arjun who 
cannot escape its grip and forces Mangala‘s group to act in 
silence and secrecy. Despite its show of military power and 
extreme control over both public and personal sectors, the regime 
does not have the ideological and epistemological depth and 
power of the British colonialism. With its superficial political 
notion of reality it cannot have the kind of ideological machinery 
that enabled the British colonial system to take hold of all 
meaning and produce subjects who were heavily dependent 
upon it (cf. Arjun in the novel). 
 Consequently, the people at Dinu‘s studio are not forced 
to withdraw into complete silence, but they are able to remain in 
the realm of discourse, albeit a different discourse from that of 
the regime. Dinu uses the language of photography and of the 
image as a representative system into which the spies sent by the 
regime have no access: 
 
Today for example, I was talking about Edward Weston‘s 
theory of pre-visualisation … that you must see the truth of 
your subject in your mind … after that the camera is 
incidental, unimportant … If you know the truth of what 
you see, the rest is mere execution. Nothing can come 
71 
 
between you and your imagined desire … no camera, no 
lens …‘ He shrugged, smiling. ‗To that list I could have 
added: No band of criminals like this regime … But I did 
not have to tell them that in so many words … They 
understood what I was saying … they knew … you saw 
how they laughed and clapped … Here in the Glass Palace 
photography too is a secret language.‘ (The Glass Palace 509-
10) 
 
The concept of ―imagined desire‖ as an example of the ethical 
approach towards the alterity of the other shall be examined in 
the article on The Shadow Lines. In this instant, Dinu‘s ethical call 
for personal truths of the mind, achieved through imaginary 
constructions and not filtered through the censorship system and 
narrow political epistemology of the regime must be of 
importance for the citizens of Myanmar. For people living inside 
closed borders with practically no access to foreign media or any 
other outside influences, the desire to know the otherness beyond 
the border is presented as a burning issue. 
Unlike totalitarian military regimes, novels are not closed 
systems, but exist in a relationship with other texts, be they 
fictional or non-fictional. So far, I have paid little attention to 
Ghosh‘s use of intertexts, although these are hinted at in many of 
his novels. An obvious intertext for The Glass Palace would be At 
Large in Burma, the non-fiction piece by Ghosh himself, which 
comprises one of the three texts in Dancing in Cambodia, At Large 
in Burma (1998). This text relates the three times the narrator (a 
Ghosh-persona) has met Aung San Suu Kyi. As intertexts by 
other writers go, The Shadow Lines forms an obvious connection 
with the novella, The Shadow-Line (1917), by Joseph Conrad. The 
relationship between these two shall be looked at in the article on 
the novel in section V.2. In the following section, I shall introduce 
Ghosh‘s sixth novel, The Hungry Tide (2004), through its central 
theme of human alienation from nature. I shall do this in a 
relationship with its intertexts. 
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II.6. The Hungry Tide 
 
The Hungry Tide (2004), features a triangular relationship between 
the Americanized cetologist Piya, the professional translator 
Kanai and the illiterate fisherman Fokir. The setting is the 
Sundarbans, a labyrinthine area of mangrove islands on the Bay 
of Bengal. Also referred to as the tide country, it forms the delta 
of the Irrawaddy river. The mixing of river water with sea water 
and the ecological niches this creates provide Ghosh with 
elaborate metaphors for inter-cultural connections, replacing the 
metaphors of weaving or the World Wide Web and railroads as 
the symbol of connections and the dissolving of binaries. Nature 
and animals (notably dolphins and tigers) are presented as the 
others of human beings, and their way of being and 
communicating is compared to those of humans, who are largely 
presented as inhibited by linguistic totalities that tie them to the 
self without ‗real‘ access to other humans or to nature and 
animals. 
Kanai and Piya arrive in the area where Fokir lives for 
different reasons. Piya comes there to search for river dolphins 
which have previously received little attention within the science 
of cetology. Kanai comes to collect a parcel his late uncle, Nirmal, 
has left him. The parcel appears to contain a diary, excerpts from 
which are sprinkled through the novel. Piya asks Fokir to 
accompany her as a guide in the canals of the area, and Kanai 
goes along to act as a translator between the two. 
All in all, this sixth novel by Ghosh contains most of the 
motifs, themes and narrative strategies to be found in his earlier 
writings. At the level of narrative strategy, the overall 
construction is close to the previous novel, The Glass Palace. The 
text is straightforward realist narration, albeit with much shorter 
chapters than in the previous, more historically oriented novel. 
The narrative also contains several overtly scientific passages, 
going through the history and methods of cetology or explaining 
the structure and functioning of the equipment needed. This 
feature is to be found in every novel by Ghosh and has, in 
addition to offering necessary information, the function of 
placing the factual knowledge production strategy of sciences 
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against the imaginary components of the narrative and creating 
connections between the two. The novel also contains oral tales 
referring to mystic features, exemplified by the story of Bon Bibi, 
the protecting Goddess of the tide country. And there is even the 
mixture of science and myth, exemplified by the lesson Nirmal 
plans for the children of the tide country, explaining the 
formation of the sub-continent through an amalgamation of 
geology and religion. The Hungry Tide also uses the construction 
of multiple views that may be antagonistic but are nonetheless 
given equal status in the narrative. This strategy was used 
especially in The Glass Palace and is in this later novel adopted 
particularly in connection with Kanai‘s late uncle, Nirmal, who is 
described by at least three characters. Concerning the use of 
languages other than English, where Ghosh previously used non-
English words to fill in gaps in the English vocabulary, we now 
find longer phrases or sayings immediately followed by a 
translation into English. 
At the thematic level, Ghosh returns to his fascination with 
what he refers to as ―patterns of work.‖ In his view, ―even the 
most mundane forms of labour can embody an entire 
metaphysic‖ (Ghosh 2002, x). This is most readily observable in 
the characters of Piya and Kanai, but comes through in other 
characters as well as one of the components of their identity. As 
Ghosh has acknowledged, in his earlier works this thematic is 
most prominent in The Circle of Reason and The Glass Palace. In the 
following scene, Kanai compares his desire to understand 
worldviews constructed by foreign languages with his desire for 
Piya, who is standing nearby examining the river through her 
binoculars: 
 
He too had peered into the unknown as if through an 
eyeglass – but the vistas he had been looking at lay deep 
within the interior of other languages. Those horizons had 
filled him with the desire to learn of the ways in which 
other realities were conjugated. And he remembered too 
the obstacles, the frustration, the sense that he would never 
be able to bend his mouth around those words, produce 
those sounds, put sentences together in the required way, a 
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way that seemed to call for the recasting of the usual order 
of things. It was pure desire that had quickened his mind 
then and he could feel the thrill of it even now – except that 
now that desire was incarnated in the woman who was 
standing before him, in the bow, a language made flesh. 
(The Hungry Tide 269) 
 
Kanai‘s ―pattern of work‖, his metaphysics, is strongly tied with 
language and discursive realities to begin with. In his view, 
everything is constructed by language, one just has to try and 
unravel the logics of the different worldviews of the targets of 
interpretation, be they other languages or other people. But the 
problem seems to be that he cannot fully satisfy his desire for the 
other human being through language. This neatly paves the way 
for the ethical ‗experiences‘ transcending language that are 
staged in the novel and examined in detail in the article later 
(V.6.). 
To continue with themes familiar from Ghosh‘s earlier 
novels, The Hungry Tide also includes a scene in which there is an 
attacking mob, although in this novel the mob attacks a tiger 
instead of people of a different religion or nationality (The Hungry 
Tide 290). There is also the scene with the shrine on the island of 
Garjontola representing the hybrid religion of the tide country 
(246), which recalls the equally hybrid shrine and religion the 
narrator of In an Antique Land finds in Mangalore on the west 
coast of India. Also the interest in etymology professed in this 
previous novel is present here. And there is the presence of a 
socialist enterprise in the Sundarban area, first conceived by Sir 
Daniel Hamilton in the 19th century and recreated in the 1970s on 
one of the islands by a group of refugees. There have been 
references to quasi-socialist phenomena in Ghosh‘s novels 
previously, most notably in The Circle of Reason, in which a group 
of people attempt to live without the use of money. 
In The Hungry Tide, this typical ideal utopia sketched by 
Ghosh in all of his novels in different ways is present in the form 
of the recurring socialist movement in the tide country. The first 
occurrence was conceived by the rich Scotsman, Hamilton, who 
himself was a capitalist from head to toe. He buys land in the 
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area from the British officials and welcomes anyone willing to 
work on it. Nirmal describes the idea of the enterprise to the 
young Kanai: 
 
They could not bring all their petty little divisions and 
differences. Here there would be no Brahmins or 
Untouchables, no Bengalis and no Oriyas. Everyone would 
have to live and work together. […] What he wanted was to 
build a new society, a new kind of country. It would be a 
country run by co-operatives, he said. Here people 
wouldn‘t exploit each other and everyone would have a 
share in the land. (The Hungry Tide 51-52) 
 
In this society the value of money would be based on actual 
work, not on value abstracted (or alienated, to use the term of 
Marx) from actual results of work. The project got a good start, 
with the blessings of eminent nationalist figures like Gandhi and 
Thakur, but after Hamilton‘s death it gradually withered away. 
The second attempt in this direction took place in the 1970s, when 
a group of people, originally refugees from what was now 
Bangladesh, moved to one of the islands. These people had been 
promised refuge in India, but instead they had been placed in 
prison-like camps somewhere in central India. They escaped and 
found their way to the tide country after what could be described 
as a long refugee march inside India. The first attempt can, with a 
slight stretch of imagination, be seen as modelled on the way in 
which Western states have been known to impose their concept 
of democracy on the so called third world countries. After the 
introduction of the idea, people have been left on their own after 
which the structure has collapsed. But the second attempt 
described in the novel has not been conceived by an outsider, but 
is the genuine outcome of the desires of the people themselves, 
an instance of subaltern agency, as it were. Sadly, these people 
have chosen as their area an island which the government has 
assigned as a nature reserve. The events lead to the massacre of 
the inhabitants of the island, which emphasizes the theme of the 
relationship between humans and nature. It seems that these 
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people are ranked below trees and animals in the government‘s 
hierarchy. 
Ghosh continues his characteristic dismantling of totalities 
and categories, this time using the imagery of nature to 
emphasize the heterogeneous and constantly changing character 
of human societies on the one hand and the eternally 
unchangeable cycles of history on the other. The Sundarbans area 
is seen as an intermediate border zone between land and sea, 
where river water mixes with sea water producing peculiar life 
environments. The environment also leads to animal behaviour 
not found elsewhere and consequently not predictable through 
previous findings of science. The relationship between man and 
nature is also altered. Where nature is usually moulded, utilized 
and exploited by humans, in the Sundarbans there is very little to 
mould and the accomplishments of people are every now and 
then washed away by huge tidal waves or tsunamis. Animals too 
are hostile to man, especially the tigers, which are strongly 
thematized in the narrative. But animals are also described as 
‗working‘ together with people, as in the case of dolphins helping 
fishermen to round up fish for mutual benefit (The Hungry Tide 
168-169), or represented as equally migrant or equally massacred 
by wars as human beings (The Hungry Tide 305-307). 
In addition to varying themes introduced in the previous 
novels and adapting them to the new scenario, this latest 
narrative also continues the development of themes that have 
been central through all the novels by Ghosh. This time, the quest 
for connections in the narrative covers the relationship of human 
beings to nature and animals. Another strong theme linked with 
that of nature and animals is the examination of the linguistic and 
epistemological alienation of humans from their circumstances 
and from one another. The capability of language to represent 
emotions and the encounter with the other is increasingly in 
doubt in recent work by Ghosh. These functions of language are 
in The Hungry Tide partly replaced by bodily gestures, like facial 
expressions and touching, as well as by a kind of transcendental 
mode of contact that exists beyond discourse. Duino Elegies by 
Rainer Maria Rilke are brought in as an intertextual backup for 
the thematics of human alienation from nature and animals, who 
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are seen as having a deeper connection with the world proper. 
Consequently, the tension between a dimension transcending 
language and an emphasis on textuality and difference is even 
more urgent than in the previous writings of Ghosh. 
Whereas the article on this novel (V.6.) concentrates on 
the breaking of the linguistic ontologies of Piya and Kanai and 
the ethical transcending of human language, which is seen as a 
deceptive framework alienating us from one another and the 
world proper, the following section examines how the use of 
intertexts backs up the central theme of the novel. 
 
II.6.1. Human alienation from nature: intertextual links 
 
The Hungry Tide contains numerous references to the Duino 
Elegies (1923) by Rainer Maria Rilke. The citations from this 
collection of poems (The Hungry Tide 8, 165, 182, 206, 216, 225, 
275, 278, 287, 360) are usually placed in the excerpts from 
Nirmal‘s diary, which Kanai is reading. The thematic similarities 
between The Hungry Tide and Duino Elegies are quite striking. 
Rilke writes about the alienation of human beings from nature 
and animals. As with Ghosh, one dividing factor seems to be 
language: in Rilke‘s view, humans are not at home in their 
―translated‖ world. However, Rilke‘s idea of nature as something 
unreachable by humans does not come through in the short 
excerpts that are located in Nirmal‘s diary.  
Nirmal is an eccentric character. He is a former radical 
Marxist who ended up as a teacher in the school on one of the 
islands, Lusibari. He is reminiscent of another eccentric teacher, 
Balaram, in The Circle of Reason. Balaram was obsessed with 
Pasteur and phrenology, Nirmal with Rilke and radical Marxism. 
Nirmal tends to interpret Rilke‘s writings of transformation and 
nature as pertaining to socio-political ideals, and is very eager to 
become part of the socialist project beginning in the area, which 
he sees as an instance of revolutionary ‗transformation.‘ His wife, 
Nilima, who runs a hospital and is, in contrast to Nirmal, a very 
pragmatic character, sees her husband as being obsessed by 
politics and revolution. For her, this is the ultimate reason for 
Nirmal‘s interest in the socialist group. But in Kanai‘s opinion, 
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Nirmal is possessed more by words than by politics. In his view, 
it was important for Nirmal to see himself as a historical 
materialist, which for him ―meant that everything which existed 
was interconnected: the trees, the sky, the weather, people, 
poetry, science, nature. He hunted down facts in the way a 
magpie collects shiny things. Yet when he strung them all 
together, somehow they did become stories – of a kind‖ (The 
Hungry Tide 282). Nirmal, then, represents another example of a 
character very much alienated from the world by language: he 
lives in a world translated through stories and fails to interpret 
correctly the practical reality surrounding him. In a similar 
manner to another uncle, Tridib in The Shadow Lines, with whom 
Nirmal also shares certain characteristics, he is destroyed by the 
violent actions of the real world. 
The following excerpts from The Eighth Elegy of Rilke‘s 
Duino Elegies contain most of the key concepts of Ghosh‘s novel: 
 
All eyes, the creatures of the World look out 
into the open. But our human eyes, 
as if turned right around and glaring in, 
encircle them; prohibiting their passing. 
What lies outside, their faces plainly show us. 
Yet we compel even our youngest; force 
each child always to stare behind, at what‘s 
already manifest, and not to see 
that openness which lies so deep within 
the gaze of animals. (1-10) 
 
We never have, not for a single day, 
pure space before us – all its flowers 
opening endlessly: there is ever World. 
We never find that nowhere, free from 
negatives, unsupervised and pure; the place 
which we might breathe and know unendingly, 
and never crave. (15-21) 
 
If they possessed our kind of consciousness 
those steady animals, whose own direction 
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always counters ours, would wrench us around 
to follow where they lead. To animals 
their being is infinite, unknowable; 
and they look out from it, not at themselves. (40-45) 
 
And we, we stay spectators; turned towards 
all things and still transcending none. (74-75) 
 
Rilke‘s message seems to be almost identical to that of the novel. 
Humans are conceived as prisoners of the totalities of self-
generated ontologies that prevent the transcending of the world 
of objects, while for animals the world is infinite. When animals 
perceive the world they can actually see outside themselves, 
whereas people only find themselves in everything they see. For 
the poems, as for the novel, the thematics of vision and seeing 
tend to take the place of language: the excerpts above do not once 
mention language. The novel thematizes language strongly, but 
offers seeing, or vision, as an alternative way of perceiving the 
world. The reference to Piya and Fokir as animals in the 
intentness of their awareness of each other emphasizes the 
infinite and non-linguistic nature of a love relationship: animals 
do not have language and they are conceived as capable of seeing 
beyond themselves to the other in a manner not possible for 
humans who are imprisoned within their linguistic totalities. 
Rilke‘s observing subject is opposed to the world and its 
objects to begin with, but there is nonetheless a sense of perpetual 
contact between everything that exists underlining the poems. 
What the poems aim at is the giving away of one‘s personality in 
front of other forms, be they objects of nature or other humans. 
The personality of the observer can dissolve and he/she can 
transform into other objects, in a sense become the other object or 
person, much in the way in which Kanai becomes Fokir in seeing 
though his consciousness (see the article in section V.6.). In her 
study of Rilke, Priscilla Washburn Shaw detects a quest for ―the 
pure relation,‖ corresponding to a fusion of the same and the 
other: ―There is an almost imperceptible shift away from the 
relationship of self-discipline to realization of the object, away 
from the seeming conflict between the existence of both self and 
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non-self. These distinctions have become fused or obliterated‖ 
(Washburn Shaw 1964, 77). In the narration of Ghosh, the subject 
is constructed precisely through connections with others who, in 
the manner of the self in Rilke‘s poems, encapsulate both other 
people, and, in the case of The Hungry Tide, nature and animals. 
And for Ghosh, like Rilke, the ideal utopia would be a space 
where the lines of division between the self and things outside 
have dissolved.  
In addition to Rilke‘s poems, it may not be too far-reaching 
to search for connections between The Hungry Tide and American 
transcendentalism. Ghosh has acknowledged his admiration of 
Herman Melville, who can be seen as one of the offsprings of this 
Emersonian quest for transcending nature (Ghosh in Sandall 
2004). Of Melville‘s novels Ghosh mentions especially Moby-Dick 
(1851), which has obvious thematic links with The Hungry Tide. 
The search for the whale, which signifies the unreachable and 
unknowable nature in general, is narrated in several discourses in 
a manner reminiscent of the narrative technique of Ghosh that 
creates room for multiple ways of interpreting the world. The 
two searches for the whale and the dolphins symbolize the search 
for the transcending of nature. As Ruland and Bradbury describe 
Moby-Dick, 
 
the book itself constantly multiplies its own language, as it 
conducts its own narrative and linguistic search for the 
meaning of the ―whale.‖ We hear the language of dusty 
scholarship, of scientific cetology, of Christian and classical 
myth and romantic celebration, of voyaging and adventure, 
as the prose seeks a sufficient commensurability. (Ruland & 
Bradbury 1991, 161) 
 
Of the discursive modes mentioned above the narration of The 
Hungry Tide has woven into it the languages of scholarship (in the 
form of etymology), cetology, myth (the story of Bon Bibi), 
adventure and even what could be characterized as romantic 
celebration of the beauty of nature. For Ghosh the multiple 
discourses have to do with the linguistic constructedness of the 
world. Each ―pattern of work‖ and way of life creates its own 
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construction flavoured by the personal character of the 
interpreter. Melville‘s point is very similar, although he does not 
contemplate the functions and character of language to the extent 
that Ghosh does: in Melville‘s view there is no human way to any 
ultimate truth, which means that there can only be different 
interpretations, as becomes evident in Moby-Dick in the chapter 
―The Doubloon,‖ in which every member of the crew interprets 
the coin symbolizing the circle of the world differently. 
The characterization of nature as ultimately hostile is also 
to be found in both novels, although perhaps for different 
reasons. In contrast to the ideas of earlier transcendentalists like 
Emerson, Melville does not see nature as benevolent, but as ―a 
deceitful hieroglyph‖ in which people see their own image. 
People plunge into this image they cannot actually reach, and 
drown in it in the manner of Narcissus. This is very close to the 
effect linguistic totalities have in Ghosh‘s writing: they block the 
outside world so that people only see a reflection of themselves 
when attempting to look outside. People are seen as linguistically 
alienated from nature, which partly explains why it is seen as 
hostile. In addition to this, Ghosh also seems to thematise the 
hostility of nature and its animals in The Hungry Tide partly as a 
counter-force to the hostility people often show towards nature 
and animals, cutting down rainforests or killing animals for 
money. But of course there are other differences. Where 
Melville‘s novel can be aptly described as ―Romantic Faustian 
tragedy of man confronting nature and divine power‖ (Ruland & 
Bradbury 160), Ghosh‘s narrative has more to do with 
confronting the barriers that linguistic ontologies pose between 
people on the one hand and between people and nature on the 
other. The transcending of language does not reveal any divine 
meaning in the Emersonian sense, but makes possible 
connections in a common dimension where the border between 
the self and the other (the other is conceived in the novel both as 
another human being and as nature including animals) has 
vanished. Melville constructs ―a resonant material world which 
would yield its transcendent significance only to the free play of 
suggestive analogy‖ (Ruland & Bradbury 124). The material 
world of Ghosh‘s narratives is always meticulously described, 
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but in The Hungry Tide the transcendent dimension is perhaps 
more thematised by concentrating on the functions of the 
mediator of analogies, language, than the analogies themselves. 
But both novels have as a basic theme the search for something 
beyond the self, something that is conceived as a mystery. 
 
II.7. Other writing by Amitav Ghosh 
 
In 2008, Ghosh‘s latest novel, Sea of Poppies, was published. As it 
forms the first part of a trilogy, the whole of which is yet to be 
written, the novel is not analysed in this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, it merits a short description. The novel comes across 
as an epic saga, and is the first in an Ibis-trilogy Ghosh has been 
planning. The novel is set in northern India and the Bay of Bengal 
in the 1830s, just before the First Opium War. Typically of Ghosh, 
the novel has a large array of characters including Deeti, the 
upper caste wife of an opium addict; Kalua, the low caste ox-cart 
driver with a strong physique; Neel Rattan, the Bengali aristocrat 
and Ah Fatt, a half-Parsi and half-Chinese opium addict. The 
destinies of these characters are intertwined on board the. The 
Ibis sails over the notorious ‗black waters‘ from Calcutta to 
Mauritius. The metaphor of journey, or travel, which is a popular 
one in Ghosh‘s writings, is used to great effect in the narration to 
examine the typical issues which concern Ghosh beginning with 
subaltern destinies leading to colonial injustices – going through 
the large and small ironies of history. 
Ironies of history, be they large or small, are also found 
throughout the non-fiction of Ghosh. It is rather rare for a 
novelist to create as large a body of essays as Ghosh has. 
Whatever his reason for such an extensive engagement in 
journalism and cultural-political commentary, it serves to reach a 
wider public than he would have as a writer of fiction. The essays 
typically form a more ostensibly analytical and politically 
informed background for the more imaginary contents of the 
novels, giving voice to Ghosh‘s academically and journalistically 
oriented interests. Although they are written in a different 
discourse, these cultural-political commentaries are typically 
compiled into the form of stories, searching for a high level of 
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engagement in the reader. The non-fictional writings by Ghosh 
are customarily treated only in passing in academic criticism on 
his works. Such is the case also in this dissertation. In the 
following, I shall very briefly look at the themes covered by 
Ghosh‘s non-fiction publications. 
These themes have been listed as follows by John Hawley 
(2005, 18-19), whose monograph is a good source for an ample 
overview of Ghosh‘s non-fiction. Where there are obvious 
thematical parallels with the novels, I have added the novel/s in 
question to the list: 
- The nuclearisation of India 
- The political crisis that has been evolving in Burma and 
Cambodia (The Glass Palace) 
- The maintenance of cultural heritage (The Circle of Reason, 
In an Antique Land) 
- Pre-European trade between India and Africa (The Circle of 
Reason, In an Antique Land) 
- Fundamentalism (In an Antique Land) 
- Anthropology & economics in local communities (all the 
novels) 
- The diaspora (The Circle of Reason, The Shadow Lines, The 
Glass Palace) 
These themes are spread over the three texts in Dancing in 
Cambodia, At Large in Burma (1998), Countdown (1999), the 
collection of essays, The Imam and the Indian: Prose Pieces (2002) 
and Incendiary Circumstances (2006), which was published after 
Hawley‘s monograph and adds the theme of international 
terrorism to the above list. In the preface to Incendiary 
Circumstances, Ghosh refers to terrorism and violent repression 
and echoes his statement in an earlier essay on the violence that 
followed the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, The Ghosts of 
Mrs Gandhi from 1995:  
 
The deadly logic of terrorism is precisely to invite 
repression: it is thus that it brings into being the social gulf 
on which its existence is predicated. To write carelessly can 
all too easily add to the problem by appearing to endorse 
either terrorism or violent repression. In such incendiary 
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circumstances words can cost lives, and it is only 
appropriate that those who deal in them should pay 
scrupulous attention to what they say. (2006: ix) 
 
Ghosh further evokes the statement by Mahatma Gandhi that 
there is no such thing as a means to an end – means are ends. I 
shall come back to Ghosh‘s technique of representing violence in 
sub-section III.3. For present purposes it suffices to say that in 
Ghosh‘s view, ‗incendiary circumstances‘ of terror and violence 
are no longer a feature of ‗half-formed nations‘ (2006: x) (meaning 
basically third-world, or postcolonial, societies), but have after 
the strikes of 9/11 become typical anywhere in the world. And it 
is here that it should be remembered that not all possible means 
should be permissible to reach the desired end. As for Ghosh as a 
writer, he certainly tries to take into account the influence words 
have in the incendiary circumstances of the contemporary world: 
it has become one of the trademarks of his writing, both in fiction 
and in non-fiction, not to narrate matters into spectacles by being 
too polemical and provocative. 
In his non-fiction, Ghosh in general uses similar strategies 
to those used in his fiction: he conjures up unforeseen 
connections through juxtaposing and interweaving lives of 
‗small‘, or, alternatively, ‗real-life‘, people against the canvas of 
large historical developments. Through this technique, such 
historical persons as, for instance, Pol Pot and King Sisowath 
become represented as having similar backgrounds (Dancing in 
Cambodia). Ghosh‘s engagement with the human condition, 
backed up by its larger global preconditions comes through as a 
style which manages to hold together a global, ecumenical 
perspective while focusing on highly individual, often contested 
or marginalized histories, such as those of King Sisowath and Pol 
Pot, or that of Aung San Suu Kyi, and so forth.  
Ghosh‘s skills as both story-teller and sensitive interpreter 
of historical and political developments is revealed in the way his 
non-fiction narratives effectively counterpoise vignettes of 
human drama that occur in distinctive locales against epic 
backdrops that adumbrate global issues of capitalized ‗History‘, 
without taking away the significance from either. His non-fiction 
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(notably The Imam and the Indian) brings to the fore his deep 
engagement in the political and cultural entanglements typical of 





III. Contexts and Themes 
 
The first two sub-sections here are contextualizing in nature.  The 
first sub-section introduces the theoretical and methodological 
bases for ethical study of literature, before looking at the ways in 
which Ghosh‘s novels are open to an ethical approach. Sub-
section III.2. contextualizes Ghosh‘s writing in the general 
intellectual and political history and climate of the Subcontinent. 
The purpose of the latter half of the section is to continue the 
examination of themes unfolding through the novels of Amitav 
Ghosh. Where section II was structured according to each of the 
six novels covered by this dissertation, sub-sections III.3. and 
III.4. are compiled thematically. The passage on the 
representation of violence (III.3.) centres on The Shadow Lines, 
while the section on narration and silence (III.4.) refers to several 
novels simultaneously.  
Sub-section III.1.1. offers a short introduction to the varied 
field of ethical study of literature by way of looking at its 
theoretical and philosophical starting points. In sub-section 
III.1.2., the theory of the meta-ethical, as developed by Emmanuel 
Levinas, is brought into contact with novels by Ghosh, 
anticipating the theoretical basis of the six core articles of this 
dissertation. My purpose is to show how I have adapted 
Levinas‘s thinking to the analysis of fiction, and to demonstrate 
how literature lends itself to ethically informed analysis. This 
section is loosely based on a previous article (Huttunen 2009). 
Section III.2. explores the cultural and political background 
of Ghosh‘s writing by examining the ways in which ideologies of 
modernism and postmodernism have been adopted among the 
intelligentsia on the Subcontinent. This is done in relationship 
with the political developments in India after independence. 
Although secondary to family as a combining unit, nationalism is 
a prominent theme in Ghosh‘s novels (notably in The Shadow 
Lines and The Glass Palace). This section touches on nationalism as 
a superimposed Western discourse in Indian circumstances, but 
does not linger on this vast topic. 
Violence and its representation are central to Ghosh‘s 
writing and are somehow featured in all his novels. 
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Acknowledging this, section III.3. examines Ghosh‘s depiction of 
communal violence in the subcontinent and the two-dimensional 
way in which he represents both the horror of violence and the 
affirmation of humanity involved in violence through his 
representation of rioting. The power-related political overtones 
carried by language are balanced by an ethical awareness in 
Ghosh‘s fiction. As a result, violence is not straightforwardly 
defined by any singular discourse appropriating the 
phenomenon into its own knowledge production strategies. Its 
presence is acknowledged and it is defined to the extent it has to 
be, but the ethical awareness of the combined impossibility and 
precariousness of an adequate representation of it is also present 
in the narrative. This subsection is also based on a previous 
article (Huttunen 2008a).  
The relationship between narration and silence, examined 
in section III.4., continues the introduction of important themes in 
Ghosh‘s novels. This section examines the way narratives by 
Ghosh stand in relationship to issues such as globalization and 
universality versus particularity, before turning to the ways in 
which the relationship between narration and silence is treated in 
his fiction. In Ghosh‘s writing, the function of silence in 
relationship to discourse and narration varies from a mere lack of 
meaning, or banality, into subversive action unfurling beyond 
discourse in the realm of the ethical. This subsection, again, is 
based on a previous article (Huttunen 2003b).  
 
III.1. Theoretical and methodological starting points 
 
This section aims to quickly chart the diverse terrain of the 
contemporary ethical study of literature beginning from its 
theoretical and methodological starting points. The section begins 
with an overall introduction of ethical studies of literature, while 
trying to situate the present study within this field. The latter part 
of the section moves more specifically to the theme of ethics as it 
comes through in Ghosh‘s writing. The purpose here is to briefly 
examine four of Ghosh‘s novels with the aim of showing how he 
represents the relationship between ethics and language. In 
general, this section has an introductory and contextualizing 
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function. It approaches the main subject of this dissertation and 
the six articles: the ethics of representing the other and the ethics 
of narrative representation in general. It also introduces aspects 
of Levinasian ethics, which spreads over the article section (IV) as 
the combining theoretical principle. 
In Literature, Power and the Recovery of Philosophical Ethics, 
Coady and Miller maintain that  
 
One of the striking features of contemporary literary 
theory, and indeed cultural studies more generally, is what 
might be termed its socio-politicisation of the ethical. 
Literary texts, traditionally viewed as repositories of moral 
and aesthetic insight or challenge, tend now to be seen as 
predominantly ideological constructions, or sites of power 
struggles between social powers of various kinds (Coady & 
Miller 201).  
 
This is indeed characteristic of what is often referred to as the 
‗ethical turn‘ in literary studies. Contemporary ethical criticism is 
closely linked with discussions of otherness at the mercy of 
discursive power. It examines, among other things, questions of 
how to represent otherness in a text, how to respond to the other 
and how to bring the concept of otherness to bear on the 
experience of reading and writing. Much of ethical theory, then, 
concentrates on interpersonal relationships, emphasizing the 
need for solidarity across ontological and epistemological 
divides, while retaining the ultimate alterity of the other. As 
should be evident by now, this dissertation concentrates on the 
representation of otherness and the creation of relationships in 
texts by Amitav Ghosh. And the concept of otherness here 
engulfs other people (both single and as groups), social classes, 
other discourses, other narrative epistemologies and discursive 
formations. Ethics is here conceived as Levinasian meta-ethics — 
it is not to be confused with compiling rules of conduct, or with 
the contemplation on the quality of life. Further, ethics is 
decidedly not the same as morality, a term which in this 




In her pioneering attempt at the application of a clearly 
defined ethical approach to the representation of social 
difference, Shameem Black (2010) examines the problem of how 
to imagine another people without violating the object of 
scrutiny. This problem is central also to this study. Black presents 
the problem of conceptualizing experiences that are well beyond 
one‘s social location as constituting ―a central crisis of 
representation that haunts the academic study of literature‖ as 
well as resonating with ―a wider concern with the ethics of 
encounter in a violently divided world‖ (2). Like Amitav Ghosh 
in his novels, Black in her book concentrates on ―moments when 
subjects seek to represent forms of social difference that have 
been associated with oppression, marginality, or ideologies of 
inferiority‖ (3). 
These kinds of representations were considered 
problematic especially within the postcolonialist, feminist and 
ethnic-minority versions of the late twentieth century literary 
criticism. They were viewed as hegemonic practises creating new 
forms of representational violence even when aiming to redeem 
and activate their object of representation. In this brand of literary 
criticism, novelistic attempts at writing across the borders of 
social difference shadowed by oppression were deemed as 
―complex fantasies that reveal much more about the subject than 
about the object of imagination‖ (Black 2011, 3). The desire to 
know the other is in this kind of criticism seen as a futile romantic 
longing without political significance, leading to forms of self-
deceit in its disguise of seeking the truth and ‗real‘. Ghosh‘s 
novels have received their fare share of this line of criticism (see 
eg. Wisvanathan 1996). 
In Black‘s view, this once relevant critical line has by now 
solidified into a critical meta-narrative, a set of widespread 
critical givens that should be replaced. In her view, ethics as a 
form of responsibility to one‘s object of inquiry—a responsibility 
opposed to hegemonic domination and representational 
violence—offers a feasible ―interpretative lens‖ for the 
examination of social difference. She further characterizes ethics 
―as an open field of possible emancipatory alternatives whose 
contours are continually being imagined‖ (3). Ghosh‘s works fit 
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nicely into her delineation of ―border-crossing fiction,‖ which is 
defined by its representation of the dissonance between subject 
and object of representation on the one hand and the drive to 
transcend this difference on the other. Due to this latter 
aspiration, border-crossing fiction in Black‘s view ―embraces the 
challenge of representation with an intensity that surpasses the 
general concern with alterity at large‖ (4). She sets up three 
criteria for the ethical representation of social difference within 
her model. First, the novels have to show a recognition of the self 
and discourses as socially shaped. Further, they must 
acknowledge that the act of imagining the other demands the 
active reimagining one‘s own social location. And finally, ethical 
border-crossing fiction entails that the self and style renounce the 
aspects of privilege inherent in them and embrace a vulnerability 
in front of the other.  
Consequently, the significant contribution of her book to 
ethical literary criticism lies perhaps not so much in 
methodological innovativeness, as in the fact that she limits the 
scope of her study to a certain brand of border-crossing fiction 
defined on account of its approach to the representation of social 
difference. Furthermore, her chosen writers all work within 
postcolonial, feminist, and ethnic-minority traditions. Amitav 
Ghosh‘s work belongs to this brand of writing on account of the 
socio-cultural circumstances from which it springs, and also 
through its attempts to secure the features of the other and to 
transcend the borders of social difference while acknowledging 
their existence. Accordingly, Black examines The Glass Palace and 
The Hungry Tide as parts of her argument (2010, 167-183 & 183-
199, respectively). Her interpretation of the latter moves along the 
same line as mine in III.1.2. & the article (IV.6.) As became 
evident in the beginning of section II.5., in the context of The Glass 
Palace she concentrates on Ghosh‘s method of representing others 
who would not in reality be speaking English, seeing this earlier 
novel as the starting point for the more radical driving of 
language to its limit apparent in The Hungy Tide. I touch on 
Ghosh‘s treatment of language in my article on the novel (IV.5.). 
In her review of Black‘s book, Chambers claims that she 
―makes too little effort to define her terms or trace their histories‖ 
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(Chambers 2010). She acknowledges the validity of Black‘s 
approach to border crossing, but finds it regrettable that for 
instance national border crossing is barely mentioned, although 
many of the writers have a migrant status. Chude-Sokei (2010) 
observes that Black‘s attempt to include a variety of 
representational strategies represented by the chosen writers 
within a notion of ethics defined as a "planetary" results in 
structural weaknesses.  He claims that the particular political 
differences and the refusal to be contained by ideological 
categories of the writers/novels examined become silenced under 
this overarching planetary model. In general, these writers 
become too forcefully appropriated into Black's new scholarly 
metanarrative for the cultural study of border crossing. However, 
although suspicious of the book‘s overarching theoretical model, 
both Chambers and Chude-Sokei applaude Black‘s treatment of 
individual novels. 
Black‘s goal is to examine how her chosen novels attempt to 
deal with the unresolvable political and philosophical problems 
involved in the representation of the other. In an ethical manner, 
these novels acknowledge the unsolvable nature of these 
problems. Nonetheless, they manifest an ethical responsibility 
towards solving them—a responsibility different writers realize 
in different manner. Instead of the influential meta-narratives in 
postcolonial, feminist, and ethnic-minority theories that have 
presented representations of alterity as forms of discursive 
domination, Black goes on to delineate an approach based on 
―crowded selves‖ and ―crowded styles‖ indicating ―images of 
subjectivity and literary form that work agains familiar forms of 
invasive imagination in their encounters of difference‖ (14). 
Although Black, whose book was published as recently as 
2010, presents her model as new, it shares many philosophical 
and methodological aspects with the varied versions of ethical 
criticism that were developed in the late 1990s. To anticipate the 
kind of criticism levelled at Black on account of her failure ―to 
define her terms or trace their histories‖ (Chambers 2010), I shall 
now turn to the various ways in which the use of ‗the ethical 
interpretative lens‘ has been conceived within what is now 
commonly called the ethical turn in the study of literature. This 
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turn became gradually discernible during the 1990s, had its 
heyday around the turn of the Millennium and is still with us as a 
pervasive undercurrent informing various approaches to the 
study of literature. 
 
III.1.1. Ethical study of literature – a sketch towards a 
discipline 
 
The current field of ethical study of literature brings together 
many varying strands. The first and most prolonged of these is 
the legacy conveyed by the critical traditions that have 
emphasized the moral thematics and basic value commitments of 
literary texts and their implied authors. Of the more recent 
contributions to studies on literary ethics, David Parker‘s Ethics, 
Theory and the Novel (1994) represents a well-informed upgrade of 
an Arnoldian-Leavisite idea of literature as a form of ethical 
reflection. A corresponding tradition in the United States can be 
found in the presence of moral thought from Puritanism to 
transcendentalism and on to pragmatism and beyond. Especially 
the works of transcendentalists such as Emerson or Melville 
provide particularly fruitful ground for more recent currents in 
the ethical study of literature, occupied as they are with the 
search for the unreachable truth beyond different versions 
apparent in the everyday world. Of the longterm ethical 
approaches to literature, quite as pervasive as the vein 
concentrating on the moral thematics and value commitments of 
texts and their authors has been the branch centering on the 
rhetoric of genre. The oeuvre of Wayne Booth, reaching through 
decades and focussing on narrative rhetoric as moral 
imagination, continues to be a frequent point of reference for 
negative and symphatetic critique alike. 
The gradual turning of some philosophers to literature as 
the privileged site for moral and ethical discourse during the 
1980s represents a development that is more recent and more 
pertinent to the contemporary state of affairs within ethical 
literary studies. Richard Rorty, Martha Nussbaum and Alasdair 
MacIntyre are probably the most obvious representatives of this 
line. In what is usually considered her major work, Love’s 
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Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature (1990) Nussbaum 
argues that the rich contextualization of moral reflection found in 
novels (notably in those of Henry James, but in others, too) 
presents an indispensable supplement to the study of moral 
philosophy (125-219). She also notes that ethically aware 
criticism, or ―the organizing questions of moral philosophy‖ 
(169), have been absent from the field of literary studies for 
several decades, pushed aside by the ‗linguistic turn‘ with its 
structuralist and poststructuralist emphasis on language and 
discursivity. Nussbaum voices a call for a kind of Aristotelian 
close relationship between literature and philosophy.7 
Rorty has characterized philosophy as a form of writing 
(1982, 90-109). More recently, he has outlined works of fiction as 
model embodiments of social value (1989, 141-188). In the context 
of arguing for Proust‘s ethical superiority over philosophers like 
Nietszche or Heidegger, Rorty explains that ―novels are a safer 
medium than theory for expressing one‘s recognition of the 
relativity and contingency of authority figures:‖ 
 
For novels are usually about people – things which are, 
unlike general ideas and final vocabularies, quite evidently 
time-bound, embedded in a web of contingencies. Since the 
characters in novels age and die – since they obviously 
share the finitude of the books in which they occur – we are 
not tempted to think that by adopting an attitude toward 
them we have adopted an attitude toward every possible 
sort of person. By contrast, books which are about ideas, 
even when written by historicists like Hegel and Nietzsche, 
look like descriptions of eternal relations between eternal 
objects. (1989, 107-108) 
 
For Rorty, particular practices in particular circumstances are the 
important thing in ethics, instead of universal principles. This 
view of ethical action is apparent in the practices of novelists:  
                                                 
7 A similar call for the importance of novels for moral philosophy and the 
significance of Aristotelian tradition has been put forward by MacIntyre in 




The novelist‘s substitute for the appearance-reality 
distinction is a display of diversity of viewpoints, a 
plurality of descriptions of the same event. What the 
novelist finds especially comic is the attempt to privilege 
one of these descriptions [...]. What he finds most heroic is 
not the ability sternly to reject all descriptions save one, but 
rather the ability to move back and forth between them 
(1991, 74) 
  
This is highly significant for the purposes of this study, as the 
narrative strategies of Ghosh include a heightened awareness of 
the existence of multiple versions of same events (see section IV.1 
on The Circle of Reason). In short, fictive narration ―presents us 
with individuality and diversity alike without any attempt to 
reduce either to the terms of a singular scheme of totality.‖ 
(Gibson 1999, 8). This point is central to my interpretation of 
Ghosh‘s novels: in his writing, novels turn into expressions of the 
ethics of pluralism by intertwining the particular characteristics 
of individual subjects with the characteristics of the surrounding 
society, thereby creating heterogeneous wholes.  
All in all, the contribution of the likes of Nussbaum, 
MacIntyre and Rorty lies not so much in any originality of 
method, as in their turning back to a moral and social value-
oriented approach to literature. From the point of view of literary 
theory, their approach seems dated in its pre-structuralist form. 
The turn to literature may make the philosophers feel that they 
are gaining new ground. But this not so for most literary critics 
and theorists. It is only when the above views on literature and 
ethics are intertwined with post-structuralist views on discourse, 
narration and language in general that a more substantial change 
in ethically aware study of literature takes place. The starting 
points for this coming together of humanism and post-
structuralism (or, more accurately, of ethics and deconstruction) 
in the 1990s is largely due to certain influential shifts in the later 
thinking of the key figures of post-structuralist literary theory, 
Michel Foucault and, more importantly, Jacques Derrida. 
Through this incorporation of ethics into the study of discursive 
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constructions and questions of power inherent in them the 
approach adopted in this dissertation also begins to take form 
more clearly. The rise of the ethics of deconstruction is, by co-
incidence, marked by the ‗fall‘ of the reputation of one of the 
leading deconstructionists, Paul de Man, with the posthumous 
publication of his Wartime Journalism in 1987. Letters in the 
publication included passages indicating Nazi-collaborationist 
activity. The publication of the letters resulted in a heated 
controversy over the moral and ethical emptiness and 
evasiveness of deconstruction. The Derridean idea of ‗nothing 
outside the text‘ began to be considered ethically void and 
problematic. Perhaps symptomatically, Derrida himself became 
increasingly engaged in social, political and ethical issues during 
the 1990s. 
However, there were two pre-existing ethical currents 
within the deconstructionist camp even before the unfortunate de 
Man controversy. One of these was put forward chiefly by J. 
Hillis Miller in his The Ethics of Reading in 1987 as a defence of the 
rigorous unreliability in critical reading as itself an ethics. 
According to Miller, there is an ethical moment in deconstructive 
reading. In practice this means that the reader necessarily fails to 
read the text correctly (the necessity of the failure is what 
constitutes the rigorousness of the unreliability), because he/she 
cannot see into the hidden workings of the language. So the text 
retains its unreachable alterity, its otherness, and the reader is left 
with a ‗false‘ interpretation for which he/she is responsible. For 
Miller, however, ethics is still conceived as a branch of 
philosophy, rather than a pre-philosophical standpoint as it is in 
Levinas.  
The other ethical undercurrent within deconstruction was 
formed by the close dialogue between Derrida and Levinas that 
lasted for decades. In practice, it seems that it was largely Derrida 
who called the attention of literary scholars to Levinas‘s work, 
notably through his critique of Levinas‘s first major work, Totality 
and Infinity (1961), in his essay ―Violence and Metaphysics: An 
Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas‖. The essay is 
mainly known from the collection Writing and Difference from the 
year 1978, but it was originally written and published shortly 
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after the publication of Totality and Infinity. This critique by 
Derrida arguably had an effect on the way Levinas further 
complicated and developed his thinking into the form it takes in 
Otherwise than Being, or, Beyond Essence (1974), as an argument for 
ethics as first philosophy – formulating the priority of ethical 
obligation for the other to ontology and being itself. Levinas 
reciprocally published criticism on Derrida‘s work, albeit in a 
much more veiled guise. According to some commentators, the 
ambivalence between praise and critique in the writings of the 
two on one another betrays the fact that they were ultimately 
working on similar themes and concerns (see e.g. Davis 1996, 69). 
As Lawrence Buell anticipated in 1999 (9), Levinas has 
become the foremost theorist of the post-poststructuralist 
literary-ethical research. The road to the new millennium of 
Levinas‘s thinking was paved by such theorists as Simon 
Critchley (1992), who ingenuously brings together the theories of 
Derrida and Levinas to arrive at a conglomeration of ethics and 
politics; Adam Newton (1995), who draws the literary study of 
ethics closer to Levinasian thinking, while still arguing for the 
distinctiveness of the ethical and the political and rather 
combining Levinas with Bakhtin to develop a kind of dialogical 
conception of ethics; and Andrew Gibson (1999), who , l i k e  
Critchley, defends an ethical theory renewed by the insights of 
deconstruction. Through his extensive use of both modernist and 
postmodernist novels, Gibson also posits Levinas in dialogue 
with theories and theorists that contradict him. He interrogates 
the blind spots of Levinas‘s thinking, such as the latter‘s lack of 
treatment of gender and sexual difference, his alleged 
Eurocentrism, and his position in relationship to a kind of ethics 
of marginality, exemplified by Gibson through queer studies. 
Whatever the combination of internal and external 
influences, the shift within deconstruction towards the 
contemplation of the ethical responsibility for the other became 
quite evident during the 1990s. The simultaneous increase in the 
attention given to the concepts of subjectivity and agency, 
intensified by the change of emphasis in the later work of Michel 
Foucault, is especially important in the context of Amitav Ghosh 
(see e.g. the fourth article on The Calcutta Chromosome). While 
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writing History of Sexuality, Foucault shifted from his previous 
emphasis on the power-knowledge issues and the social 
construction of subjects by discursively functioning institutions 
to the care of the self realized as an ethical endeavour. He came to 
realise ethics as a semiautonomous area that was ―not related to 
any social -- or at least to any legal—institutional system,‖ (1997, 
255) and to conceive of imagined power-relations as open to 
instability and reversal. His attention moved from structures of 
domination to practices of self-actualization. From the point of 
view of ethics, Foucault can be seen as shifting from the 
examination of the Christian tradition of self-renunciation and 
submission to external law (the discursive constructedness) to the 
Aristotelian tradition where people practised personal ethical 
virtue so that it became a permanent habit. This radical change of 
emphasis (the idea of the self taking itself as a work to be 
accomplished) also anticipates, and most probably has had 
influence on, the attention later given to the critical writing on 
ethics as the rival of politics in the examination of social 
engagement. 
Foucault further started to criticize his own earlier view of 
the notion of ‗truth‘ as a mere discursive tool utilized by the 
epistemic will to power. The strain of recent theory that has 
sprung from this recalibration is targeted at the avoidance of the 
reductionisms and moral perils of the cognitive scepticism of 
poststructuralism, while simultaneously avoiding the dangers of 
mimetic realism. The beginnings of the coming together of 
political/discursive and ethical/humanist strands, which is quite 
evident in Ghosh‘s narratives as well as in the theory of e.g. 
Radhakrishnan (see the next sub-section & the first of the articles, 
on The Circle of Reason), are visible here. In the words of Satya 
Mohanty, especially in the case of postcolonial writing, or writing 
of authors coming from oppressed peoples, there is the need to 
―explore the possibility of a theoretical understanding of social 
and cultural identity in terms of objective social location‖ (1997, 
216). But the actual basis for those who examine the problematic 
of whether truthful or reliable representation can be produced 
discursively is Derridean. The general idea behind much of 
postcolonial and other ‗minority‘ scholarship has been that truth 
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and authenticity, even some kind of historical factity, are lying 
somewhere behind, or amidst, hegemonic discourses that are 
opaque and elliptical. The use of, for instance, strategic 
essentialism à la Spivak (see the first article in this dissertation) in 
narrative representations by minority, or postcolonial, writers has 
been seen as an ethico-political way of resisting, or opening up, 
these discourses that tend to eclipse the other and the subaltern. 
One significant trend in current ethical study of literature 
that is not adopted in this dissertation is the rejuvenation of 
reader response ethics through the treatment of the reader-text 
relationship as the equivalent of that of the self to the other. 
Instead of regarding this relationship as one of appropriation or 
reinvention as Barthes did, the ethical response theory stresses 
the conscienceful listening and opening-up to the otherness of the 
text as the basis for readers‘ relationship with texts, thereby not 
treating this relationship as the assertion of power. 
Contemporary literary works are seen as making an ethically 
based call for solidarity to the reader through their resistance of 
standard generic expectations, thereby demanding that the 
reader hear subaltern voices and faces without, however, fully 
grasping or cognitively processing them. See e.g. Sara Ahmed 
(2000) for an ethically informed feminist reader response 
approach. 
The text-reader relationship is also evident in the three-fold 
writer-text-reader relationship as delineated by Derek Attridge. 
In an effort combining the recuperation of authorial agency in the 
production of texts on the one hand and reader response ethics 
on the other, Attridge (2004a & 2004b) describes the literary text 
as the product of an act of creation inspired by otherness. The 
role of the writer is here emphasized as an additional force 
beside, even alternative to, the social constructedness of texts. In 
Attridge‘s view, literary texts emanate from the experience in 
which the writer, who is located in culture's familiar modes of 
understanding, encounters something strange (strange in that it 
does not yet exist within the cognitive framework that culture 
provides for thinking and experiencing). Through the encounter 
with this strangeness, the writer is required to resist the mind's 
tendency to reduce new things by understanding them by way of 
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the familiar. Accordingly, the act of writing involves treating 
language in a way that lets otherness to influence the individual‘s 
mental world and, eventually, the cultural field it embodies. In a 
sense, then, the literary work is inspired by otherness. Attridge 
describes writing as consisting of both passivity and action. On 
the one hand, an encounter with otherness that replaces settled 
forms of thinking requires passivity, a surrender of intellectual 
control to the other; on the other hand, through its destabilization 
of the field of the familiar, this encounter with the other inspires 
the writer to remould familiar patterns of thought. And the 
reader goes through a similar process when encountering the 
otherness of the text.  
In this vein, Amitav Ghosh the writer can be seen as 
destabilizing the familiar knowledge-production strategies of 
such discourses as modernism, postmodernism (plus the 
concomitant, but socio-culturally distinct colonialisms and 
postcolonialisms,) and the Indian version of secular nationalism; 
sciences like historiography, ethnography and medicine; and the 
various narrative strategies springing from these discourses. He 
does this by producing texts that cause an ethical 
defamiliarization of established ways of conceiving of various 
aspects of the world. However, regardless of the fact that fiction 
is always written by someone, this dissertation concentrates on 
the texts, not the writer. In other words, whatever the nature of 
the otherness that inspired Ghosh to remould familiar patterns of 
thought, it is not in focus here, but the outcome of this process 
(i.e. fiction written by him) is.  
According to Attridge, then, the act of reading can be active 
and passive at the same time just like writing is. If the reader 
succeeds in opening him/herself to that which cannot be 
expected and therefore known in advance, reading becomes not 
only a willed action, but also something that happens to the 
reader's consciousness. Given that any relationship to alterity 
inevitably does away with settled forms of thought, a form of 
reading that responds to the otherness of the text will have an 
effect on the familiar. The reader's loss of control over the other 
will inspire him or her creatively to alter the field of the familiar 
in an attempt to accommodate the other. This way, the reader 
101 
 
becomes responsible for the other. This idea of the literary text's 
relationship with otherness, the writer and the reader informs 
both Attridge's discussion of Coetzee's novels (2004a) and his 
more poetry-centered work on literature as a kind of ethical 
performance (2004b).  
At this point, a detour examining my own position as both 
a reader and a writer is perhaps in order. In the case of this 
dissertation, I am both the reader of Ghosh novels and the writer 
of the presently unfolding text. As I am also a researcher, the 
otherness of Ghosh‘s texts is not revealed to me directly. The 
theoretical ideas I have chosen to adopt here filter the novels to 
me in a certain way. In a sense, this text is designed to block out 
both Amitav Ghosh and myself, revealing just the the novels and 
the theoretical ideas through which they are shown. Although 
this independent existence is ultimately a fallacy, it nonethess 
represents a methodological decision that limits the scope and 
argumentation of this dissertation to a reasonable scale and focus. 
I am here clearly responsible for Ghosh‘s novels, and I would 
even say I have opened myself up to their otherness to the extent 
the parameters of dissertation writing make possible. This, I 
think, is evident in the present text‘s lack of a neat and consistent 
theoretical framework. Instead of such a totalizing and distorting 
device, I have attempted to let the novels define how they should 
be approached. Therefore, I approach them through a selection of 
theoretical and methodological ideas, instead of attempting to 
construct a comprehensive theoretical model, or adopting an 
already existing one. If I were concerned with several different 
novels written by a number of writers, such a model would 
clearly be a feasible way of focusing the research, but as I am 
concentrating on the thematically consistent oeuvre of one writer, 
this ‗open‘ way of going about it seems more appropriate. Instead 
of a theoretical model, this dissertation then has as its basis the 
guidelines of the ethical encountering and representation of 
otherness. And I am presently going through the manifold 
outcomes of the adoption of these guidelines during the ‘ethical 
turn‘. 
To return from the methodological self-reflections above to 
the debates of current literary-ethical criticism, another important 
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feature within the field that is of significance in the context of 
Ghosh‘s novels and this dissertation in general, is the interest in 
narrative devices and strategies. This entails discerning incipient 
or already evident ethical aspirations in the application and 
intertwining of various genres, representative strategies, or 
discourse modes in individual works of literature, or in the larger 
output of individual authors. Throughout the present study, it is 
my contention that Ghosh‘s novels transform the discourses of 
Western modernity (whether scientific or novelistic) by 
producing ethically informed narrative constructions that have a 
subversive relationship to the discursive knowledge production 
strategies that originally produced them. This view of literary 
texts as media for ethical reflection enabled by their generic and 
formal idiosyncracies has developed through the generic studies 
of Wayne Booth, the genre-related scholarship of Martha 
Nussbaum, and the combination of Levinasian ethics and 
poststructuralist discursivity in the work of e.g. Adam Newton 
(1995) and Geoffrey Harpham (1992). 
Yet another important issue running through the field is the 
controversy on the relationship between the personal/ethics and 
politics/morality. This polarity as well as the need to transcend it 
already comes to the fore in the first article of this dissertation 
and I examine this topic further in relation to Ghosh‘s writing in 
the latter sub-section of the concluding remarks. This 
relationship, characterized as one of ―semiantagonistic 
interdependence‖ by Buell (14), remains open and heated. The 
most satisfying solution, from the point of view of this study, 
comes from Simon Critchley in his excellent Ethics of 
Deconstruction (1992), to which I shall return in the next sub-
section, as well as towards the end of the present study (section 
V.2.). This problematic of ethics vs. politics permeates the field of 
ethics-literature studies: It is evident in Booth‘s attempts to argue 
for multiple reader responses without becoming guilty of critical 
relativism (1982), Nussbaum‘s view of James‘ rhetoric as a 
―dialogue between perception and rule‖ (1990, 157), Harpham‘s 
statement that discourse issues rules without, however, 
determining situation-specefic obligations (1992, 5), and, most 
importantly, Levinas‘s idea of the responsibility for the other as 
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meaning ―not the disclosure of a given and its reception, but the 
exposure of me to the other, prior to every decision (1998, 141).  
This basic endeavour ―to adjudicate the relationship 
between disposition and normativity‖ (Buell 199, 14) remains the 
same whether examined from the standpoint of the author, 
reader, language, or human relationships. The problematic of the 
relationship between the personal and the socio-political is 
closely related to the ethical-political discussion. ‗Ethics‘ is an 
ambivalent word, referring to both private and public domains 
(this ambivalence comes through in the articles, and is 
specifically looked at in the final subsection). Ethical acts can only 
be carried out in specific socio-cultural circumstances: the ‗being 
with‘ is an integral part of the ethical relationship to the other/s. 
However, it seems that there are grounds for concern over the 
possible privatization of human relations that bypasses the social 
and the political. 
The emphasis on the area of interpersonality and 
interhumanity as the critique of the 1970s textuality and 1980s 
historicism is probably the most lasting contribution of the ethical 
turn that actualized in the late 1990s. Regrettably, it seems that 
this lively period of ethical awareness quite quickly degenerated 
into a haphazard and unfounded use of the word ‗ethics‘. In the 
literary criticism of the 2000s, there appears to be an unfortunate 
tendency to regard any action or representative strategy that can 
be deemed subversive as unproblematically ethical. As the use of 
the word ethics has become more fashionable, it has also become 
more ductile and misleading, if not outright confusing. No 
specific model, or theoretical framework, for ethical examination 
of literary works managed to emerge with any force out of the 
cacophony of general ethical interestedness, and many 
practitioners of outspokenly ―ethical‖ criticism today fail to 
connect their mode of examination to antecedent traditions or to 
alternative brands of contemporary ethical study (Shameem 
Black‘s excellent Literature Across Borders (2010) is an outstanding 
exception to this tendency). This might be viewed as not 
surprising for an emergent discourse (or a bundle of discourses) 
searching for self-definition. But it does create confusion. Some 
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writers, like for instance Coetzee and Beckett,8 have become the 
target of consistent and innovative ethical scholarship, but within 
for instance postcolonial studies at large the term is usually just 
thrown in to add fashionable flavour to the text.  
A more optimistic stance on the vicissitudes of ethical 
literary studies in the new millennium has been put forward by 
Bárbara Arizti and Silvia Martínez-Falquina in their edition on 
the ethical turn: they ―revel in the polyphonic nature of the turn 
to ethics. The advantages of the ―crossover‖ among disciplines, 
interests, discourses and practices, brought about by the 
phenomenon, amply make up for the putative loss of critical 
edge‖ (2007, xiv). Disciplinary crossovers in ethical vein are 
presented also by Astrid Eril, Herbert Grabes & Ansgar Nünning 
in their volume on the dissemination of ethical values in 
literature and media (2008). Recent more ‗neutral‘ voices include 
Russell Smith, who sees the ethical turn ―variously as an attempt 
to give ethico-political substance to what was perceived as the 
empty linguistic formalism of deconstruction […], or as a retreat 
from the conflictual space of the political in search of a 
consensual realm of the ethical‖ (2009, 2-3), and David 
Cunningham, who in line with Smith characterizes the ethical 
turn as the phenomenological fleshing out of the formalist tenets 
of deconstruction with Levinasian substance. Cunningham 
further notes that 
 
As such, the ‗ethical turn‘ is a ‗turn‘ that has largely taken 
place, not in fact against, but within what are understood to 
be the ‗philosophical‘ terms of mainstream ‗deconstructive‘ 
literary criticism itself. In this they have broadly followed 
developments in the theoretical interests of Anglophone 
‗deconstruction‘ more generally: developments which have 
sought to ‗add moral weight‘ […] to deconstruction‘s 
definitive ‗preoccupation‘ with alterity (2009, 25). 
 
                                                 
8 See e.g.  Attridge (2004) and Leist & Singer (2010) on ethical approaches to 
Coetzee, and Smith (2009) on Beckett. 
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Perhaps the most sombre recapitulation of the outcome of 
the late 1990s ethical project comes from one its own proponents, 
Andrew Gibson who, in 2006, after a ‗personal turn‘ towards the 
French philosopher, Alain Badiou, and with the benefit of 
hindsight, characterized the ethical turn as follows: 
 
Its underlying impetus is in fact pragmatic compromise. 
Badiou is surely right: what was initially a sophisticated 
and theoretically demanding conception of ethics swiftly 
became a mixture of a bland ethics of the other and a 
doctrine of human rights whose essence is a reconstituted 
and basically sentimental brand of liberal humanism. (2006, 
91) 
 
Gibson further claims that there is an underlying religious 
ontology behind Levinas‘s thinking:  
 
What requires our self-abnegation in the encounter with the 
other? If it is not a principle or an imperative that exists 
prior to the encounter itself—and it cannot be that, in 
postmodern ethics—the command can only stem from the 
presence of the Great Other within the other, from God. 
(2006, 91-92)  
 
Gibson also announces that Levinasian ethics cannot separate 
itself of theology without becoming inconsistent.  
Levinas does acknowledge that for him philosophy derives 
from religion (1990, 182). But this does not imply that philosophy 
is subordinate to religion, or that religion needs philosophy to 
give it intellectual respectability. Rather, religion and philosophy 
represent two parallel but distinct spheres which are both part of 
the same spiritual process of the approach of the transcendental. 
Whether this religious component in Levinas‘s thought is 
considered intrinsic and indispensable or not, my interpretation 
of his view of God, as well as the significance of the idea of God 
in his thinking differs from that put forward by Gibson (and 
Badiou) in that I find it more useful to interpret the notion of God 
in Levinas as signifying a metaphor for the encounter with the 
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other. The presence of God in the very core of subjectivity serves 
to prove that the subject is not its own origin, and that there is 
something alien and unreachable inside it. This alien is the other. 
The subject only comes into being when it encounters the alien 
alterity of the other, be that God or another human being (see the 
fourth article in this dissertation for more thorough analysis of 
God in Levinas). In short, Levinas is trying to explicate his idea of 
the other and its significance for the self through using the 
metaphor of God. So, our ―self-abnegation‖ that Gibson is 
referring to in the above quotation is required in the first place by 
the other, which is needed for the self‘s coming into existence in 
the first place.  
Nonetheless, after reading Badiou, Gibson appears quite 
vehement towards the theorists of the 1990s ethical turn, his 
former self included: 
 
Those, like Simon Critchley—and myself, in the past—who 
have argued for a Levinasian ethics in the mode of ‗atheist 
transcendence‘, to adopt Critchley‘s phrase, have failed to 
recognize that, without the theological sanction, Levinas‘s 
ethics simply falls apart. (2006, 92) 
 
Gibson‘s turn of mind is not wholly inconsistent, given the fact 
that he was searching for ―blind spots‖ in Levinas‘s thinking 
already in 1999 (17), although he at that time was basically of the 
opinion that the combination of Levinas and Derrida was just 
what was needed in the literary theory of that time. 
Given my view that Gibson‘s recent outburst against the 
theological basis of Levinas‘s theory is perhaps based on a too 
literal a reading of the latter‘s immensely metaphorical and, 
admittedly, religiously charged language, I myself tend to agree 
with the Gibson of 1999. As will become evident in the articles, I 
see Ghosh‘s writing as the coming together of poststructuralist 
(or Derridean/deconstructive) tenets to dismantle pre-existing 
discursive models (e.g. of modernism and colonialism) and 
humanist ethics promoting the use of imagination to transcend 
discourse as such in a pre-ontological and pre-linguistic plane of 
relationships. I am also of the view that ethical and political are 
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intertwined in Ghosh‘s writing into a properly ethico-political 
discourse (see V.2.). On the level of genre, I view Ghosh‘s generic 
mixtures as ethically aware in that they break and re-construct 
pre-existing generic formations, thereby changing their political 
implications. The self-other relationship is also narrated ethically 
as a reciprocal relationship, in which neither of the two is 
reduced into a passive target of scrutiny, but both appear as 
active agents in the relationship with a voice of their own. This 
serves to avoid appropriation and to create agency for the 
discourses and subjectivities that are being narrated into 
existence.  
Above I have tried to chart the fractured map of ethically 
informed literary criticism and locate my study within it as best I 
can. However, because of the general methodological and 
theoretical confusion within ethical studies of literature, no clear-
cut theoretical framework can be discerned in this dissertation. 
And even if there did exist relatively standardized models for 
ethical study of literature, I feel that the very basis for an ethical 
relationship between a text and its examiner negates the 
possibility of the use of a ready-made framework in the 
examination of specific literary works. As I have already 
indicated, I would rather let Ghosh‘s novels ´speak´ for 
themselves and participate in the process of interpreting them 
than distort them by applying a certain theoretical model into 
which they would become appropriated. Filtering the texts 
through a certain framework with its idiosyncratic knowledge 
production strategies would diminish their alterity, i.e. their 
otherness, by eclipsing aspects of them and making them part of 
the familiar.  
At the risk of repeating myself, I once again state that, in 
order to avoid too obvious discursive appropriation, I build my 
arguments on certain (mainly Levinasian and deconstructionist) 
philosophical ideas and starting points, not so much on 
comprehensive theories or pre-existing theoretical models. This 
may be deemed eclectic, even opportunistic, but to my mind it is 
a way of attempting to ascertain the alterity and independence of 
the object of study to the extent this is possible. What is more, this 
reflects the general modus operandi within the ethical turn: the 
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critics choose varying theoretical and methodological threads out 
of a myriad of philosophical and theoretical influences to form 
their own approach to the chosen objects of study. I try to let the 
texts bring forth the thematic concerns inherent in them and 
choose my tools accordingly. And in doing so, I try to avoid 
forcing them into a preconceived framework. This, I hope, will 
prevent ―what was initially a sophisticated and theoretically 
demanding conception of ethics‖ turning into ―a mixture of a 
bland ethics of the other and a doctrine of human rights whose 
essence is a reconstituted and basically sentimental brand of 
liberal humanism‖ (Gibson 2006, 91). 
In the following, I shall introduce some of the key concepts 
in Levinas‘s thinking in connection with Ghosh‘s novels and their 
central themes, in an attempt to create a kind of ethically 
informed athmosphere for the later sub-chapters on 
representation of violence and the treatment of narration and 
silence. The main thrust of my argument here revolves around 
the relationship of ethics and language, the resources that 
language and narration have for bringing forth the ethical in 
interhuman relationships. Towards the end of the section I shall 
tentatively bring ethics into connection with deconstruction. 
 
 III.1.2. Ethics, language and the writing of Amitav Ghosh 
 
To point out an issue I shall be returning to repeatedly in the 
course of this dissertation, there is an increasing emphasis on the 
inadequacy of language to represent the movements of the mind 
and the encounter with the other in the writing of Ghosh. A 
tension between post-structuralist emphasis on textuality and 
difference on the one hand and a humanism transcending 
discourse on the other has been found in his fiction. In one of the 
first thorough articles on Ghosh's work, Robert Dixon 
characterizes his writing as exhibiting a ―fluid and at times 
confusing deployment of the lexicons of both liberal humanism 
and post-structuralism, though without allowing his writing to 
be affiliated with either‖ (1996, 16) and as flickering between 
―suggesting a metaphysics of presence and a Derridean trace‖ 
(1996, 17). In Mondal‘s view, Ghosh is ―seeking a syncretism that 
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is an anti-humanist, postmodern recognition of difference and is 
also at the same time a humanist secular ideal‖ (2007, 30, orig. 
emphasis). My aim here is to imply that this supposed tension is 
a product of the simultaneous application of approaches very 
close to Levinasian ethics and deconstruction. This view will be 
strengthened through the article section and the concluding 
remarks. At this point, my approach follows the general outlines 
detailed by Adam Newton in his Narrative Ethics:  
 
Ethical answerability here is not a flattened prescription for 
action; it is not a moral recipe book. Nor is deconstruction 
an indifference to answerability; it is at its best a scrupulous 
hesitation, an extreme care occasioned by the treachery of 
words and the danger of easy answers (1995, 37). 
 
According to Levinas, communication has two dimensions, 
which he refers to as Saying and the Said. The Said represents the 
surface level where we use language to communicate themes, 
ideas and observations to one another via discourse. Saying is the 
ethical dimension where the genuine encounter with the other 
ideally takes place. Saying is pre-discursive, and although it 
leaves a trace in the Said, it has its own significance that cannot 
be represented within the Said: ―Saying states and thematizes the 
Said, but signifies it to the other, a neighbor, with a signification 
that has to be distinguished from that born by words in the Said‖ 
(Levinas 1998, 46). Saying, then, cannot be grasped within the 
Said, which is the dimension of linguistic ‗knowing‘ and 
ontology. In the words of Simon Critchley, Saying represents ―the 
non-thematizable ethical residue of language that escapes 
comprehension, interrupts philosophy, and is the very enactment 
of the ethical movement from the Same to the other‖ (Critchley 
1999, 7).  
Levinas tries to find ways of using language that would 
transcend the totalizing effects of representation and preserve the 
self and the other as independent and self-sufficient, but still in a 
genuine relationship with each other. Throughout this 
dissertation, I suggest that this kind of relationship between the 
self and the other is very close to Ghosh‘s goal as a writer of 
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fiction. Where the outcome of Levinas‘s experiment within the 
parameters of philosophic argumentation is, to say the least, 
perplexing and self-contradictory, Ghosh has more success 
within the multiple narrative modes of his fictive representations. 
In fiction, the contrasting views on language and the mystical 
experiences which transcend discourse can be approached more 
easily.  
Levinas, then, seems to propound the view that the ethical 
is destroyed by attempting to present it in language and that the 
proper understanding of, or contact with, the other occurs 
beyond language. Although Ghosh uses language in several 
narrative modes to open up ways of representation that would 
ascribe independence, voice and agency to the other, whether 
conceived as a person or another discourse, he seems to share the 
same assumption concerning the ultimate possibilities of 
language. But, although the ethical cannot rigorously speaking be 
reached through language, the novel with its polyphonic 
character seems to be a good device for ‗showing‘ or ‗staging‘ the 
ethical without explicitly defining it, and thus inviting the 
imaginative capacity of the reader to compensate for the 
incapabilities of language (on this point, I am in general 
agreement with Rorty, Nussbaum and MacIntyre). In the 
following, I would like to examine three aspects of The Hungry 
Tide. These are formed by the questions of what is said, how it is 
said and how what is said draws on outside information. First, 
there is the level of the inside of the narrative, as it were. This 
level examines the way in which the characters act within the 
story frame of the novel. Then there is the level of the narration 
itself, pertaining to the narrative strategy, i.e. the modes and 
discourses used to narrate the story. Thirdly, I would like to 
sketch a level outside the narrative, examining the elements left 
outside the novel but hinted at through the use of intertexts, for 
instance. 
Most of my interpretation of the novel in the article-section 
(IV.6.) belongs to the first level. There I examine the manner in 
which the characters in it conceive of language, nature and each 
other. I will also look at the ways in which these manners change. 
The most striking attempts at descriptions of transcendent ethical 
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experience are those with Kanai on the island of Garjontola. In 
these scenes, to be examined later in the article, language is really 
stretched to its limits to give the impression of its transparency or 
its vanishing, or its forming into a kind of vision. Language 
cannot properly speaking describe its own transcending, its own 
beyond. But we, as readers, can imaginatively understand the 
purpose of the language in this instance and try to think, or 
rather feel or sense, such an occurrence ourselves. This would in 
practice mean the use of transcendental imagination as 
characterized by Cornell and precise imagination as delineated 
by Radhakrishnan (see the introduction). 
The second level has to do with the choice of what is 
narrated, and through what kind of linguistic strategies the 
chosen targets of narration are represented. As noted in the 
introduction to the novel above, the setting is the Sundarbans, a 
marginal area by any standards, and also an intermediate zone 
between land and sea, or fresh water and salt water, indicative of 
diversity and connections within and between areas 
conventionally conceived as separate totalities. The list of 
characters is diverse linguistically, socially, as well as in terms of 
class and ideology. If ethics is about forming connections with 
various kinds of others while restoring voice and agency to the 
same others (be they humans, worldviews or discursive 
representations of the world belonging to these worldviews), 
then this kind of setting bringing to the fore a marginal area 
seldom treated in fiction, and a cast of characters covering a wide 
area of the Indian society and even beyond, has to be considered 
ethically aware. Also the careful exposure of the many differing 
viewpoints in many differing discourses, like those of natural 
science, etymology, religion, myth and diary notes, not to 
mention the finely tuned differences in the prosodies of the 
characters, are exemplary in their attempt to secure voice and 
independence to a multitude of ‗others‘ without appropriating 
them through ‗knowing‘ them in one discourse.  
Information outside the actual novel is constituted by the 
intertextual references, or hints, to other texts. In The Hungry Tide, 
the obvious example would be the already discussed (II.6.1.) 
poetry of Rilke (Duino Elegies). What is interesting about the 
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excerpts from Rilke in the narrative is that they do not represent 
the passages from the poems that would most obviously or 
apparently support the themes of the novel. They are very short 
and appear to be there just to give more poetic grandeur to 
Nirmal‘s already ‗winged‘ diary style. It is only when one 
becomes better acquainted with Rilke‘s works that their real 
significance in relation to the novel becomes evident. 
Consequently, Rilke‘s works are, in a sense, hinted at in the 
narrative, but not discursively defined by tying them into the 
narrative too strongly or thematising them too obviously. Once 
again, this has to be considered an ethical way of constructing a 
narrative: although it wants to form a connection with the poems, 
the narrative is careful not to appropriate Rilke‘s work into its 
discourse too strongly. 
The novel as a whole can be seen as a way of describing the 
ethical relationship with the other in a way that is not possible 
within the discourse of philosophy. Nussbaum (1990) proposes 
the idea that novels can tell us things about moral or ethical 
views that cannot be discussed in philosophy. She also states that 
a novel‘s message of how to live morally is dependent on the 
narrative form of that novel (the relationship between the content 
and the form of a narrative is, of course, not a new idea, 
especially after the studies of Hayden White). Consequently, in 
addition to containing material that supports or refutes certain 
philosophical theories, the novel can be seen as representing the 
philosophical viewpoint of its author (or, if we want to avoid the 
pitfalls of authorial intention, we can always talk of the 
philosophical message of the narrative as a whole). As indicated, 
the message of this novel seems to be that the good way to live is 
on the one hand to try to keep an open mind regarding the 
stimuli from the outside and on the other to refrain from too easy 
or rash acts of defining the outside. The infinity and ultimate 
unattainability of otherness is emphasized through the use of 
multiple discourses for its description. The understanding and 
tolerence of the other requires the transcending of the personal 
totalities that are largely seen as linguistically constructed. 
Although this can be stated in the discourse of philosophy, the 
‗showing‘ of it, for instance in the manner of Kanai‘s encounter 
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with Fokir and his experience alone on the island, is beyond the 
parameters of philosophical language and argumentation. The 
above mentioned scenes are examined in the article in section 
IV.6. 
As I have already established, in the fourth novel by Ghosh, 
The Calcutta Chromosome, silence, or the extra-discursive, is given 
a prominent role. The extra-discursive represents an instance of 
subaltern agency in the novel. People who come from the lowest 
strata of society are secretly using Ross, who represents Western 
science and rationality. This elusive group leaves only 
inconspicuous signs of its existence. One of the characters in the 
novel describes Mangala as ―her who has so long eluded me: 
Silence herself. I see signs of her presence everywhere I go, in 
images, words, glances, but only signs, nothing more…‖ (The 
Calcutta Chromosome 122). Nowhere is the group defined 
straightforwardly, and the characters in the novel are only able to 
find elusive textual traces of it, despite their frantic search. This is 
consistent with Levinas‘s idea of silence as ―the inverse of 
language: the interlocutor has given a sign, but has declined 
every interpretation‖ (Levinas 1969, 91). Language and speech 
would consist in the other coming to the aid of the sign given by 
him/her, enabling the formation of an interpretation, but this is 
what Mangala‘s group refuses to do for fear of becoming ‗known‘ 
and appropriated through this interpretation. 
Ghosh seems to imply that we can only know through 
language. Consequently, in knowing the world, scientifically or 
otherwise, we simultaneously change it by projecting onto it 
ideological meanings carried by language. In the novel, 
knowledge, which is conceived as discursive, is strongly linked 
with the concepts of agency and voice. The project of the group, 
targeted at the moment of crossing to an alternative mode of 
being, proceeds through moments of mutual discovery. The 
borderline between the discoverers and those who are discovered 
is extremely porous. In the narrative, no person discovers the 
other person without that other person simultaneously 
discovering him/her. This guarantees voice and agency to every 
character and no-one becomes reduced to the position of the 
passive object of knowledge, to be appropriated to the discourse 
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of the observer. This is phrased by Murugan as follows in novel, 
―You see, for them the only way to escape the tyranny of 
knowledge is to turn it on itself. But for that to work they have to 
create a single perfect moment of discovery when the person who 
discovers is also that which is discovered‖ (The Calcutta 
Chromosome 303). This is ethical: the other is not reduced to a 
passive object by discursive representation, but retains its 
subjectivity and agency. 
I would say that achieving immortality in the novel is equal 
to escaping the grip of the totality of the discursive ontology of 
the discreet intentional subject, and ethically approaching the 
infinity of the other. In other words, getting outside oneself 
ethically, not at the level of a separate, discursively functioning 
consciousness. This dismantling of the solitary self is precisely 
what ethics as the examination of interpersonal relationships 
aspires to achieve. The effecting of personal transference in the 
novel shares some aspects with the Levinasian concept of 
substitution. As Alphonso Lingis observes in his commentary on 
Levinas, 
 
substitution is the ethical itself; responsibility is putting 
oneself in the place of another. Through becoming 
interchangeable with anyone, I take on the weight and 
consistency of one that bears the burden of being, of alien 
being and of the world. I become substantial and subject, 
subjected to the world and to the others. And because in 
this putting myself in the place of another I am imperiously 
summoned, singled out, through it I accede to singularity. 
(Lingis 1998, xxix) 
 
The moving of personality traits, or ―matching symptomologies‖ 
(The Calcutta Chromosome 107) of people, between different minds 
and bodies (different selves) is a science-fiction utopia. It is 
reminiscent of something that cannot, strictly speaking, happen 
in real life: the ethical substitution of the self for others. Through 
this substitution, the questions of voice and agency, as well as the 
notion of discreet subjectivities, would be deprived of meaning. 
Furthermore, through the transmission of socially learned 
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personality traits, the distinction between the self and the other 
would vanish and the contemporary subject appropriating the 
other and the world through ‗knowing‘ them would cease to 
exist. In Levinas‘s model, subjectivity would come to mean the 
subjection of the self to the other, all the way to the substitution 
for this other. For Ghosh, the transferring of personality traits 
does not go quite that far, but stops at the dispersal of intentional 
subjectivity through the establishment of connections and over-
lappings between multiple subjectivities. In a sense, Ghosh does 
not reverse the power-relationship between self and the other as 
the Levinasian model seems to do in its move from appropriation 
to substitution, but he makes the whole unequal relationship 
impossible by dismantling independent subjectivities, which are 
its component parts (see the article in section IV.4. for a more 
thorough discussion on this point). 
As Lingis observes, for Levinasian ethics, ―the other is not 
experienced as an empty pure place and means for the world to 
exhibit another perspective, but as a contestation of my 
appropriation of the world, as a disturbance in the play of the 
world, a break in its cohesion‖ (Lingis 1998, xxix). In the novel, 
Mangala‘s group surely represents a contestation of the 
appropriation of the world by Western discourses, most notably 
the historical and scientific ones. The Levinasian substitution 
seems to be quite close to the view on universal/particular 
implied in the novel. Like the chromosome, this substitution 
provides access to the universal while maintaining the particular, 
or singular. But the terms ‗universal‘ and ‗particular‘ can no 
longer be seen as opposites, or as a binary construction, because 
they have been redefined. ‗Universal‘ now refers to the multitude 
of selves, or personality traits, which exist in the same dimension 
for one another. Singularity is formed through the fact that these 
selves can be summoned, or called, as single entities (compare to 
the discussion on universal particularism in section III.4.). 
While the above discussion of the novel largely belongs to 
the realm of what could be characterized as the meta-ethical and 
tends to concentrate on the thematic contents of the narrative, the 
narration itself is also ethically aware. If ethics is about the 
establishment of interpersonal connections across discourses on a 
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mutual basis, then The Calcutta Chromosome has to be considered 
as a narration that proceeds according to an ethical logic. It forms 
connections by representing characters from vastly different 
areas of society, instead of concentrating on just a few. 
Furthermore, as established in the section II.4.1., these 
representatives of different social classes are described in their 
own environment, instead of placing them in alien, or somehow 
generalized, circumstances. The narrative also creates 
interpersonal connections with an awareness of the problems of 
voice, agency and appropriation. No-one is reduced to being a 
mere target of knowledge and discursive definition, or 
appropriation; all are granted voice and agency. Everyone gets to 
speak and does this in his/her own idiosyncratic English, 
variants of which in the novel have been illuminatingly examined 
by Khair (2001, 315). By this means, the narrative dismantles 
religious, social, ideological and linguistic differences and 
borders constructed by the use of these discourses in a political 
vein, as tools of definition utilized to construct power-
relationships. Silence, then, represents the kind of unattainable 
experience that transcends the level of language, or knowing. 
This would be the experience of the ultimate truth that has not 
been changed through knowing, in other words by the meanings 
carried by language. This would also be an ethical experience. 
The ultimate truth in the novel belongs to the realm of the ethical, 
transcending the divisions created by various linguistic totalities.  
A similar response to the problematics of silence and 
knowing can be found in The Circle of Reason. The scene in which 
the protagonist, Alu, speaks to a crowd of people in a "turmoil of 
languages" features an instance of communication which 
transcends the claim to knowledge by a specific language: 
 
It was like a question, though he was not asking 
anything, bearing down on you from every side. And 
in that whole huge crowd nobody stirred or spoke. 
You could see that silently they were answering him, 
matching him with something of their own. […] 
Tongues unraveled and woven together – nonsense, 
you say, tongues unraveled are nothing but nonsense 
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– but there again you have a mystery, for everyone 
understood him, perfectly […] They understood him, 
for his voice was only the question; the answers were 
their own. (The Circle of Reason 279) 
 
This mixture of languages does not introduce to the listeners any 
particular ideology or claim to power in the way a specific 
language would. It does not ‗know‘, it does not provide a 
definitive answer. It signifies only the ethical approach towards 
each ‗other‘ in the group in the form of a question, to which 
everyone can have their own response. Therefore, it speaks to 
everyone, regardless of class or language, without treating them 
as a homogeneous group. As Phulboni says in The Calcutta 
Chromosome, although this is the world of silence, it is animate, it 
has a spirit and voice. Consequently, the crowd is capable of 
answering Alu through silence. 
In In an Antique Land, the problematics of knowing the 
other is approached from the point of view of ethnography. In 
the novel, the Egyptian villagers, who would normally constitute 
the target of a traditional ethnographic study, are transformed 
from passive objects of traditional ethnographic representation 
and knowledge into active agents/characters with a historical 
trajectory of their own, while the ethnographer/narrator turns 
into an object of inquiry. This does not signify a mere change of 
roles, but creates a two dimensional relationship, which comes 
through for instance in the following scene with the narrator and 
one of the villagers, Nabeel: 
 
'It must make you think of all the people you left 
at home,' he said to me, 'when you put that kettle on 
the stove with just enough water for yourself.' 
There was a brief pause and then Isma'il said 
quickly: 'Why should it? He has us and so many other 
friends to come here and have tea with him; he has no 
reason to be lonely.' 
'It's not the same thing,' said Nabeel. 'Think how 
you would feel.' 
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[…] It was the first time anyone in Lataifa or 
Nashawy had attempted an enterprise similar to mine 
– to enter my imagination and look at my situation as 
it might appear to me. (In an Antique Land 152) 
 
Radhakrishnan, who, like Ghosh, is engaged in a project of 
dismantling the hegemonic position of a Western-originated 
discourse (the discourse of postmodernism, in his case), 
maintains that for genuine transcultural readings to become 
possible, other realities will have to be "recognized not merely as 
other histories but as other knowledges." (2000, 58; orig. emphasis) 
To transcend the incommensurability in worldviews, the 
participants would have to imagine their own "discursive-
epistemic space[s] as a form of openness to one another‘s 
persuasion" (2000, 61). As can be seen in the above quotation 
from the novel, the narrator‘s encounters with the villagers 
constitute this kind of openness through a two-directional act of 
knowing, a moment of contact between two active participants 
similar to the idea of the simultaneous discovery in The Calcutta 
Chromosome. One cannot simply observe the world by either 
trying to know it, or by trying to know oneself by looking at it: 
the world, or the other, looks back at one at the same time. 
Consequently, the other is not merely an inert object to be 
appropriated to the ethnographer's own discourse by ‗knowing‘ 
it, or to be used for purposes of self-definition: it is active and 
looks back at the observer. 
The connections Ghosh creates in his novels are primarily 
those eclipsed by the universalized knowledge-production 
strategies of Western ideologies and sciences (especially history 
and social sciences). Even if the present-day cross-cultural 
communication in the narrative proves to be nearly impossible 
without these universals, In an Antique Land does succeed in 
piercing through them and revealing other epistemologies by 
dissolving and transforming the traditional methods of 
knowledge production in history and ethnography. Ghosh‘s 
strategy of representation in the novel is almost identical to the 
program of "modernist" ethnography delineated by the 
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ethnographer George E. Marcus and shortly introduced in the 
introduction: 
 
Far from ignoring "objective conditions" such as 
processes of coercion, the play of interests, and class 
formation, the focus of modernist ethnography on the 
experiential and access to it through language in 
context is direct engagement with and exploration of 
such conditions – without, however, the usual 
obeisances to the given social scientific frameworks 
for their discussion. […] But while modernist 
ethnography operates fully cognizant of the history of 
the political and economic circumstances in which 
identities have been formed, it is not built explicitly 
around the trope of power, but rather of ethics, that 
is, the complex moral relationship of the observer to 
the observed, of the relevance of the observed's 
situation to the situation of the observer's own 
society, and ultimately the exploration of the critical 
purpose of contemporary ethnographic analysis. 
(1998, 75) 
 
It would seem that the significance of ethically tinged 
representation based on the relationships and connections 
between people as both observers and those observed lies in "the 
possibility of changing the terms in which we think objectively 
and conventionally about power," to use the words of Marcus 
(1998, 75).  
But despite references to an ethical dimension exceeding 
the abilities of the traditional intentional subject or existing 
beyond language and discourse, novels are, obviously, very 
much narration and language. Even though Ghosh has 
constructed his novels in a manner that tries to preserve the 
alterity and independence of the other insofar as this is possible, 
he remains inside language. Especially in In an Antique Land and 
The Calcutta Chromosome, the choice of what to narrate and how is 
strongly reminiscent of Derridean deconstruction, which is aimed 
at opening a certain text up to the blind spots or ellipses within it. 
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In the latter novel, the dominant interpretation to be 
deconstructed is that of the history of Malaria research and the 
breakthrough in it achieved by Ronald Ross. In line with 
deconstruction, the novel repeats this dominant version through 
a detailed commentary in the form of Murugan‘s accounts of the 
official version of this intertwined colonial and medical history 
and simultaneously opens it up with the narrative of the silent 
group manoeuvring the whole thing. In an Antique Land 
deconstructs the representational strategies of the sciences of 
ethnography and historiography with fictive literary narration to 
produce a narrative that opens up new ways of realizing the 
contemporary situation of globalization and multiculturalism. 
Ideally, deconstruction aims at a reading which is neither a 
commentary nor an interpretation. It is meant to open up a 
textual space that is ‗other‘ to commentary and interpretation, by 
this means creating distance to logocentric conceptuality. A 
deconstructive reading of a text exceeds the totality of the 
dominant version. Seen in this way, the goal of deconstruction is 
to locate a point of otherness within logocentric conceptuality 
and then to deconstruct this conceptuality from that point of 
otherness (Critchley 1999, 20-31). 
The above characterization of deconstruction comes quite 
close to what Levinas aims at in his self-other relationship: in his 
model the other remains an undefinable alterity interrupting the 
totality of the same. Levinas differs from Derrida in that for 
Levinas the other exists ultimately beyond discourse. Derrida‘s 
model, although resistant to the language of logocentrism and 
traditional philosophy, is decidedly about texts and discourse. 
The Calcutta Chromosome as a whole represents the coming 
together of ethics and deconstruction: in it the dominant version 
of the history of malaria research is deconstructed from a point of 
alterity (Mangala‘s subaltern group), which resists definition or 
interpretation by remaining secret and silent outside of discourse. 
The novel is highly remisniscent of Critchley‘s delineation of 
clôtural reading. Critchley is here outlining a manner of 




Clôtural reading articulates the ethical interruption of 
ontological closure, thereby disrupting the text‘s claims to 
comprehensive unity and self-understanding, a procedure 
which [...] extends all the way to a reading of Derrida‘s and 
Levinas‘s texts. A clôtural reading of a text would consist, 
first, on a patient and scholarly commentary following the 
main lines of the text‘s dominant interpretation, and 
second, in locating an interruption or alterity within that 
dominant interpretation where reading discovers insights 
within a text to which that text is blind. My governing 
claim is that these insights, interruptions, or alterities are 
moments of ethical transcendence, in which a necessity other 
than that of ontology announces itself within the reading, 
an event in which the ethical Saying of a text overrides its 
ontological Said. (Critchley 1999, 30) 
 
Consequently, instead of producing a tension or vacillation 
between each other in the novel (or within Critchley‘s concept of 
clôtural reading), Levinasian ethics and Derridean deconstruction 
seem to support each other in their goals of disrupting and 
transcending discursive totalities, be they those of the self or 
those of logocentric narratives. 
As a waypoint, it should by now be clear that Ghosh is 
engaged in a project which raises our awareness of alternative 
ways of constructing the world based on ethical connections that 
dismantle the traditional binary constructions of Western 
modernity. As I stated in the introduction, the primary purpose 
of this dissertation as a whole is to examine Ghosh‘s ethically 
informed techniques for transcending the borders between 
various discursive totalities. The articles in section IV break down 
this larger question by examining the ways in which Ghosh 
represents the encounter with the other, be that a person, a 
discourse, a literary genre or an animal. On the other hand, the 
articles form a whole by approaching the main research question 
of the dissertation from slightly different angles that are dictated 
by the thematic emphases of each novel. 
Levinas‘s meta-ethics and poststructuralist deconstruction 
are both highly abstract theoretical constructions. In this 
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dissertation, they are placed in the context of Ghosh‘s narratives, 
to show how fiction and ethico-political theory can explicate and 
back up one another and set examples for how we conceive of the 
world. Although the relationship and possible bias between the 
personal and socio-political within theories of the ethical is in 
dispute, all parties agree on the fact that the only space where the 
personal ethical action is conceivable is the social space of being 
with other/s. The defining of ethical action demands that it be 
contextualized in specific socio-cultural and political 
circumstances. The following section ties Ghosh‘s output into the 
intellectual climate of the Subcontinent through examining the 
coming together of modernist and postmodernist ideas in the 
cultural and political history of India. 
 
III.2. Modernism, postmodernism and the idea of India 
 
In the West, the concepts of rationality, knowledge and truth that 
were developed during the Enlightenment period became the 
building blocks of the metaphysic of modernity. The ideology of 
modernity is heavily dependent on binary constructions (e.g. 
science/religion, or rationality/irrationality). The world is largely 
conceived through separate opposites divided into two 
antagonistic poles. Various modernist tenets were also inherent 
in the colonial project. Later, postmodern ideas were developed 
with the goal of destabilizing such ways of thinking. As a 
consequence, the postmodernist dissolution of modernist, 
separate, individual subjectivity, the dismantling of the ideology 
based on binaries and the highlighting of the textuality and the 
representational character of different versions of reality were 
eagerly adopted by many postcolonial intellectuals as useful tools 
for deconstructing the colonial legacy. But this does not mean 
that the ideology of Western originated postmodernism was 
necessarily assimilated as such. In India, as in many other areas, 
the process of adopting postmodern ideas is more aptly described 
as a process of translation, in which the local discourses blend 
with modernist and postmodernist ways of thinking, producing 
idiosyncratic amalgamations. In the following, I shall offer an 
overview of how the process of interweaving modernism, 
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postmodernism and the indigenous discourses of the Bengal area 
and culture proceeded in India. 
One modernist discourse that people in the subcontinent 
had to assimilate was that of nationalism. Sunil Khilnani (1997) 
presents the striving for Indian unity mainly through the ideas 
and influence of two men, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlar 
Nehru. Their notions of Indian identity and unity were in many 
respects oppositional. Gandhi refused to separate religion and 
politics in the secularist manner of the colonial power, and opted 
for traditional tales and religious legends to find a common basis 
for Indian identity and unity. He was against Partition as a 
violation of the common cultural inheritance of the population. 
His was an idea of a self-produced unity and an identity free of 
the problems of the Western mode of history and nationalism, a 
unity produced on the level of everyday life on the basis of the 
common inheritance of tradition and legend. The Prime Minister, 
Nehru, on the other hand, operated on the political level. His idea 
was to create a common history for India that would present its 
past as leading through a gradual unification of various cultures 
towards participation in the universal development of mankind. 
He saw the adoption of the Western philosophy of development 
as the only way to create unity in India and make it an inherent 
part of world economics and politics. According to Khilnani, 
Nehru‘s idea was that a distinct Indian identity was possible only 
―within the territorial and institutional frame of a state […]: a 
model committed to protecting cultural and religious difference 
rather than imposing a uniform ‗Indianness‘‖ (1997, 167). In 
general, Gandhi can be seen as representing the ethical means for 
creating connections between people of the Subcontinent, while 
Nehru clearly operated within the hegemonic discourse of 
nationalism he wanted to modify to Indian circumstances. 
With independence and nationalism, then, the new political 
entity of India adopted the Western ideology of a common 
history leading to the unification of a people as a nation. With a 
population comprising such manifold differences, this history 
had to be an extremely forced and premeditated invention. On 
the surface, Partition seemed to be a clear division between the 
Hindu and Muslim religions. In reality, as we know, there are 
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people of both religions on either side of the border, not to 
mention all the other religions that have been brutally divided by 
it. Furthermore, the secularist nationalist separation of the 
religious component from all the other components contributing 
to communal identity was an extremely violent process. It 
disregarded all the other cultural affiliations that people 
necessarily possess, such as ties to place of origin, ethnic group, 
language etc. 
In a sense, the political decolonization was not enough to 
create a stable state and a healthy nation. Independence, the 
Partition and the federalism and the secularism of the new state 
were political ideals functioning within the political discourse 
that only recognized citizens: it had no established way of 
affecting the development of national, communal and religious 
identities of actual people. These political measures, together 
with the charismatic figure of the Prime Minister, Nehru, were 
enough to bring things to a standstill for some time, but 
eventually the regional and religious communalism managed to 
surface with an alarming force. After the periodical communal 
trouble of the 1950s, the situation gradually worsened. The 
central government exerted military force in the areas of Goa and 
Kashmir. Political decisions had to be increasingly circulated 
through the central administration, which created regional 
frustration. The apparent lack of power and autonomy also 
triggered secessionist movements in Assam, Punjab, Nagaland 
and Kashmir. These encouraged the central authorities to use 
even more power by dispatching the army into these regions. The 
increased authoritarianism of the state was now clearly visible 
and resulted in Indira Gandhi declaring a state of emergency 
(Mondal 2007, 23-24). 
After the end of the state of emergency, Mrs Gandhi‘s 
undertakings led to the centre—region problematic becoming 
increasingly mixed with religious communalism, which had 
always represented the other side of the Indian national identity 
(at the same instant India became an independent nation it was 
also divided on religious and communal grounds). This tension 
between the state and the various communalisms is depicted by 
Ghosh in The Shadow Lines, for instance in the scene where the 
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narrator contemplates the fact that riots, which are communal 
trouble, do not make it to the newspapers, which only report acts 
of war which have to do with the nation-states and governments. 
I shall come back to this issue of nationalism and violence in the 
following section III.3. 
To bring things to a standstill, Mrs Gandhi tried to increase 
her popularity within the Hindu community, which could help 
her thwart the appeal of the regional secessionists. With the 
support of Hindu majoritarianism, the centre tightened its grip 
over the regions, and matters resulted in Mrs Gandhi being 
assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984. This happened 
following an attack by the army on a Sikh shrine to arrest the 
leader of a Punjabi secessionist movement. After this, the 
religious/communal dimension of Indian national imagination 
took over with militant and chauvinistic Hindu nationalism in 
the lead. 
These developments had a tremendous impact on the 
Indian cultural and political self-image. Modern Indian history 
and identity had to be reconsidered due to the fact that the grand 
narrative of nationalist freedom-fight against colonial rule had 
lost its relevance and credibility with the destruction of national 
ideals. This Nehruvian idea of a secularist and democratic 
national unity had slowly died with the deepening crisis of the 
Indian nation. Only empty words now remained of this once 
functional rhetoric. National unity had dispersed into various 
regional, linguistic, religious, caste and class identities. 
Secularism had been wrecked by using religious denominators 
for political manoeuvrings, which had planted communalism as 
an inherent part of political logic. Finally, democracy had 
deteriorated into a smoke screen covering the corruption of a 
disproportionately large bureaucracy (Mondal 2007, 25). 
All this resulted in a serious crisis of representation, both 
politically and in a more fundamental sense. The Enlightenment-
based idea of a secular nation and the adjacent representational 
structures had collapsed and destroyed India‘s emergent idea of 
itself. With the ideology of nationalism went its political 
manifestation, the concept of a modern sovereign and self-
representative state, which had stood for progress, modernity, 
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liberty and freedom. The state now stood for coercion, repression 
and oligarchy. This sinister depiction of a not atypical 
postcolonial state would frequently connect with the period of 
emergency when the state had assumed its most authoritarian 
guise. In Indian fiction of the 1980s, it is quite common to 
encounter the state as a threatening and all-invading presence. In 
the fiction of Ghosh the state comes through ―variously as a 
menace, a threat, a distant and peremptory presence, or is 
ironically mocked as a perversion of ‗rationality‘‖ (Mondal 2007, 
26). In general, the history of twentieth century India is 
represented as a fight for national freedom over the colonial rule, 
followed by the fight of multiple religious and regional 
communities against the repressive nation-state. 
In her Limiting Secularism: The Ethics of Coexistence in Indian 
Literature and Film (2008), Priya Kumar provides an extensive 
treatment of the entanglements between religious co-existence 
and secularist nationalism in India after Partition. She proposes 
an ethically conceived alternative to the Nehruvian discourse of 
liberal secularist tolerance which, as we have seen, has 
degenerated into coercion and oppression of other religious 
groups by the Hindu majority. Her idea of ‖revising the related 
and entangled notions of tolerance and secularism‖ through the 
examination an ―ethics of coexistence‖ is based on an 
―imaginative response to particular to particular historical 
moments marked by rising religious violence in the Indian 
subcontinent‖ (Kumar 2008, xv). This comes very close to the way 
in which Ghosh depicts the religious-communal rioting in The 
Shadow Lines, where imagination is highly emphasized as the 
basis for ethically wrought versions of the national past of India. I 
shall examine Ghosh‘s narrative representation of violence in the 
next section. 
The need to criticise and revise the discourses of 
colonialism, Indian nationalism and Indian colonial and national 
identity is apparent in all of Ghosh‘s writing. He is also opposed 
to the authoritarian and coercive actions of the state. But at the 
same time there also seem to be signs of a longing for certain 
aspects of the Nehruvian utopia of a secularist, democratic 
national unity within a nation-state that would contain India‘s 
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diversity in a syncretic whole. Based on ethically conceived 
solidarity, this would provide an ideal alternative to religious 
and ethnic chauvinism as well as political dispersal and 
religious/ethnic violence that are rampant in contemporary 
Hindu nationalism. Postmodern ideas offered a useful method 
for tackling the social and political situation in India in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
To deconstruct the descriptions of the colonies by various 
colonial discourses it was necessary to deconstruct the 
philosophical basis on which they stood. Similarly, the various 
modernist genres and scientific discourses need to be dismantled 
or changed to suit the purposes of the postcolonial world. 
Accordingly, Ghosh has been commended for his generic 
versatility and inventiveness. His experimentation with literary 
and scientific genres and disciplines are the most apparent 
testimony to his affiliation with postmodernism. He mixes 
historiography, ethnography and scientific discourses with 
various literary genres in his search for authentic representations 
that are cognizant of both the heterogeneity and the unity of 
cultural groups. This is most readily evident in In an Antique 
Land, which, as stated in the introductory section (II.3.) is the 
most postmodern of Ghosh‘s works in terms of its narrative 
technique. 
Obviously, writers of fiction adopted postmodern ideas to 
varying extent. It is commonly agreed among critics that the 
impact of Rushdie‘s Midnight’s Children in 1981 on the narrative 
strategy of Indian fiction in English was tremendous. Ghosh does 
not embrace postmodernism as whole-heartedly as Rushdie, but 
they both use postmodern literary techniques to examine the 
birth, development and crisis of the Indian nation. The way 
postmodernism advocates diversity and difference as outcomes 
of the dispersal of modernist entities and totalities was embraced 
by writers trying to make sense of the Indian nation, which was 
about to disintegrate due to religious and communal trouble. The 
tensions caused by the double axis of centralism and regionalism 
plus nationalism and religious communalisms, which had caused 
pressure already during the days of the Raj, had come to the 
surface again after Nehru‘s death in 1964. The unrest reached its 
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peak during the 70s and 80s with the state of emergency (1975-77) 
and the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, the influence of 
which can be detected in the background of The Shadow Lines. 
Ghosh‘s attitude towards the past and the possible future of 
India and nationalism in general provides obvious ground for 
what Mondal describes as ―an acute political and ethical 
dilemma‖ that tends to lead to ―ambivalent meditation‖ in his 
writing (Mondal 2007, 28). This clearly resonates with problems 
of contemporary India, where the tension between the state and 
the numerous ethnicities is evident. The state uses its power to 
keep the nation together at least as a political concept, while the 
various religious communities are attempting to tear it apart. In 
The Shadow Lines, the concept of freedom in relationship to nation 
appears differently for different generations: for T‘hamma 
freedom lies with the state and nationality. It is freedom from the 
colonial rule. But for the cosmopolitan Ila freedom means 
freedom from both the restrictive and oppressive state and the 
customs and rituals of the ethnic/religious communities. She 
abandons both dimensions of the failed Indian nationalism for a 
certain kind of cosmopolitanism. 
What, then, could freedom mean in the future and how 
should the history of the Indian nation be represented for it to 
become meaningful for the needs of the present? This is where 
the political and ethical dilemma Mondal is referring to becomes 
a burning issue. Criticism of the contemporary concept of 
nationhood is necessary so that the original goal of freedom for 
the people promised at independence is not totally forgotten. 
However, the destabilizing and dismantling of the current 
nationalist structures in representation might easily lead to even 
greater disintegration and the total dispersal of the nation. The 
huge national whole of India should be protected, while the 
current discourse and ideology of the only thing keeping this 
whole together, the state, should be deconstructed and rebuilt in 
a manner that makes possible the peaceful co-existence of the 
various heterogeneous elements it contains. The politics of 
difference and instability and the ethics of unifying connections 




Mondal claims that Ghosh is ideologically attached to the 
syncretic nationalism of Nehru (Mondal 2007, 29). It is true that 
Ghosh‘s writing tends to promote syncretism and humanism, 
which as Enlightenment-originated ideas on the surface seem to 
create a certain tension with his postmodernist preoccupations. 
For Ghosh, the common humanity and the accompanying 
similarity of human experience across different spaces and times 
has been divided and fractured by the ideology of modernity and 
its various avatars like Western geographical and ideological 
expansion, modernist knowledge production strategies (mainly 
of sciences) and nationalism. And it is concerning nationalism 
where I would disagree with Mondal. Although the Nehruvian 
model of nationalism would perhaps be regarded by Ghosh as a 
lesser evil than the current situation, I would say that Ghosh 
conceives nationalism in general as an undesirable Western 
formation. Nationalism is based on binary divisions and 
necessarily demands the invention of a certain kind of ‗false‘ 
history on which to stand. Where the idea of nation is concerned, 
Ghosh seems to be closer to Mahatma Gandhi than Nehru: 
Gandhi opposed the Partition, the Western form of nationalism, 
and the discourse of history that came with it. The idea of 
constructing a feasible future out of a selected past did not appeal 
to him. Gandhi wanted to count on pre-existing local identities 
and traditions to create a larger Indian whole. For this purpose, 
he developed the concept of Swadeshi, 
 
a patriotism based on a respect for the everyday material 
world inhabited by most on the subcontinent. His adoption 
of cloth as a symbol of interconnection exemplified this 
esteem of the everyday. By spinning and weaving their own 
cloth, through literal self-production, Indians would regain 
the economic control and cultural respect that colonialism 
had usurped and battered. (Khilnani 1997, 165) 
 
Gandhi‘s idea of nation as a self-producing community was 
clearly incommensurable with the traditional Western 
territorially conceived political nation-state. 
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Like Gandhi, Ghosh is opposed to the political discourse, as 
well as the haphazard division of land and human communities 
required to form a nation. It is noteworthy that, in The Circle of 
Reason, he uses precisely cloth and weaving as the metaphors for 
creating the world and its history. The protagonist of the novel, 
Alu, is reminiscent of the imprisoned Gandhi, who fasted and 
took vows of silence while sitting at his spinning wheel for a 
week at a stretch. He considered the spinning wheel in his cell to 
be the only connector capable of making all Indians using it feel 
that they are the children of the same land (Wolpert 2001, 115). In 
Ghosh‘s novel, Alu is equally silent, until he gains a unifying 
voice through the activity of weaving and creates connections 
between the individuals in the diverse crowd. Ghosh further 
connects weaving with writing, i.e. the production of discursive 
representations. Both weaving and writing, then, are thematised 
as self-productive activity which disrupts the discourse and 
history of Western modernity. And this activity is in the novel 
linked with ancient trade and the routes used to convey self-
produced commodities to distant places. Unlike Gandhi, Ghosh 
extends the connections implied by cloth trade and weaving far 
beyond the Indian predicament to other times and places. In a 
sense, Ghosh by-passes nationalism as though it were a mere 
whim of modernity while reaching beyond its sphere both 
geographically and temporally. However, like Gandhi for whom 
spinning could regain the economic control and cultural respect 
of a people usurped by colonialism, Ghosh weaves cultures into a 
texture of connections between people to produce a 
heterogeneous whole, like a many-coloured cloth. 
Although Ghosh adopts syncretism and humanism in his 
project of seeking ways of representing connections between 
cultures, and although he probably would agree with the view of 
nationalism in India as a colonial/postcolonial failure, I would 
connect his humanist tendency and his concept of nationalism 
more with Gandhi than with Nehru. Further, there seem to be 
signs of a separation between the state and society within 
nationalism in Ghosh‘s writing. Ghosh, who usually appears 
quite positive about the possibilities of various discursive 
mergers, is surprisingly adamant in his delineation of 
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nationalism: in his view, the nationalist political and ‗official‘ 
discourse is incommensurable with human affairs and constitutes 
a gap between the words and the world. The state, unfortunately 
the only connecting force in the Indian nation, comes through as 
a faceless and violent machinery totally detached from the actual 
lives of the people, whom it only recognizes and addresses as 
‗citizens‘. This is reminiscent of their separation by Rabindranath 
Tagore, who characterized nation as a state of being which 
people assumed when being organized as a mechanical unit. In 
Tagore‘s view, this kind of attitude destroys personal humanity. 
Further, the state, which represents the mechanical political 
machinery, uses science for perpetrating violence and oppressing 
people.  
Consequently, Ghosh‘s endorsement of syncretism and 
humanism that alleviate cultural differences through enabling the 
establishment of connections, as well as his antipathy towards 
nationalism and its dividing epistemology, seem to have their 
distinguished predecessors in Mathatma Gandhi and 
Rabindranath Tagore. Nehru, who was also greatly influenced by 
these two, did not, however, share their antipathy towards 
traditional Western political nationalism. I shall not chart the 
possible reasons for the failure of his national model here. Suffice 
it to say that it was a failure that cast a long shadow that still 
hangs over the social and cultural intelligentsia in India. Through 
Tagore, among others, Ghosh also became implicated in the 
tradition of the Bengal Renaissance, which is the best known of 
the vernacular ‗renaissances‘ that emerged in India around the 
mid-nineteenth century. This movement represented the attempt 
of the colonised India to come to terms with the ideology of 
modernism and to produce a specifically Indian modernity out of 
the encounter between the ‗indigenous‘ cultures and this Western 
model. 
The modernism that came into existence through the 
Bengali Renaissance was by no means a straightforward replica 
of the Western version. Modernist concepts had to be 
interrogated in relation to the existing social and cultural 
traditions and to India‘s position as a colonised area. For instance, 




modernity was not palatable as such. This form of humanism had 
its basis in the Enlightenment political discourse on ‗rights‘. 
These rights became actualised in the French and American 
revolutions and they followed the logic of the essential and 
universal humanity as the defining characteristic of all human 
beings. They were shared by everyone irrespective of time and 
place. It is no surprise that the reception of this discourse based 
on universal rights was not unproblematic in a colony where 
these rights were denied. Further, the generally optimistic spirit 
of the European humanism was in India mixed with insecurity, 
even pessimism. It became symptomatic of the frustrating battle 
for cultural equality with the Western nations—a goal never to be 
reached according to the criteria of the same nations, despite 
obvious merits (e.g. Tagore‘s Nobel Prize for Literature in 1913).  
Consequently, in India universal humanism was 
intertwined with local particularism which would then colour 
every discourse forming within the parameters of Indian 
modernity (this was the case for instance with the Bengali 
Renaissance). As we have seen, Indian nationalism would be one 
obvious example. The idea of individualism, of singular 
individual identities, is another case in point: it was continuously 
under pressure by the various religious, linguistic and other 
collective identities that represented considerable power. The 
idea of distinct subjectivities was therefore not easily assimilated 
into the discourses of the Subcontinent. I have already looked at 
Ghosh‘s way of constructing subjects with both modernist and 
postmodernist features in sub-section II.3.1., and shall briefly 
return to this issue from the point of view of ethics in the article 
on The Calcutta Chromosome (IV.4.). 
On a more positive note, much could be assimilated from 
Western modernity and used for specifically Indian purposes. 
The introduction of print culture paved the way for new literary 
genres like the novel, the short story and biography. With them 
also came new concepts of identity and subjectivity. The ‗neutral‘ 
(as opposed to sacred) time of the empty, linear causal logic of 
modernist historiography seemed to be just waiting for 
emplotment in the interests of creating a history that would 
answer the need for cultural parity with Western nations. 
133 
 
Rationalism stemming from the Enlightenment-based positivism 
and empiricism came to India in the form of scientific rationality 
advocated by the colonial state. It was therefore taken as a sign of 
power. Science became the equivalent of reason and progress.  
The ambivalent form in which these discourses were 
assimilated by the Bengali Renaissance reflects the position of 
colonial subjugation. For instance, while scientific positivism and 
empiricism were welcomed enthusiastically, their secular nature 
was discarded. There were quests for analogies and equivalents 
in ancient (mainly Hindu) religious texts and philosophies. In a 
slightly contradictory vein, the same religious and philosophical 
traditions were also used in attempts to humanise science 
(Balaram in The Circle of Reason is one tragicomic fictional 
representative of both these tendencies). Either way, rationalism 
appears as mediated by religion. The science versus religion 
problematic is central throughout The Circle of Reason, and I 
examine the blending of these two poles in the article on the 
novel (sub-section IV.1.). 
In an interview, Ghosh has spoken of the influence that 
Tagore and the writer and film maker, Satyajit Ray, have had on 
his writing and on his way of conceptualizing the world (Silva 
and Tickell 1997, 172). Most idiosyncrasies of Indian modernity 
can be traced back to Tagore. Consequently, all of the above 
mentioned features of the Indian modernity are represented in 
Ghosh‘s writing. Tagore‘s attitude towards nationalism has 
already been touched on. His relationship with Western 
modernity in general was complex and changed during his life. 
In its project of constructing an Indian modernity, the Bengali 
Renaissance was no longer interested in the rural folk culture, 
which these representatives of upper and middle classes had 
previously shared with the peasants. This neglect of the culture 
produced by the subaltern people of India was later a cause for 
great regret for Tagore. This is also a point where Ghosh diverges 
from the Bengali tradition: he has always been interested in 
popular culture and oral folk stories, the representation of which 
in English forms a significant dimension of his writing. But 
Tagore‘s knowledge of the fact that the formation of people into 
colonial subjects has caused and required forms of self-alienation 
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both on individual and larger cultural levels is something Ghosh 
endorses quite eagerly. The most touching depiction of this 
predicament comes probably in The Glass Palace, in the character 
of Arjun (see sub-section II.5.1. and the article in IV.5.). Mondal 
represents Tagore as ―the figure that looms over Ghosh‘s 
troubled and ambivalent relationship to modernity and 
humanism‖ (Mondal 2007, 36). This is quite evident in the shared 
negative attitude of the two towards the modernist discourses of 
nationalism, science, colonialism and their alienative effects. 
The writer and film-maker Satyajit Ray is featured by 
Mondal as representing a more straightforward and positive 
attitude towards modernity, especially the discourse of 
humanism based on the Enlightenment. Ray‘s films and stories 
almost invariably either address children or depict the world 
through them. This ―register of innocence‖ (Mondal 2007, 36) has 
points of convergence with several of Ghosh‘s main protagonists, 
notably Alu in The Circle of Reason and the narrators in The Shadow 
Lines and In an Antique Land. There is an aura of, if not innocence, 
at least openness about these characters. This ‗liberality‘ at the 
face of the world backs up Ghosh‘s promotion of unprejudiced 
attitude towards everything new and especially towards other 
people and the world they inhabit. This works well as an 
epistemological principle for Ghosh, whose work is directed 
towards the humanist creation of ethically formed connections 
between differing cultures and often antagonistic discourses. It 
seems that for Ray, too, open-mindedness worked as a metaphor 
for humanism. It comes through as a part of his project of 
confirming the human, which basically stood for the invigorating 
of the humanist appeal within the tradition of the Bengali 
Renaissance. As far as the narrative techniques and themes in 
fiction writing are concerned, Ray‘s delineation of multi-
dimensional individuated characters and his way of writing 
highly intricate plots and themes into deceptively simple 
narrative structures are also apparent in Ghosh‘s writing. 
The tensions created by the clash and merging of Western 
ideologies with those of the Subcontinent resulted in a discursive 
whirlwind, which reached its peak in the 1980s with the 
introduction of postmodernist ideas (see II.3.1.). This seems to 
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have resulted in the appearance of ethical tenets in Ghosh‘s 
narratives. The clash between ideologies has clearly resulted in a 
heightened awareness of the relativity of all discursive 
constructions. Ghosh‘s ability to move in-between discourses, to 
mould them, as well as to interweave and undo them, can be seen 
as resulting in a kind of frustration with language and discourse: 
although narration carries with it powerful political overtones 
and has the power to mould the world (even to make things 
corporeal, as Zindi‘s narration does in The Circle of Reason), it does 
do not seem to offer access to any ultimate and unchanging truth 
concerning human existence or the encounter with the other 
human being. The power of language seems to lie in its ability to 
change its object of description and create realities. The ethical 
awareness of the distorting nature of narration begins to show 
more clearly in The Shadow Lines, where, as shall be shown below 
as well as in the article IV.2., the narration seems to be urgently 
aware of its own powers and the need to wield those powers 
cautiously. 
Consequently, while continuing to discuss the difficult 
relationship of nationalism and communalism in the 
Subcontinent in a closer relationship to Ghosh‘s narration, the 
following sub-section also reacts to Ghosh‘s endeavour to 
transcend the ‗aesthetic of indifference‘ mentioned in the 
introduction. The representation of violence, which, as has been 
noted, is a recurrent theme in Ghosh in the form of the attacking 
mob, offers excellent ground for examining Ghosh‘s narrative 
strategy of refusing to turn violence into an overtly dramatized 
aesthetic spectacle. This strategy of not defining matters too 
obviously from any one angle is characteristic of Ghosh and is 
one of the defining features of his writing. As the presence of 
collective violence is most readily available in The Shadow Lines, I 




III.3. National and communal struggle 
– representation of violence 
 
Although each of his novels contains some measure of mob 
action, The Shadow Lines represents the most thorough 
examination of collective violence in Ghosh‘s oeuvre. The novel 
narrates rioting in post-partition India and Pakistan in close 
relationship with nationalism and communalism. In another 
context, Ghosh has expressed his concern about the descriptions 
of violence in general: 
 
When I now read descriptions of troubled parts of the 
world, in which violence appears primordial and 
inevitable, a fate to which masses of people are largely 
resigned, I find myself asking, Is that all there was to it? Or 
is it possible that the authors of these descriptions failed to 
find a form—or a style or a voice or a plot—that could 
accommodate both violence and the civilized willed 
response to it? (Ghosh 2002, 62) 
 
I shall next look at how violence and unrest are represented in 
Ghosh‘s own descriptions of violence.  
When the narrator of The Shadow Lines is studying in Delhi, 
he browses through old newspapers to find something on the 
riots he remembers from the Calcutta of the early sixties. He 
learns that the riots of his memory were the off-spring of riots 
that followed the theft of a relic (the hair of the Prophet 
Muhammad) from a mosque near Srinagar in the Kashmir area of 
India in the late 1963. The relic had been very popular among all 
the communities in Kashmir and over the centuries it had become 
a symbol of the unique and distinctive culture of Kashmir that 
transcended the now politicised and nationalised denominator of 
religion. After the theft, riots erupted both in India and Pakistan, 
but this time the targets of the rioters were not people of different 
religion and community, but property identified with the 
government and the police. The government officials were 
surprised: the theft of the relic had brought together the 
communities of Kashmir as never before. After two weeks of 
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rioting in India and both wings of Pakistan, the relic was 
allegedly ‗recovered‘ by the Indian intelligence authorities.  
Regrettably, as the city of Srinagar bursts with joy, a 
demonstration against the theft of the relic in the town of Khulna 
in the east wing of Pakistan turns violent. As events accumulate, 
people of different religions are once again restored as the target 
of the rioters, and Hindus begin to pour into India over the 
border. The riots then gradually spread to Calcutta, where, as an 
inverted ‗mirror image‘ of what happens in Pakistan, Muslims 
are attacked by Hindus. The common feeling among the 
Kashmiri communities epitomized through the ancient relic 
provides an example of the kind of connection that leaves aside 
nationalist discourse with its religious and other divisions. Both 
governments are eager to stop the riots, which they regard as 
subversive action against the hegemonic discourse of 
nationalism. Eventually, however, the riots develop from a 
communities vs. nations type of disorder into a nationalities vs. 
communalisms kind of struggle, in which the citizens of the 
Hindu nation attack Muslims within its borders and vice versa. 
The beginning of these riots is in line with Gaurav Desai‘s 
observation that ―any residual syncretism evident today is to 
Ghosh a privileged site of political resistance itself—and 
particularly of political resistance to the repressive state‖ (Desai 
2004, 128). But as the unrest spreads syncretism against the state 
is gradually pushed aside as the communal status of violence is 
restored. 
In the case of India and Pakistan, the national border is also 
a communally constructed border. But while the border is quite 
valid at the level of official national discourse and clearly 
separates two nation-states, the communal border actually 
divides the original Indian Self, which was formed by the 
plenitude of religious communities, the two largest of which are 
Hindus and Muslims. Consequently, the divide between the 
Hindu and the Muslim is clear cut only in the nationalist 
discourse; in practical reality there are people of both 
communities on both sides of the border. The national and 
communal identities mix with one another. In this sense, on the 
other side of the border is not an other, but rather the divided 
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communal Self.9 Hence the title of the novel, The Shadow Lines, 
which constitutes a comment on the shadowy nature of the lines 
and borders separating the intertwined communal and national 
identities of people. 
This two-sided nature of the border is symbolized in the 
novel among other things by the mirror, which shows not only 
oneself, but functions also as a window to other selves on the 
other side of the border constituted by Partition. When writing 
about the fear of riots he felt as a child in Calcutta, the narrator 
concludes: ―It is this that sets apart the thousand million people 
who inhabit the sub-continent from the rest of the world—not 
language, not food, not music—it is the special quality of 
loneliness that grows out of the fear of the war between oneself 
and one‘s image in the mirror‖ (The Shadow Lines 204). The 
narrator also describes the border between India and Pakistan as 
a ―looking-glass border‖, referring to the mirrored riots on both 
sides of the border: ―I, in Calcutta, had only to look into the 
mirror to be in Dhaka; a moment when each city was the inverted 
image of the other, locked into an irreversible symmetry by the 
line that was to set us free—our looking-glass border‖ (The 
Shadow Lines 233). Ironically, then, the line that was supposed to 
create two free nations with free citizens, actually bound people 
together more strongly than ever. Of course, the idea of a mirror 
functions both on the communal and the national spheres: if the 
riots are mirror images of each other at the communal level, so 
are the official announcements at the national level: ―As for the 
two governments, they traded a series of curiously symmetrical 
accusations‖ (The Shadow Lines 230), first criticizing each other for 
letting the riots happen, then congratulating each other for 
quelling them. 
All in all, the novel depicts riots at three levels. There are 
riots between different religious communities within one nation-
state, there are simultaneous, mirrored, riots between religious 
communities in two states and there are riots between different 
communities (one or more) and the government. Robi, one of the 
                                                 
9 See Anshuman Mondal (2003) for more extensive clarification of the 
national/communal problematics in relation to the novel. 
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narrator‘s cousins, describes his experiences from the time he was 
acting as a government official: 
 
I‘d have to go out and make speeches to my policemen, 
saying: You have to be firm, you have to do your duty. 
You have to kill whole villages if necessary—we have 
nothing against the people, it‘s the terrorists we want to 
get, but we have to be willing to pay a price for our unity 
and freedom. And when I went back home, I would find 
an anonymous note waiting for me, saying: We‘re going 
to get you, nothing personal, we have to kill you for our 
freedom. It would be like reading my own speech 
transcribed on a mirror. (The Shadow Lines 246-247) 
 
Ironically, both the terrorists and the government troops are 
acting to secure their freedom, which, as a construction of 
nationalist ideology, is an illusion. As Robi says: ―the whole thing 
is a mirage. How can anyone divide a memory? If freedom were 
possible, surely Tridib‘s death would have set me free‖ (The 
Shadow Lines 247).  
In his article on The Shadow Lines, Jon Mee ties up nicely the 
three-fold nature of riots on the subcontinent: 
The riots represent one of those blurrings that haunt the 
novel as they reveal that the imagining of the nation and 
the state may not be the same thing. Even in their 
antagonism towards each other, the rioters may be bound 
together in ways that the state cannot acknowledge. […] 
The riots are as much a subversion of difference, the 
difference between India and Pakistan, as they are the 
product of difference, the difference between Hindu and 
Muslim, and even the latter asserts a relationship with the 
image in the mirror. (Mee 2003, 104-105) 
 
The blurring Mee refers to is at a general level due to the 
narrative‘s tendency of dismantling various discursive totalities 
(here nationalism and communalism) on the one hand and 
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attempting to offer multiple views/versions on the events 
making these dismantlings evident on the other. 
In Ghosh‘s fiction, then, the two-dimensional nature of 
human connections becomes apparent on many occasions. For 
instance, the double nature (national and communal) of the 
divide between India and Pakistan is symbolized through the 
two-fold function of the mirror. When applied to the divide, or 
border, it both acknowledges the difference (or national identity) 
instigated through nationalist discourse (the mirror that blocks 
out the other and only shows oneself) and recognizes the 
communal bonds that reach across this official divide (the 
window through which you can see other selves of the divided 
Indian whole). As a result of the combined mirror-window effect, 
the relationship between the two nation-states is presented as a 
multi- and interhistorical issue in the communal and personal 
sense and not just as an issue based in the difference inherent in 
the discourse of nationalism (see the article on the novel in 
section IV.2. for more thorough examination of the mirror-
window dyad). 
But as the riots caused by the theft of the relic in the novel 
show us, people in the subcontinent are never safe from violence. 
Whether people opt for the inter-communal unity vs. the nation-
states, or affiliate themselves with the nationalist imagery, which 
has divided the Indian communal self according to religious 
majorities, the double-condition of the subcontinent seems to lead 
to crowd disorder in the novel. Hence the need to create one‘s 
own affiliations, one‘s own imaginary identifications, to avoid 
appropriation by the discourses of others and to stay away from 
violence. Mee examines the novel as an example of a cultural 
translation that would by-pass the universals of nationalist or 
scientific discourse and occur directly between cultural 
differences. As Mee explains, quite often ―universal values are 
privileged as a third term through which all differences must 
pass if they are to relate to one another‖ (2003, 91). Mee sees the 
strategy of the imaginative invention of one‘s own stories 
promoted by Tridib as an example of the kind of translation, or 
connection, that leaves these universals aside. It in a sense 
reaches across cultures instead of taking a detour into a universal 
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(such as the discourse of nationalism) beyond them. This is very 
close to how Radhakrishnan views the novel and its treatment of 
nationalist discourse, which  
 
insists that all other a priori imaginary relations and 
identifications (be they gender or sexuality based or 
class, religion, ethnicity, or community specific) be 
mediated and alienated into knowledge by the symbolic 
authority of nationalism that […] exercises total 
command precisely because it cannot be had by any one 
group yet can perform its representative-pedagogical 
function with seeming neutrality. (2000, 62, orig. 
emphasis) 
 
The narrative itself backs up this kind of interpretation quite 
strongly by depicting riots on both sides of the border as a 
reminder of an ―independent relationship‖ that manifests the 
―indivisable sanity that binds people to each other independently 
of their governments.‖ This relationship ―is the natural enemy of 
government, for it is in the logic of states that to exist at all they 
must claim the monopoly of all relationships between people.‖ 
(The Shadow Lines 230) 
To sum up, then, nation-states and communities do not 
exist on the same plane: a division that creates two nation-states 
and is quite successful in nationalist discourse, results in violent 
incisions at communal level. On the other hand, calls for 
communal divisions are unacceptable within the discourse of a 
nation-sate. But both nations and communities are in the end 
inventions. And all these inventions, whether personal or 
‗official‘ are equal in the epistemological sense; they are equally 
imaginary. But, as Radhakrishnan states in his study of the novel, 
although these inventions are epistemologically equal versions, 
they may be ―all too ‗real‘ in their political effects, hence the need 
to have ‗one‘s own‘ version.‖ (2003, 28) Accordingly, the novel 
offers the possibility of a kind of utopian transcendence of the 
communal (and at the same time the national) division in the 
form of the strategy of the imaginative invention of one‘s own 
stories promoted by the narrator‘s uncle, Tridib.  
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If we now re-examine the passage in The Shadow Lines 
where the narrator endeavors to find a way of writing about riots 
but ends up in a ―struggle with silence,‖ we can see that this 
silence is not only produced by the borders of national discourse: 
 
Every word I write about these events of 1964 is the 
product of a struggle with silence. It is a struggle I am 
destined to lose—have already lost—for even after all 
these years, I do not know where within me, in which 
corner of my world, this silence lies. All I know of it is 
what it is not. It is not, for example, the silence of an 
imperfect memory. Nor is it a silence enforced by a 
ruthless state–nothing like that, no barbed wire, no 
check-points to tell me where its boundaries lie. I know 
nothing of this silence except that it lies outside the reach 
of my intelligence, beyond words—that is why this 
silence must win, must inevitably defeat me, because it 
is not a presence at all; it is simply a gap, a hole, an 
emptiness in which there are no words. (The Shadow 
Lines 218) 
 
In the strictest sense, then, in the novel the experience of a riot is 
―beyond words‖ and consequently also outside the reach of 
knowing. The experience of riots in the narrative is ethically 
depicted. Riots enact memories and sensations, but these are very 
difficult to turn into language because this would create meaning 
and knowledge, which again would not be able to convey these 
memories and sensations due to their partial and distorting 
character. It seems that any representation of a riot is necessarily 
banal, losing itself in the gap between the world and the words. 
Consequently, on another occasion the narrator reflects that the 
fear caused by riots ―has a texture you can neither forget nor 
describe‖ (The Shadow Lines 204) and this double impediment 
affects the narrative representation of riots in the novel to a high 
degree. This texture that cannot be put into words or forgotten 
corresponds to the ethical Saying as delineated by Levinas and 
explicated in the section III.1.2. 
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Amitav Ghosh has expressed his concern about the literary 
representation of collective violence in an essay originally 
published in The New Yorker in 1995 (The Ghosts of Mrs Gandhi). 
There, for the first time he writes about his experiences of the 
rioting that followed Indira Gandhi‘s assassination in 1984. He 
quotes the Bosnian writer Dzevad Karahasan‘s essay Literature 
and War, where Karahasan establishes ―a connection between 
modern literary aestheticism and the contemporary world‘s 
indifference to violence‖ (Ghosh 2002, 60). In Karahasan‘s view, 
―the decision to perceive literally everything as an aesthetic 
phenomenon—completely sidestepping questions about 
goodness and truth—is an artistic decision. That decision started 
in the realm of art, and went on to become characteristic of the 
contemporary world‖ (Karahasan in Ghosh 2002, 60). 
Ghosh explains that for his next novel (The Shadow Lines), 
and for descriptions of violence in general, he needed to find a 
strategy of representation that would not reduce experiences and 
representations of riots, or violence in general, to mere spectacle. 
He had difficulties in finding a way of writing about the riots 
directly without ―recreating them as a panorama of violence,‖ as 
an aesthetic phenomenon in the sense Karahasan means. For 
instance, Robi‘s description of the riot that led to Tridib‘s death 
(The Shadow Lines 244-246) is narrated by him in the form of a 
recurring dream, a nightmare that ends before Tridib is actually 
killed. The description is dramatized and creates the effect of a 
film with rapid cuts. It seems that here Ghosh the writer does 
allow for a dramatized, spectacle-like description of violence. But, 
significantly, Robi‘s version of the incident is represented as a 
frightening dream; it follows the form and content of a 
stereotypical nightmare and does not claim to be a realistic 
account of the event. On the contrary, attention is drawn to the 
fact that the dream assumes ‗artistic liberties‘ compared to how 
Robi actually remembers the events. Below is the beginning of 
the dream: 
 
Sometimes it‘s a crowd, sometimes just a couple of men. 
[…] The odd thing is, that no matter how many men 
there are—a couple, or dozens—the street always seems 
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empty. It was full of people when we went through it 
[…] but all the shops are shut now, barricaded, and so 
are the windows in the houses. […] Then the men begin 
to move towards us—they‘re not running, they‘re 
gliding, like skaters in a race. They fan out and begin to 
close in on us. It‘s all silent, I can‘t hear a single thing, no 
sound at all. (The Shadow Lines 243-244) 
 
Thus the only obviously dramatized description of violence in the 
novel—the only turning of violence into a predominantly 
aesthetic phenomenon—is presented as a dream. What is more, 
this dream is silent, which implies that it somehow unfolds in an 
ethical dimension outside language.  
The death of Tridib is described towards the end of the 
novel, and this is done in a totally different manner. When the 
narrator meets May, one of the eye-witnesses to Tridib‘s death in 
the 1964 riots, he says that he has never asked her about the 
events surrounding Tridib‘s death because he did not know how 
to do it: ―I told her the truth: that I hadn‘t known how to ask, that 
I simply hadn‘t possessed the words; that I had not had the 
courage to breach her silence without the solid bridgehead of 
words.‖ (The Shadow Lines 250) When the death of Tridib in the 
hands of the mob is finally described, it is reported by May 
without any dramatizing detail, without unnecessary adjectives, 
bluntly and in as short sentences as possible. Below is the end of 
the description. May has come out of the car and is running 
towards the old man and the rickshaw: 
 
I began to run towards the rickshaw. I heard Tridib 
shouting my name. But I kept running. I heard him 
running after me. He caught up with me and pushed 
me, from behind. I stumbled and fell. I thought he‘d stop 
to take me back to the car. But he ran on towards the 
rickshaw. The mob had surrounded the rickshaw. They 
had pulled the old man off it. I could hear him 
screaming. Tridib ran into the mob, and fell upon their 
backs. He was trying to push his way through to the old 
man, I think. Then the mob dragged him in. He 
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vanished. I could see only their backs. It took less than a 
moment. Then the men began to scatter. I picked myself 
up and began to run towards them. The men had melted 
away, into the gullies. When I got there, I saw three 
bodies. They were all dead. They‘d cut Khalil‘s stomach 
open. The old man‘s head had been hacked off. And 
they‘d cut Tridib‘s throat, from ear to ear. 
 That was that; that‘s all there is to tell. 
 We cleared away the dinner plates then, I 
remember. 
 (The Shadow Lines 250-251) 
 
The short sentences in this quotation may have the effect of 
building up the atmosphere, but certainly they make for a very 
undramatical representation of violence, especially towards the 
end, where the deaths of the three men are stated matter of factly, 
before moving on to describe quotidian household tasks. 
Significantly, May does not see the actual acts of decapitation and 
throat cutting, in which the violence reaches its peak. The mob 
envelopes Tridib and the old man, blocking the view. Any 
description of violence is necessarily dramatic to a certain extent, 
but at least the above passage avoids aestheticizing the event or 
turning it into a spectacle. The incident is merely reported, there 
is no superfluous description and there is no explanation that 
would seek to give meaning to what happened. 
The novel is more concentrated on narrating the inner 
experiences and consequences of riots than describing the actual 
acts of violence. And when finally the actual violence is described 
it is done in a manner that avoids any superfluous narration and 
by this means avoids superfluous dramatizing and meaning 
construction. The narrator of the novel seems to be quite as 
careful in his descriptions of violence as is Ghosh in the essay 
examined above. In the representation of riots the world of 
experience and the language of meaning do not coincide: there is 
a gap, and the narrator tries to avoid banality both by desisting 
from the use of discourse that would be inappropriate for the 
description of riots, and by not remaining silent about them. In 
his essay on the 1984 riots Ghosh explains that he felt responsible 
146 
 
for what he would write, what the effect of his words would be in 
a context where the political situation leaves ―so little room for 
the writer‖: 
 
To write carelessly, in such a way as to appear to 
endorse terrorism or repression, can add easily to the 
problem: and in such incendiary circumstances, words 
cost lives, and it is only appropriate that those who deal 
in words should pay scrupulous attention to what they 
say. It is only appropriate that they should find 
themselves inhibited. (Ghosh 2002, 61) 
 
This kind of awareness of the possibly drastic effects careless 
words might have has surely influenced the way in which Ghosh 
the writer represents violence. Ghosh further explains that to be 
able to write about violence he had to resolve the dilemma 
between his roles as a writer and a citizen. He maintains that, as a 
writer, his subject was obviously the violence, and as a writer he 
was worried about the fact that the contemporary conventions of 
representation in novels, news reports and films often just give us 
the bloody details and ―present violence as an apocalyptic 
spectacle, while the resistance to it can easily figure as mere 
sentimentality, or, worse, pathetic or absurd.‖ But as a citizen and 
a human being, Ghosh‘s experience of the riots was ―not the 
horror and violence but the affirmation of humanity: in each case, 
I witnessed the risks that perfectly ordinary people are willing to 
take for one another.‖ (Ghosh 2002, 61)  
The description of Tridib‘s death in the novel seems to seek 
an equilibrium between the two ‗faces‘ of a riot taken up by 
Ghosh in his essay: it depicts both the violence of the event and 
the ―affirmation of humanity‖ that comes through in the form of 
Tridib‘s action as he faces the mob. By surrendering himself to 
the mob, Tridib sacrifices himself on May‘s behalf. When he 
pushes May down and plunges into the crowd trying to rescue 
the old man and Khalil, he must know what is going to happen to 
him. The act of Tridib is characterized as a sacrifice and mystery 
by May, once again highlighting the evasive nature of collective 
violence as the object of representation in the novel: matters 
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pertaining to it cannot be understood or voiced properly: ―He 
gave himself up; it was a sacrifice. I know I can‘t understand it, I 
know I mustn‘t try, for any real sacrifice is a mystery‖ (The 
Shadow Lines 252). 
The novel attempts to address the issue of violence by not 
defining it too obviously: the riots are there in the background all 
the time: they have had an effect on everyone. But the narrative 
appears extremely guarded about straightforward descriptions of 
violence. It does not try to define violence or give it meaning 
beyond the absolute minimum, because this would create the 
danger of allying it with the political discourse and giving riots a 
political meaning as either terrorism or action against repression. 
In the hands of Ghosh, fiction seems to be a useful discursive 
meta-mode for blending and framing various discourses and 
topics without defining them to the extent that they no longer 
seem to exist in their own right or independently. Ghosh has 
always managed to be surprisingly up-to-date and aware of 
things going on in cultural and political debates without 
explicitly thematizing them. This way of writing manages to 
engulf the urgent aspects of contemporary societies without 
becoming affiliated with any branch of science or politics; indeed 
without subordinating these debates to too much defining 
discourse. The various aspects of the world are not so much 
transformed into objects of the ‗knowing‘ words of language; 
they are rather shown but left undefined so that everyone can 
form his/her own imaginary identifications with them. The 
power-related political overtones carried by language are here 
balanced by an ethical awareness, whereby communal violence is 
not straightforwardly defined into some discourse (be that public 
or personal, national or communal) appropriating the 
phenomenon into its own knowledge production strategies. Its 
presence is acknowledged and it is defined to the extent it has to 
be, but the awareness of the impossibility of an adequate 
representation of it is also present in the narrative. And when a 
description of violence cannot be avoided, care is taken to feature 
both the violence and the ―civilized willed response to it,‖ to 
contrast the horror of violence with the ethical affirmation of 
humanity. In The Shadow Lines, this affirmation is present in 
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Tridib‘s sacrifice, which is characterized as mystery. This, then, is 
an example of ethically aware narration, in which the political 
potential for definition and meaning formation of 
discourse/language is balanced by juxtaposing, or connecting, it 
with this ethical sacrifice, or giving away one‘s self, in front of the 
other. The ethical dimension that comes through in the character 
of Tridib shall be examined in more detail in the article in IV.2. 
In the following, my aim is to outline how Ghosh situates 
his writing in relation to the process of globalization and the 
power-relationships that steer it, and how he represents the 
encounter between different classes, cultures and ideologies. 
Language carries with it power-related overtones, and when 
certain narratives gain hegemonic positions, other areas of reality 
tend to be left in silence. Therefore, I shall examine Ghosh‘s 
relationship to various ‗grand‘ narratives by looking at the 
relationship between narration and silence in his novels. As we 
have seen, narration in general stands for the political and 
discursive, and silence for the ethical and non-discursive in 
Ghosh‘s narration. 
 
III.4. Narration and Silence 
 
Emanating from discussions of the new global world order over 
the past two decades has been the call for a new ‗multicultural‘ 
literary paradigm. Apparently the term world literature was first 
coined by Goethe. As Wail S. Hassan (2000) notes in his article on 
literature in the age of globalization, when sketching the idea of 
world literature, Goethe was envisioning the future rather than 
describing a contemporary state of affairs. For him, world 
literature was a literature which would describe some kind of 
universal human experience through cross-cultural 
understanding, which he thought could be achieved by reading 
the leading writers of other (Western) nations. There was to be an 
open dialogue between nations, through which their literatures 
would eventually reach a synthesis. As Hassan notes, there have 
been suggestions that Goethe‘s idea of world literature was 
triggered by the increasing trade and communication that had 
followed the industrial revolution. 
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In the case of Amitav Ghosh, the idea of universalism, or 
universal human experience, is most evident in his call for 
connections across cultures. Already in The Circle of Reason, he 
adopts weaving, a symbol also used by Mahatma Gandhi for the 
creation of connections (see section III.1.), for referring to the 
universal nature of the experience constructed of particular 
strands: ―And so weaving, too, is hope; a living belief that having 
once made the world one and blessed it with its diversity it must do so 
again. Weaving is hope because it has no country, no continent‖ 
(The Circle of Reason 58; emphasis added). Weaving, or experience 
or narration, has no specific country or continent. In this sense, it 
is a universal feature of mankind. In the introduction, I have 
already referred to the importance of establishing connections 
(weaving), and the meaning attributed to place that come 
through in the above citation. But this passage, and Ghosh‘s 
narration as a whole, also seem to negate the separate existence of 
universalism and particularism through a narrative process. The 
simultaneous emphasis on the diversity and the universality of 
humankind that emerges from Ghosh‘s narration is close to what 
Patrick Colm Hogan has named ―particularist universalism‖ 
(2000, xvii), which can be characterized as simultaneous 
universalism and cultural particularism. 
Hogan distinguishes between absolutism and universalism. 
While absolutism represents the idea that one culturally specific 
set of beliefs or practices applies to everyone, universalism 
―involves a self-conscious effort to understand precisely what is 
common across different cultures‖ (2000, xvi). Hogan seems to 
construct universalism as a point of view, rather than a 
dimension that becomes visible through the examination of 
various sites and their connections, as Marcus suggests (1998, 
83).10 Universalism, as defined by Hogan, seems to be adoptable 
at will, a method for examining heterogeneous groups of people. 
                                                 
10 Although Marcus in this context does not speak of universalism, but of 
the ―global,‖ and although the word ―global‖ bears Western- and capital-
related overtones of which universalism as a term is relatively free 
(excluding the discussions on Eurocentric ‗universalism,‘ which actually is 
absolutism), for the purposes of this text, local and global or particular and 
universal can be used interchangeably. 
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According to him, in the universalist view, ―no practices are 
ethnically particular,‖ but all are ―ethnically neutral‖ (2000, 313). 
He also states that through universalism people can discern ―the 
common humanity‖ and the ―shareable value of distinct 
instantiations‖ (2000, xviii) of it. He sees cultural particularism 
not as the opposite of universalism, but as its consequence. 
Hogan‘s universalism moves in the opposite direction from that 
of Marcus; in Hogan‘s view, respect for different cultures is to be 
gained through universalism, whereas Marcus promotes the view 
that universal features become visible through the examination of 
multiple particular sites and their connections. 
It would seem that the model of Marcus is closer to Ghosh‘s 
narration than that of Hogan. Ghosh does not set out to search for 
universal features, but to construct multiple historical trajectories 
and connections among them. For him, the clothing (to apply an 
example used by Hogan) of his characters is certainly socio-
culturally specific, and he usually describes the garments of his 
characters, as well as their circumstances of living (e.g. the 
descriptions of the apartments of the characters in The Calcutta 
Chromosome examined in section II.4.1.). But the fact that there are 
so many differing kinds of clothing, of which none are presented 
as being more significant or neutral than the others, lessens the 
definitive power of clothing in relation to the characters‘ ethnicity 
or origin. To the characters in Ghosh‘s novels, ethnic or racial 
differences, although acknowledged, are of surprisingly little 
consequence. Ghosh‘s way of narrating multiple histories and the 
creation of connections where they usually have not been 
discerned circumvents the traditional postcolonial discourse 
contemplating racial and ethnic differences. This has been noticed 
by Ranjita Basu in her article on Ghosh‘s novels: ―It is curious to 
note that no false note is struck in Ghosh`s delineation of 
Egyptian or Arabic characters and this is because their emotions 
and passions are related to their universal humanity rather than 
to their racial identity‖. She describes this universal dimension as 
―a broader, more human context that transcends the boundaries 
between Indian and foreign‖ (1994, 152-53). In The Circle of 
Reason, for instance, we only learn towards the end of the novel 
that Zindi is Egyptian. As Basu points out, ―this knowledge does 
151 
 
not help to define her in any way, for Ghosh has already defined 
her in a broader, more human context that transcends the 
boundaries between Indian and foreign‖ (1994, 153). 
For Ghosh, then, to create connections between various 
socio-cultural and historical discourses is a deeply humane action 
that also indirectly constitutes the universal dimension of his 
narration. What is universal is revealed through ethical 
connections between various particularities (see the ethically 
framed discussion on substitution and universalism versus 
particularism in section III.1.2.). Since there is no straightforward 
access to these universals, one cannot just adopt a universalist 
approach; one has, rather, to narrate, often painstakingly, the 
intertwined histories and socio-cultural circumstances of various 
groups, to avoid the appropriation of discourses, and to secure 
for these groups their own agency and voice. The common 
humane features of mankind are gained through particularism. 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the idea of 
universal experience has expanded considerably from the 
Western-based concept propounded by Goethe. Similarly, the 
status of nations has changed dramatically since Goethe‘s times, 
and trade and communication have multiplied in quantity and 
speed. Arif Dirlik succinctly lists the typical features of the 
contemporary situation:  
global motions of peoples (and, therefore, cultures), the 
weakening of boundaries (among societies, as well as 
among social categories), the replication in societies 
internally of inequalities and discrepancies once associated 
with colonial differences, simultaneous homogenization 
and fragmentation within and across societies, the 
interpenetration of the global and the local (which shows 
culturally in simultaneous cosmopolitanism and localism of 
which the most cogent version may be ‗multiculturalism‘), 
and the disorganization of a world conceived in terms of 
‗three worlds‘ or nation-states. (1997, 93) 
If literature is produced under such circumstances, I think it is 
fair to say that we now live in the era of global multicultural 
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world literatures. But the question is, are we reaching a cultural 
synthesis through the merging of literatures, or are we witnessing 
a dispersal and fracturing of cultures. And what does this 
‗multiculturalism‘ mean? Postcolonial theorists such as Homi 
Bhabha (1994) see multiculturalism as a positive concept and 
celebrate the border areas of cultural existence as a fertile ground 
for creating new narrative strategies to account for the new kinds 
of fragmented ‗hybrid‘ experiences. Marxist theorists warn us 
against such abstract concepts and claim that multiculturalism is 
just a new name for marginalization and racism, this time 
dictated by the late-capitalist mode of production, which depends 
on globalization, not on colonial expansion. In their opinion, 
postcolonialism eventually serves to strengthen the ideology it 
claims to subvert. For this line of argument, see e.g. Edward San 
Juan:  
 
What strikes me as fatal is the repudiation of foundations 
and objective validity that undermines any move to 
produce new forms of creative power and resistance 
against global inequalities and oppression. Hybridised, 
heterogeneous and discrepant lifestyles, local knowledges, 
cyborgs, borderland scripts - such slogans tend to obfuscate 
the power of the transnational ideology and practise of 
consumerism and its dehumanizing effects. Postcolonial 
discourse generated in "First World" academies turns out to 
be one more product of flexible, post-Fordist capitalism, not 
its antithesis. (1998, 8) 
 
San Juan further characterizes globalization as "a recently 
retooled program of universal commodification, imperialism for 
the twenty-first century." (1998, 198). Dirlik, in turn, criticizes 
postcolonial theory for its abstract concepts and accuses it of 
rendering "into problems of subjectivity and epistemology 
concrete and material problems of the everyday world" (1997, 76). 
He sees multiculturalism as a trick performed by global 
capitalism to include within its sphere areas that might otherwise 
turn against it.  
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The globalization discussion seems to indicate that there are 
elements of both homogenization (especially the political and 
economic levels) as well as diversity and tension (especially the 
cultural level) present in this new ‗global village‘.11 As Doris 
Bachmann-Medick has noted in her study on intercultural 
communication, it seems that although we may have a relatively 
free trade zone in our post-national world, this has not resulted in 
"free cultural trade" of the kind Goethe thought could be 
achieved through the trans-national concept of world literature 
(Bachmann-Medick 1996). The directions, or narrative strategies, 
of this new world literature are varied. There is the alternative of 
aiming at a peaceful fusion of all difference into some kind of 
homogenic multicultural experience (Western postcolonialism). 
Then there is the option of building discursive barriers to resist 
this multiculturalization that acts as a smoke-screen for economic 
exploitation directed from the West (´the Empire writes back‘ 
type of thinking). Most works naturally end up as something that 
has elements of both these extremities in them.  
During the 1990s, the Marxist branch of postcolonial theory 
(Aijaz Ahmad, E. San Juan, Dirlik, etc.) gained a prominent 
position beside the variant based on poststructuralism, which 
was the leading paradigm during the 1980s and part of the 1990s. 
The methods of Marxist theory are more practical and historically 
informed than those of the often abstract poststructuralist-based 
postcolonialism. With its emphasis on the movements of capital 
and work force, and with its insistence on the importance of the 
historical perspective, Marxist theory is also relevant and 
methodologically suitable for the examination of the 
globalization process. On the other hand, traditional postcolonial 
theory, with its basis on language and discursively constructed 
realities, is a useful tool for examining questions of power. As I 
am dealing with literature here, it is quite reasonable to take as a 
starting point language, and more specifically narration. In 
reference to the problem of synthesis versus diversification, it can 
be said that we have one world but several narrative realities that 
                                                 




inhabit it. These narrations are constructed through language, 
which carries with it cultural, political and power-related 
overtones. So, in the end, this seems to be a question of agency 
and power, of whose voice is heard and whose voice and 
ideology get to map the world. Those who are conquered, in a 
military or ideological sense or otherwise, are thrown into 
silence. 
In his writing, Ghosh uses stories to indicate diversity in 
the social and cultural backgrounds of his characters. By using 
stories, he also tries to deal with the problem of appropriation. By 
giving away his narratorial responsibilities, in a way, he tries to 
give authentic voice to various kinds of people coming from 
different social classes and cultures. Through their stories, Ghosh 
tries to avoid appropriation on several levels. One of these is 
narratorial appropriation. The narrator in Ghosh‘s novels is often 
from the middle or upper-middle class of Indian society, 
belonging to the privileged group that has had Westernized 
education and is fluent in English (like Ghosh himself). 
Describing the lower classes from this position in a language they 
often do not know at all can be seen as an act of appropriation 
that makes them part of the privileged discourse, both 
linguistically and ideologically. Ghosh tries to give these people 
agency and their own point of view by locating them as the 
narrators of their own stories, instead of relating their lives from 
a privileged point of view. Consequently, Ghosh‘s attempt at 
avoiding narratorial appropriation is tantamount to the avoiding 
of appropriation over class differences. 
In his study of Indian English fiction, Tabish Khair (2001) 
makes a distinction between the privileged and Westernized 
"babu" class and the "coolie" classes that are lower in the social 
hierarchy. He has also examined Ghosh‘s use of language in 
relation to appropriation (Khair 2001, 314-17). He points out that 
Ghosh does not "stage" the coolie and his/her use of English, or 
any other language. In other words, Ghosh does not use anything 
like the Rushdian chutney or Sanskritized English of Raja Rao to 
represent the language of the coolie, be it Bengali or some form of 
English. Everything is translated into English grapholect, with an 
indication in the text of the kind of variety in question. 
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Vernacular words and Indianisms are used only to explain 
something or to "fill a gap in the English grapholect" (2001, 316). 
As Khair points out, this is a good way of representing the 
subaltern without "appropriating a sense of authenticity" (2001, 
316). Khair‘s reference here is to The Calcutta Chromosome only, 
but this feature seems to be present in Ghosh‘s other novels too.  
If the stories help to maintain and create diversity, Ghosh‘s 
representation of his characters can be seen as creating common 
ground, or as moving towards a kind of transcendent unity in his 
narration. As I have attempted to show, Ghosh circumvents the 
traditional postcolonial discourse contemplating racial and ethnic 
differences by narrating his characters on the level of a kind of 
universal humanity, or experience. As will be seen later, the 
relationship between diversity and wholeness, or particularity 
and universality, in Ghosh‘s writing is quite complicated. Suffice 
it to say here, that in these days of discursively constructed 
realities, and of discourse as power, the delineation of this kind of 
transcendent ethical universal experience connecting people may 
appear to be out of place. But this is exactly how Ghosh seems to 
want it. He does not remain tied up only with the constructionist 
discursive epistemology, because this would mean conforming to 
the hegemonic Western way of narrating, or constructing, the 
world. 
The stories narrated, or focalized, through individual 
characters in Ghosh‘s novels, although not superfluous to the 
narrative as a whole, often appear as distinct from the main 
stream of narration, and their contents represent the world of the 
character through which they are focalized. As indicated, the 
stories also have to do with agency. In The Circle of Reason, 
narration creates the world, makes it real, even corporeal. This 
implies that by changing the narrative, the narrator changes the 
world. To use one of Ghosh‘s favourite expressions, already 
encountered in the introduction to The Glass Palace, a change in a 
narrative is like the potter‘s thumb on the malleable clay whirling 
on the wheel. The Circle of Reason, then, concentrates on the 
importance of narration and the power of language to signify and 
to create alternative realities. The reference to clay also marks the 
material, corporeal and substantial nature of these narratively 
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constructed realities (The Circle of Reason 212-213). Silence, apart 
from the fact that it is a feature of Alu‘s character, does not play a 
significant role in the novel. There is, however, one scene where 
narration and silence are presented as parts of the same 
communicative process (this is a scene I shall be returning to 
several times). Uncharacteristically, Alu has begun to talk. He sits 
at the loom, weaves ferociously and speaks in a strange mixture 
of languages. The usually talkative group of people gathers 
around him to listen in silence (The Circle of Reason 279). 
Amazingly, people in this multi-lingual crowd seem to answer 
him through their individual silences. The scene is typical of the 
magic-realist spirit of the novel, but it also has relevance to 
Ghosh‘s theme of diversity in one - this is an example of all the 
languages in one.12 This kind of mixture would also do away 
with the problems of agency and appropriation. It raises a 
question that has relevance to Ghosh‘s later writing: what is the 
nature of silence - is it the opposite of speech and narration, or 
does it have communicative potential? I will come back to this 
question later.  
While it is not significantly thematised in In an Antique 
Land, in Ghosh‘s fourth novel, The Calcutta Chromosome, silence is 
given a prominent role. The theme of diversity in one is present 
once again, this time for instance in the form of the 
heterogeneous congregation dedicated to the goddess of Silence. 
The crowd has gathered to follow the transition of the mysterious 
Laakhan to a new body: "It seemed like a strangely motley 
assortment of people: men in patched lungis, a handful of 
brightly painted women in cheap nylon saris, a few young 
students, several prim-looking middle-class women - people you 
would never expect to see together" (The Calcutta Chromosome 
164-165). In other words, the worshippers of Silence come from 
vastly different social backgrounds. As was seen in the 
introductory section on the novel (II.4.1.), Ghosh narrates the 
social spectrum from various viewpoints in several discourses. 
As a result of the parallel narration of several temporal and 
                                                 




spatial dimensions, the structure of the novel is very fragmented. 
Nevertheless, the characters in the novel are "not fractured into 
their separate and local identities but knitted together along with 
their differences into a, shall we say, great-narrative that pits their 
agency against their representation in and by colonial and 
imperial great-narratives" (Khair 2001, 328). The fragmentary 
structure, often connected with the Western postmodern 
novelistic genre, functions here as a useful tool for the 
simultaneous narration of several realities and voices. 
On a political level, Ghosh‘s message here seems to be that 
the hegemonic position of the Western narrative of rationality 
and science is so strong that it cannot be overcome through 
subaltern narration or voice. This has been commented on in the 
context of the self-alienation of Arjun in The Glass Palace (II.5.1.). 
In Ghosh‘s delineation, Western discourse has, over the centuries, 
partitioned the world both geographically and culturally, and 
now reigns over this fragmented whole through the ideology of 
modernism and global capital. This is thematised most clearly in 
In an Antique Land and shall be discussed in the article in section 
IV.3. In The Calcutta Chromosome, silence is not seen as mere 
banality and lack of meaning as it is in The Shadow Lines; on the 
contrary, in The Calcutta Chromosome, silence represents 
considerable subversive power. Western narration of the world 
has no way of containing and understanding reality in the 
manner of the subaltern people in the novel, because its 
language, its way of knowing, changes the world into a process 
of rational causal relationships. Murugan, who has conducted 
extensive research on Ross‘s career and has found Mangala‘s 
secret group in the process, explains the idea of this counter-
science in the novel as follows: 
Wouldn‘t you say that the first principle of a functioning 
counter-science would have to be secrecy? The way I see it, 
it wouldn‘t just have to be secretive about what it did (it 
couldn‘t hope to beat the scientists at that game anyway); it 
would also have to be secretive in what it did. It would in 
principle have to refuse all direct communication, because 
to communicate, to put ideas into language, would be to 
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establish a claim to know - which is the first thing that a 
counter-science would dispute. (The Calcutta Chromosome 
101) 
This group cannot voice their aspirations; if they did, they would 
immediately be appropriated by Western scientific discourse. 
Furthermore, these worshippers of the female Goddess of Silence 
are illiterate and know little or no English. They act outside the 
reality formed by the English narrative, but still manage to 
manipulate that reality. 
As was seen above in the context of representing communal 
violence (III.3.), in The Shadow Lines silence is described as 
something which has been left out by the hegemonic narration 
and which therefore has not been given meaning. It is a gap, a 
whole and an emptiness (The Shadow Lines 218). In The Calcutta 
Chromosome, it is precisely this lack of meaning, the fact that the 
hegemonic discourse has left this area of the world out of its 
process of meaning production, dismissing it as irrational, that 
empowers silence. Silence is here considered a kind of feminine 
counterforce to Western male-centered science and rationalism. 
As long as the group works in silence, Western scientific 
discourse has no access to it; it cannot, in fact, even be aware of 
its existence.  
On an epistemological level, Ghosh implies that we can 
only know through language. Consequently, in knowing the 
world, scientifically or otherwise, we simultaneously change it by 
projecting onto it ideological meanings conveyed by words. 
Silence represents the kind of unattainable experience that 
transcends the level of language, or knowing. This would be the 
experience of the ultimate truth that has not been changed 
through knowing, in other words by the meanings carried by 
language. In the words of Murugan, this would mean "the 
ultimate transcendence of nature" (The Calcutta Chromosome 106). 
In his writing, Ghosh seems to operate on two levels. First, 
he acknowledges that the world is a narrative and discursive 
social construction where alternative narrative realities and 
ideologies clash and unite. This is evident in his foregrounding of 
oral stories and is also clearly evident in The Shadow Lines, which 
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examines the multiple narrative realities and the construction of 
personal and national identities out of these realities. In this 
novel, the narrator seems to privilege language over images; 
reality only comes into existence through the narrative ordering 
of images. In The Calcutta Chromosome, where silence and the 
transcending of language have a more prominent role, Phulboni 
is less certain of this order:  
I have never known, whether life lies in words or images, in 
speech or sight. Does a story come to be in the words that I 
conjure out of my mind, or does it live already, somewhere, 
enshrined in mud and clay - in an image, that is, in the 
crafted mimicry of life? (The Calcutta Chromosome 226) 
But there is an alternative to the discursive, in a sense 
poststructuralist, epistemology, which Ghosh increasingly finds 
untenable: he acknowledges to the world a reality beyond human 
knowledge, or narration. This is the world of silence: a unified, 
but not homogeneous world, free of the power politics 
distributed by language. It is a space that transcends temporal 
and spatial distances, as well as differences of social position, 
without making them vanish. It also brings us back to Ghosh‘s 
theme of diversity in one: it is in this world that Alu, in the scene 
in The Circle of Reason referred to earlier, is speaking in his 
"turmoil of languages." This mixture of languages does not put 
forward any particular ideology or claim to power in the way a 
specific language would. In other words, it does not ‗know‘, it 
does not provide a definitive answer. It is only a question, to 
which everyone can have their own response. Therefore, it speaks 
to everyone, regardless of class or language, without treating 
them as a homogeneous group. As Phulboni says in The Calcutta 
Chromosome, although this is the world of silence, it is animate, it 
exists and it has a spirit. Consequently, the crowd is capable of 
communicating with Alu through silence.  
This world is also similar to the one for which the narrator 
in The Shadow Lines is longing when he speaks of  
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a pure, painful and primitive desire, a longing for 
everything that was not in oneself, a torment of the flesh, 
that carried one beyond the limits of one‘s mind to other 
times and other places, and even, if one was lucky, to a 
place where there was no border between oneself and one‘s 
image in the mirror. (The Shadow Lines 29) 
In In An Antique Land this world of diversity in one is represented 
by the unpartitioned past before the Western hegemony, in which 
different religions and cultures lived together in peace. And, 
finally, it is to this kind of world that Murugan, Tara and the 
numerous other voices are taking Antar in the closing lines of The 
Calcutta Chromosome: "There were voices everywhere now, in his 
room, in his head, in his ears, it was as though a crowd of people 
was in the room with him. They were saying: ‗We‘re with you; 
you‘re not alone; we‘ll help you across‘" (The Calcutta Chromosome 
306). 
Although Ghosh does not thematize this transcendent 
reality too strongly, it is nevertheless present in the background 
of all of his novels and represents a kind of ethical universal 
experience which is beyond language. In The Calcutta Chromosome 
and The Circle of Reason, it is hinted at on an epistemological or 
transcendent level, whereas in the other two novels examined 
here it is represented in the form of a reconstructed past. The 
sketching of this kind of ‗alternative‘ reality, or reconstruction of 
the past, may be seen as overtly idealistic or romantic, but to my 
mind it is a subversive act in itself, offering us a refuge from the 
oppressive power struggles of everyday life into an ethically 
constructed world that "has been made one and blessed with 
diversity" (The Circle of Reason 58). 
It seems that this idea of a heterogeneous whole is Ghosh‘s 
answer to the questions I posed at the beginning of this sub-
section about the possible direction of the new world literatures 
and about multiculturalism. Literatures should not aim at 
"homogenizing heterogeneity", a world embracing hybridity that 
does away with context-specific differences, nor should they 
engage in a radical and pointed emphasizing of difference that 
does not recognize the whole. Ghosh‘s work resonates with both 
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postcolonial and Marxists modifications of ‗multiculturalism‘. In 
An Antique Land, for instance, shows current multiculturalism in 
Egypt in a very practical and historically informed guise as the 
interpenetration of the local and the global, resulting in 
simultaneous cosmopolitanism and localism, as defined by 
Dirlik. But there is also the discursively constructed multicultural 
‗hybrid‘, for instance in the form of the anonymous narrator of 
The Shadow Lines. His identity is written at the border-lines of 
cultures, and his narration adopts a curious strategy of mingling 
the imaginary and the actual to account for his fragmented 
experiences.  
Gauri Viswanathan has examined In An Antique Land with 
reference to the concept of religious syncretism. She states:  
 
Ghosh‘s syncretism denies the historical reality of religious 
difference. That is why no matter how moving Ghosh‘s 
book might be, and no matter how appealing his humanist 
call for dissolving barriers between nations, peoples, and 
communities on the grounds that world civilizations were 
syncretic long before the divisions introduced by the 
territorial boundaries of nation-states, the work cannot get 
beyond nostalgia to offer ways of dealing with what is, 
after all, an intractable political problem. (Wiswanathan 
1996)  
 
I have to disagree, because as a whole the book does offer a 
feasible way of representing cultural-political problems: it gives 
voice to various scientific approaches as well as to different 
cultures, classes and religions without obliterating their 
differences. If a certain nostalgia for the past emanates from the 
book, that has to be allowed for a writer of fiction. I shall return 
to the political viability of Ghosh‘s writing in closer detail in 
section VI.2. Suffice it to say here, that even though Ghosh can be 
accused of attempting to produce some kind of nostalgic 
universal human experience or forced syncretism, he never 
dispenses with diversity and particularity in his writings. He 
aims at a unity, but he arrives at it through the representation of 
diversity, without doing away with the conflicts it enacts. 
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In her study, Bachmann-Medick evokes Lévi-Strauss and 
his plea for "a controlled cultural ethnocentrism" which "stresses 
the need of cultures for self-assertion and defends it against the 
shapeless multiculturalism" (Bachmann-Medick 1996). Ghosh 
tries to avoid shapeless multiculturalism by narrating the whole 
through the distinctive voices of several cultural groups and 
social classes. He recognizes the whole, but retains its diversity. 
This also comprises Ghosh‘s remedy for the contemporary 
fragmentation and disorganization of the world. In the manner of 
Mahatma Gandhi, he seeks for ‗wholes‘ that transcend the 
partitions and differences created and maintained by the 
changing forms of Western ideology and capitalism. As has been 
shown, these ‗wholes‘ may appear in the form of narrative 
reconstructions of the past, or they may appear as ‗silent‘ 
transcendent realities that exist outside linguistically constructed 
knowledge, or a discursively realized world. 
 These ‗wholes‘ disrupt the Western discourses of 
colonization or globalization far more than some now almost 
conventionalized forms of postcolonial "writing back". This is 
because, as was shown in the context of The Circle of Reason, in 
delineating his characters, Ghosh leaves without emphasis such 
partitioning concepts as nationality, ethnicity and race. He lets 
these features, and the conflicts they create, come up in the 
background, for instance in the stories that his characters tell, but 
he does not use them as representative or definitive qualities of 
his characters. As Ranjita Basu notes, the "emotions and passions" 
of Ghosh‘s characters are related more to "their universal 
humanity" than to their racial or ethnic identity (Basu 1994, 152-
153). This kind of representation of racial and ethnic difference 
escapes the grip of the Western discourse, which largely defines 
people on the basis of their nationality, race, ethnicity or religion. 
Consequently, although the typical postcolonial subvertion of 
power-relationships that are connected with racial difference, for 
instance, does raise the position of marginalized peoples, it still 
happens in the discursive framework constructed by the West. 
But the characters in Ghosh‘s novels pay scant attention to ethnic 
or racial differences. Ghosh transcends the Western (and 
postcolonial) discourse of ‗otherness‘ and difference by 
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delineating his characters in a universal, human, context that 
transcends the boundaries between nationalities and religions. 
To sum up, then, it would seem that at the level of narrative 
strategy Ghosh has found fresh ways of representing the global 
multicultural societies and experiences. His refusal to foreground 
nationality, ethnicity and race (even class) as the principal 
definitive features of fictional characters, and his search for a way 
to represent different social groups that ensures their authentic 
voice and agency seem to be particularly good methods for the 
new world literatures to reduce the clash between cultures and, 
conversely, to avoid homogenization in their representation of 
multiculturalism. Furthermore, his project of narrating silences 
produced by nationalistic discourse, or the discourse of Western 
historiography, has acute cultural and political relevance in the 
context of many areas of the world that have so far been 
presented only as parts of ‗grander‘ narratives. And, at an 
epistemological level, he is trying to find a way of escaping the 
realm of the hegemonic Western mode of being and narrating the 
world. It seems that one of the possible ways he has found to 
circumvent this powerful and deeply rooted ‗way of knowing‘ is 
to turn to silence as a means of achieving realities that exist 
outside the hegemonic narration and epistemology. 
Silence has traditionally been considered as the absence, or 
failure, of agency in literary criticism. But when the difference 
between being silent and being silenced was foregrounded, 
silence began to be presented as a site of resistance. It was 
considered discursive and agential; it had communicative 
potential. The voluntary silence, the ―will to unsay‖ (Duncan 
2001, 28-30), became prominent as a subversive act, a token of 
resistance towards hegemonic discourses. In a literary text, the 
unspoken was seen as having ―the potential for decoding that 
which is hidden by and from the dominant discourse‖ (Huttunen 
et al 2008, xv). Conceived as a textual site that has the potential to 
create alternative meanings, this performatively functioning 
silence needed a reading strategy of its own. (Huttunen et al 2008, 
xv). But, as should be evident from the above discussion of 
silence in the narration of Ghosh, this view of silence as 
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discursive does not entirely exhaust the significance that silence 
has in the narratives under examination here.  
For Ghosh, silence ultimately has an ethical function, which 
basically posits silence beyond, or outside, discourse. Silence in 
Ghosh‘s narration comes through as ethical rather than 
discursive. For instance, the silent group in The Calcutta 
Chromosome functions beyond discursive knowledge. If its silence 
were discursive, it would already have been defined by the 
discursive methods of meaning production. The group is not 
straightforwardly defined in the novel, which in a way remains 
on the shadowy line between defining and remaining silent about 
it. The fact that it is symbolized by a clay figurine also highlights 
the non-discursive character of the group, which is represented 
through an image instead of language. Of course, the outside of 
language cannot be reached by using language, but it can be 
approached, or staged and hinted at, to the extent this is possible. 
In the hands of Ghosh, the novel has a meta-discursive function, 
as it blends the discursive methods of sciences and literary 
genres. The idea of a non-discursive narration, although a 
contradiction in terms, maybe possible to attain by readers 
through the use of the ‗precise imagination‘ put forward by 
Radhakrishnan in his study of The Shadow Lines. 
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IV. The Articles 
 
The following articles revolve around the simultaneous presence 
of modernist and postmodernist discourses in Ghosh‘s fiction, 
while concentrating on specific themes raised in the six novels. 
The articles are arranged in the order in which the novels were 
published, and so they also offer a sense of how Ghosh‘s writing 
techniques have changed through time. The deconstruction and 
subsequent reassembly of discourses in unexpected forms is 
Ghosh‘s strategic methodology. The resulting narratives, I shall 
argue, are ethically informed: they break discursive totalities and 
refuse to allow the other to be subordinated by the self. 
The first article, on The Circle of Reason (IV.1.), examines 
how the dismantling of the modernist epistemology based on 
binary constructions enables the construction of ethical 
connections. In this article, I argue that the novel represents the 
coming together of ethics and politics in its deconstruction and 
reassembly of the poles of modernist binaries. I also argue for the 
use of Spivakian ‗strategic essentialism‘ as a viable ethico-
political alternative for the construction of subaltern 
subjectivities. 
The second article is on The Shadow Lines (IV.2.). It 
concentrates on the importance of imagination and narration in 
the construction of personal versions of events. It examines the 
way narration weaves together hegemonic ‗given‘ versions of 
events with imaginative personal narrative constructions. I argue 
that Ghosh‘s suspicion about the capacity of language to 
ultimately represent emotions or the other comes through in this 
novel for the first time. I further argue that relationships based on 
love and desire, which are central themes in the narrative, are 
ethically constructed in the novel. 
The next article, written on In an Antique Land (IV.3.), looks 
at the manner in which Ghosh delineates the encounter between 
different cultures and ideologies while examining his way of 
juxtaposing and amalgamating established discourses. I present 
the novel as a representative of the simultaneous 
provincialization of European history and re-moulding of 
traditional ethnography, following the ideas of Dipesh 
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Chakrabarty and George Marcus, respectively. I argue that there 
is in the novel an awareness of other people‘s realities not only as 
other histories but also as other knowledges, towards which we 
have to remain open so that genuine transcultural reading may 
become possible. This openness to other knowledges also 
comprises an ethically noteworthy narrative principle. 
The fourth article (IV.4.) takes as its object of investigation 
The Calcutta Chromosome. It examines the ethical outcome of the 
merger of universal humanism and postmodernist textuality 
through the themes of silence and knowledge. I argue that, in the 
novel, silence represents the ethical dimension beyond discourse 
and language, while knowledge is indicative of discursive 
totalities. I aim to show that the narration in this novel proceeds 
though the principles of both deconstruction and ethics. I also 
argue that the narrative uses image/vision as a tool of 
representation for the ethical, while language, discourse and 
knowledge point towards the closed and eclipsing totalities of 
Western discourses, and of the traditional self. 
The fifth article on The Glass Palace (IV.5.) sheds light on 
Ghosh‘s method of setting different ideologies against each other 
both on the content level and as regards the discourses used to 
narrate this content. The novel proceeds through discussions, 
which, I argue, form an ethical way of representing interhuman 
relationships. I further argue that here, as in the previous novel, 
image and vision are chosen as metaphors for the ethically 
informed representation, this time in the form of photographs 
and photography. 
The last article (IV.6.) covers The Hungry Tide and seeks to 
clarify Ghosh‘s views on language as the communicative medium 
for the encounter with the other human being, and with animals 
and nature. I argue that there is a heightened awareness of the 
inability of language to represent the encounter with the other in 
the novel. Again, I argue that a form of vision is used to signify 
ethical understanding in the narrative. All in all, I further argue, 
the novel depicts animals as being more in tune with themselves 
and the world than humans, who are inhibited by a deceiving 
bag of tricks: language as a communicative apparatus.  
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V. Concluding Remarks 
 
The above articles approach Ghosh‘s novels simultaneously from 
the viewpoints of humanism and poststructralism, or ethical 
humanism and political postmodernism. Poststructuralist tenets 
are applied to the deconstruction of discursive totalities, and 
humanist ethics is laid as the ground on which new, ethically 
constructed, relationships are built. Beyond claimig that the 
novels form ethico-political wholes, the articles do not, however, 
comment on the political implications of the merging of the two 
in any significant detail. It is my contention, however, that the 
coming together of ethics and politics in Ghosh‘s writing has 
interesting effects on how human societies could be constructed 
and on what principles they might function. It is precisely on this 
point that a certain kind of dubiety, or uncertainty, concerning 
the political implications of Ghosh‘s narratives seems to surface 
when the criticism on his works is examined as a whole. The final 
subsection of this dissertation provides an explanation for this 
uncertainty by explicating how the narrative strategies of Ghosh 
function in relationship to politics. There I shall examine his 
writing with a view to the passage, or move, from ethics to 
politics in Levinasian ethics. 
In order to situate this study within the field of criticism on 
Ghosh, the first part of the following final section provides a 
short general overview of the critical reception of Ghosh‘s novels. 
I shall not comment on the schools of thought that have surfaced 
on the Subcontinent, especially around the The Shadow Lines. The 
purpose is rather to chart the main lines of argument in 
international criticism on his works in order to evaluate the 
potential impact and relevance of my findings in the articles. 
 
V.1. Critical overview 
 
The criticism written on Ghosh clearly establishes him as one of 
the most prominent in his generation of Indian writers in English 
(see e.g. John Thieme‘s excellent writings on Ghosh). Although 
Ghosh‘s writing does not define them in any obvious ways, it 
nonetheless deals with many of the urgent political and 
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theoretical issues of the contemporary academic world. Ghosh 
himself does not acknowledge an affiliation to postcolonial 
theory, or at least to its poststructuralist variant propounded by 
such theorists as Homi Bhabha. Nevertheless, he examines issues 
that form the area of interest of postcolonial theorists and critics. 
It is evident that he explores the colonial and postcolonial themes 
and eras, but not from the viewpoint of the various sub-branches 
of postcolonial theory.  
On the other hand, Ghosh does consider Indian writing in 
English to be an apt characterization of his work: 
 
I think of myself as an Indian writer in the first instance. By 
this I mean that my work has its roots in the experience of 
the people of the Indian sub-continent, at home and abroad. 
I think I would be uncomfortable with any categorization of 
my work that did not acknowledge this. In this sense 
'Indian writing in English' seems to me to be a perfectly 
acceptable categorization of my work. (Ghosh in Dougal 
2001) 
 
Possibly due to his endeavours in the university world, it was 
precisely within academic circles that his work was first 
acknowledged as a prominent voice in the Indian writing in 
English. As Mondal observes (2007, 164), the publication of The 
Shadow Lines coincided with academic interest in the 
interrogation of nationalism and national identity, which were 
fast developing into a major concern within postcolonial 
criticism. In an Antique Land finally made apparent Ghosh‘s 
intellectual preoccupations, which, incidentally, largely 
overlapped with those of this new generation of critics. Ghosh 
came across as a writer ―whose innovative textual experiments 
offered new insights and openings into the cluster of conceptual 
and theoretical concepts that had been developed to describe, 
analyse and interpret the complex of colonial and postcolonial 
relations‖ (Mondal 2007, 164). 
The first really important and influential piece of criticism 
on Ghosh‘s writing was probably by Dixon in 1996. I have 
referred to this article in many of my own articles. Another 
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important and more substantial endeavour came from Tabish 
Khair in the form of a chapter on The Calcutta Chromosome in his 
published PhD in 2001. The two very different monographs on 
Ghosh by Mondal (2007) and John C. Hawley (2005) were an 
important addition to a body of edited volumes that has been 
growing especially in the Indian subcontinent. There have been 
unpublished dissertations, parts of which have found their way 
to various journals. Some of the most notable journal publications 
in this line come from Claire Chambers, specifically on The Circle 
of Reason and The Calcutta Chromosome. In general, criticism on 
Ghosh within Western academia has concentrated on In an 
Antique Land and The Calcutta Chromosome, whereas the criticism 
stemming from the Indian subcontinent has found its main target 
in The Shadow Lines and its preoccupations with nationalism. 
Decidedly ethical criticism on Ghosh‘s novels worth 
mentioning here has been provided among others by Black (2010) 
on The Glass Palace and The Hungry Tide and Kumar (2008) on The 
Shadow Lines and In an Antique Land. Kumar juxtaposes In an 
Antique Land with Rushdie‘s The Moor’s Last Sigh praising both for 
their successful imaginings of a more ―inclusive and hospitable 
world‖, and congratulating Ghosh for his transnational 
cosmopolitanism that calls into question ―the post-Partition 
binaries of ―Indian‖ and ―Pakistani‖‖ (xxiv). She draws attention 
to Rushdie‘s version of cosmopolitanism and its tendency to 
dissolve differences altogether in its desire for a borderless world. 
Paradoxically, Rushdie in Kumar‘s view also manifests an 
inability to move beyond the idea of modernist nation-state. In 
this vein, Ghosh in her view ―offers a more complex account of 
the intermeshing of religions and cultures, one that is not limited 
by, and indeed exceeds the bounds of, the nation-state‖ (2008, 
xxiv). Kumar further maintains that Rushdie fails to do away 
with fundamentalist and regressive lexicons in his 
representations of religion, while Ghosh appears unable to self-
reflectively question the secular universalist position of his 
narrator. The Shadow Lines is examined by Kumar in juxtaposition 
with Looking through Glass by Mukul Kesavan, highlighting the 




I have already referred to Black and her excellent analysis 
of Ghosh‘s novels (see section II.5. and the beginning of section 
III.1.). Black discerns in Ghosh‘s fiction ―inceasingly radical 
textual sacrifices‖ (2010, 16) that appear necessary for imaginative 
border crossing. This foregrounds the ethical problem of 
representing linguistic difference. It is necessary to find a solution 
to the problem of ethically narrating the translingual, 
multilingual and (certainly in the case of Ghosh) even extra- or 
antilingual experiences in the English language. In Black‘s view, 
Ghosh‘s treatment of English in The Glass Palace makes the 
language ―renounce elements of its own aesthetic privilege‖ (17) 
in an attempt to accommodate different forms of expression.13 
Renouncing obvious markers of linguistic variation, such as 
dialect and style (still carefully crafted and pointed out in The 
Calcutta Chromosome) this novel ―flattens the sonic dimension of 
English to create a tone that different readers are meant to hear 
differently‖ (17). I agree with Black on this point, and I am also 
on the same lines with her on The Hungry Tide, as can be inferred 
from my article on it. I therefore share Black‘s contention that 
―the radicalism of this approach deepens in The Hungry Tide, 
which produces expansive crowded selves and styles to embrace 
the significant linguistic otherness of hyperverbal translation and 
nonhuman communication‖ (17). Black concludes her treatment 
of Ghosh as follows: 
 
As Ghosh‘s writing asks how fiction in English might 
accommodate the multiplicity of multilingual and 
antilingual experience, it copes with the borders between 
                                                 
13 Black (2010, 167) connects Ghosh‘s preoccupation with new practises of 
textuality with a larger trend of experimenting with the relationship between 
linguistic form and social difference she discerns within the twenty-five-year 
span she examines in her book (1980-2005).  She mentions novels such as The 
Bone People (1983) by Keri Hulme, Kafka’s Curse (1997) by Achmat Dangor and 
Londonstani (2006) by Gautam Malkani as texts occupied with the various ways 
of depicting socially explicit usages of the English language. Especially Hulme 
comes close to Ghosh in her delineation of silence and visual arts as forms of 
representation. Of course, the ‗chutneyed‘ English of Rushdie‘s Midnight’s 
Children (1981), and the ‘sanskritized‘ English of Raja Rao from earlier decades 
also come to mind here. 
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languages by divesting English of exclusive aesthetic 
privilege. The flattened language of The Glass Palace 
eschews the hierarchies of dialect, favouring instead the 
visual techniques of modernist photography, and the 
crowded selves of The Hungry Tide forge a compromise 
between the utopianism of the unspoken and the fallible 
speech of translation. These aesthetic renunciations, 
paradoxically, expand the capacity of English to represent 
non-English worlds of experience. They testify to possible 
strategies for lives lived across the borders of language. 
(2010, 199) 
 
The Hungry Tide, which among Ghosh‘s novels has received 
the largest amount of substantial ethical criticism, has been 
approached from this angle also by Terri Tomsky, whose 
interpretation of the characters of Kanai and Piya as well as their 
relationship is strikingly close to mine (see the article in IV.6.). 
But Tomsky also examines the way the characters of Nirmal and 
Nilima in the novel can be ethically approached through Edward 
Said‘s concept of ―anxious witnessing‖ (Said 2000, xxi), originally 
conceived as denoting the relationship of the writer to his/her 
community. Anxious witnessing is in Tomsky‘s view inseparable 
from ethical inquiry as it brings the creative vision of the 
displaced (or exiled) writer together with the ethical obligation of 
the intellectual (58). Consequently, Tomsky foregrounds anxious 
witnessing as ―a useful hermeneutic for understanding the model 
for ethical action advanced by Ghosh‖ (Tomsky 2009, 54). She 
further maintains that Ghosh, like Said, ―recognizes that ethical 
intervention is only effective when accompanied by the economic 
agency of the transnational bourgeoisie.‖ In her view, anxious 
witnessing ―collapses into modes of melancholia and incapacity 
without financial mobilization‖ (54), thereby emphasizing the 
importance of this cosmopolitan component. However, Tomsky 
is observant enough to recognize that Ghosh‘s ethics also comes 
through as ―a meditation on the transformative power of close 
human relationships‖, which I highlight in my article and which 
Tomsky characterizes as having an effect on the political actions 
(cf. Nilima) and philosophical interests (cf. Nirmal) of the 
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characters. Tomsky also brings the concept of the affect à la Sara 
Ahmed (2000) to bear on her interpretation of the novel. 
As I have endeavoured to establish, the writing of Ghosh is 
affiliated both with postmodernism and liberal humanism. In 
general, the criticism written on his works tends to adopt one of 
the following four stances in relation to this ambivalence: the 
avoidance of both postmodernism and humanism (eg. Dixon 
1996), affiliation with both (eg. Mondal 2007), or seeing his 
writing as primarily humanist (eg. Viswanathan 1996) or 
postmodernist (eg. Kaul 1995). In addition to his own argument, 
Mondal offers an apt discussion on the views of the other three 
scholars mentioned above (Mondal 2007, 169-172). The presence 
of both postmodern and humanist sentiments in Ghosh‘s output 
is quite evident and, as will be shown in the next sub-section, this 
duplicity does not indicate an escape from both realms by 
avoiding affiliation with either, as Dixon would have it. On the 
contrary, it ―denotes a strategic commitment to both‖ (Mondal 
2007, 171; original emphasis). Ghosh‘s texts cannot be defined 
solely as postmodern or humanist without eclipsing a significant 
amount of important material in them. His texts weave together 
elements of both ideologies for certain purposes. The articles in 
this dissertation chart the historical and cultural contexts of this 
ambivalent approach, while trying to establish the goals of the 
ensuing ideological texture. 
As Mondal (2007, 171) observes, although Ghosh‘s writings 
have been explored thoroughly from theoretically and politically 
informed angles, their political status and viability have largely 
been left unresolved. Of the four above mentioned critics, 
Viswanathan, Kaul and Dixon respectively maintain that Ghosh 
either fails to consider political problems in his forced humanist 
syncretism (In an Antique Land), proposes the use of amorphous 
imagination that has no consequences on material reality (The 
Shadow Lines), or lets his text flow free of any affiliation, be that 
humanist or postmodernist. The central thesis proposed by 
Mondal is that Ghosh has a strategic commitment to both 
humanism and postmodernism, and that this explains the 
ambivalent attitude that his texts reveal towards both. My own 
stance in this respect has been explicated in the articles and will 
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be returned to in these concluding remarks, but suffice it to 
mention here that I am closest to Mondal on this issue. But a 
caveat is in order: with Ghosh, it is only safe to say that his 
narratives are equally preoccupied with matters pertaining to 
both liberal humanism and postmodernism, not so much with 
these two as theoretical disciplines or sets of methodological 
tools. Ghosh the writer of fiction is not to be confused with Ghosh 
the academic. 
In addition to the concern about the political implications of 
Ghosh‘s writing expressed by several critics, the matter of gender 
in Ghosh‘s output merits a mention since it has clearly been 
neglected by critics in the subcontinent and the West alike. This is 
commented on by Mondal, who briefly discusses the 
representation of gender in Ghosh‘s novels (2007, 165-169). In 
addition to Mondal, texts on Ghosh that specifically take up 
gender include those by Nagesh Rao on cosmopolitanism, class 
and gender in The Shadow Lines; Suchitra Mathur on third-world 
women and the politics of science, that includes The Calcutta 
Chromosome as one of three examples on its theme; and Shameem 
Black (2006) on The Shadow Lines. This dissertation does not 
concentrate on questions of gender in any detail. But it is worth 
noting that Ghosh‘s narratives are mindful of gender and that the 
significance of gender in his output has been on the increase. 
As I have attempted to establish, Ghosh‘s works resonate 
strongly with the history of the assimilation and/or refutation of 
Western ideas (be they modernist or postmodernist) in India and 
especially in the Bengali tradition from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards. The ambivalence inherent in this tradition 
between the initially successful creation of cultural/political 
strategies for facing colonialism and the resulting defeat in the 
form of the failure of the construction of a politically functional 
Indian nationalism comes through in Ghosh‘s writing. What 
creates the more positive dimension of his fiction is the outlining 
of strategies for transcending or avoiding the boundaries set by 
modernist knowledge production strategies and the political 
systems based on them. 
The representational strategies developed by Ghosh 
advocate the establishment of connections through ethical 
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principles, which help to avoid the pitfalls lurking in the 
mechanisms of an unguarded discursive representation of the 
other. Ghosh explores the colonial and post-colonial situation 
through an amalgamation of postmodernism (politics of 
difference) and humanism (ethics of connections). As I clarified in 
section III.2., both humanism and postmodernism are an integral 
part of the ideological history of India. As I shall attempt to show 
in the following section, in Ghosh‘s writing this ideological fusion 
comprises an ethical project not indicative of political failure, or a 
failure to cope with political discourses. It is, rather, 
representative of the simultaneous representation of both ethical 
and political dimensions of human existence. 
  
V.2. From ethics to politics – political viability in the writing 
of Amitav Ghosh 
 
As I mentioned above, certain critics (especially Viswanathan and 
Kaul) of Ghosh‘s writing have dismissed his work on the 
grounds that it is incapable of taking political responsibility 
and/or confronting political realities. Presumably, this dismissal 
is motivated by a certain kind of ‗activist‘ conception of what 
constitutes political behaviour or responsibility. This conception 
presupposes that politics automatically involves action and that a 
discourse is politically significant ―to the extent that it can be 
acted upon‖ (Mondal 2007, 172). Politics would then require 
choices that make for a certain course of action. Ghosh‘s 
ambivalence, his concentration on both the ethics of connections 
and the politics of discourse and difference causes a problem in 
this respect, because he seems to be espousing two political 
positions, making two choices at once. Mondal connects this 
ambivalence with Ghosh‘s dislike of binary models evident, as I 
have shown in the article in IV.1., right from The Circle of Reason. 
Mondal claims that Ghosh chooses to pick both stances: he 
chooses not to make a choice based on a binary model. According 
to the ‗standard‘ view, in politics people cannot follow two 
allegedly opposing courses of action simultaneously. Ghosh‘s 
model remains open-ended when examined from those premises. 
297 
 
Mondal‘s explanation concerning Ghosh‘s two-dimensional 
representational strategy, or as he characterizes it, Ghosh‘s 
―politics of ambivalence‖ (2007, 173), is quite close to the 
interpretation I proposed in the introductory sub-section on 
ethics and language in Ghosh (III.1.2.) and later in the articles. In 
Mondal‘s view, postcolonial circumstances are best met with 
such an ambivalent political attitude, because they demand two 
registers: one that 
 
acknowledges the metaphysic of modernity, its institutions 
and its governing ensembles of knowledge such as the 
state, citizenship, equality, social science and the rule of law 
etc.; and, on the other hand, another register which exceeds 
and resists that metaphysic because it does not observe the 
forms of rationality that inhere in the emancipatory projects 
of modernity. Indeed, this politics recognises that those 
projects involve an epistemic violence against other ways of 
thinking and being in the world – hence the strategic value 
of alignment with postmodernism – whilst also 
acknowledging the importance of modernity‘s universal 
frameworks in any struggle to establish social justice on a 
global scale. (2007, 173) 
 
I have referred to this ambivalence on several occasions (e.g. sub-
section III.1.2.; the articles in IV.4. & IV.5.), but shall repeat the 
main purpose behind these two registers again here. It seems that 
Ghosh is above all attempting to create narrative representations 
that establish connections across totalities constructed by 
modernist discourses. He does this by narrating into existence 
ethical relationships ensuring agency and voice to all while 
avoiding the appropriation of these voices to any one discourse. 
This is achieved by juxtaposing representative strategies and 
deconstructing the hegemonic position of certain versions. The 
transcending of borders inevitably requires a certain emphasis on 
difference, as well as an awareness of realities as discursive 
constructions in the poststructuralist vein. In a sense, Ghosh has 
to play the postmodernist games of textuality and of ‗discourse as 
power‘ in order to deconstruct modernist totalities and to be able 
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to avoid discursive appropriation and abstract homogenizing of 
heterogeneous groups. But this recognition of difference is 
effected on the basis of ethically conceived relationships that 
transcend the discursive totalities created by representations. 
As Mondal acknowledges, Ghosh‘s choice of both these 
registers proposes a commitment to ethical problems involved in 
the encounter with the other. And this two-dimensional 
representation refuses ―the subordination of the ethical to the 
political, the means to the ends, theory to practise, and 
deliberation to action,‖ all of which are set up by the ‗activist‘ 
branch of politics in the form of oppositions that bring forth a 
certain kind of concept of politics (Mondal 2007, 173). Ghosh‘s 
political ambivalence opens a way to the ethical negotiation of 
cultural difference that would be blocked by political activism, 
which is set on achieving ends at the cost of exploring the means. 
The political value of Ghosh‘s texts has to be seen in the 
context of deconstructing the hegemonic position of European 
discourses and trying to excavate other, silenced ways of being 
and realizing the world that might enable the creation of a more 
inclusive and globally just future. To hear these silenced voices, 
we have to open up our own ways of being to those of others and 
to acknowledge our ethical responsibility to react to the other. 
The problem is how to do this. This is a question Ghosh neither 
evades nor provides an exhaustive answer to. In line with 
Levinasian ethics, the question is more important than the 
answer, which draws us back to the linguistic totality of the self, 
preventing the approaching of the other human being or 
discourse. This explains the open-endedness of Ghosh‘s 
narratives: he does not endeavour to act in the sense of doing 
something decisive. The targets of representation are not 
‗known,‘ but there is an attempt to approach them without 
distorting them by appropriating them fully into one discourse.  
Like Ghosh and his narratives, Derrida and deconstruction 
in general have been criticized for not being able to deal with 
issues pertaining to politics (e.g. Critchley 1999). Deconstruction 
has been accused of discursive terrorism that tears apart without 
providing means for remedy. In his book, The Ethics of 
Deconstruction, Simon Critchley combines the theoretical 
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approaches of Levinasian ethics and Derridean deconstruction to 
envision a model for a society that would be based on ethical 
relationships and be politically valid and operative at the same 
time. In the following, I shall examine Ghosh's writing in 
relationship to this theoretical model in order to find out how 
these novels treat questions of ethical relationships in a political 
society. 
 ―[A]ccess to a just conception of politics can only be 
mediated ethically,‖ states Critchley (1999, 219), echoing Levinas. 
In totalitarian societies, the domination of politics, the idea that 
everything is political, leads to the reduction of practically all 
areas of social life. Totalitarianism is politics without anything 
beyond it—without transcendence, or interruption by the ethical. 
This comes through in The Glass Palace in the passage in which 
the narrator meets Dinu in the modern closed state of Myanmar. 
The passage is examined in more detail in the article on the ethics 
of representation in The Glass Palace, but it is invoked here again 
for further reference. Among other things, this part of the novel 
features the figure of Aung San Suu Kyi as the representative of 
the ethical that transcends the level of the all-invading politics: 
 
'politics has invaded everything, spared nothing ... religion, 
art, family ... it has taken over everything ... there is no 
escape from it … and yet, what could be more trivial, in the 
end? She understands this ... only she … and this is what 
makes her much greater than a politician .' 
'But if that's true,' Jaya said hesitantly, 'doesn't it make it 
much harder for her to succeed – as a politician?'  
Dinu laughed. 'But she has already succeeded … don't 
you see? She has torn the masks from the generals' faces ... 
She has shown them the limits of what she is willing to do 
… and these limits have imprisoned them too ... she haunts 
them unceasingly, every moment ... she has robbed them of 
words, of discourse.' (The Glass Palace 542) 
 
This is an example of the ethical (Suu Kyi) interrupting and 
transcending the political (the military regime). As Critchley 
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observes, for Levinas ethics means precisely the disruption of the 
discourse of totalizing politics (1999, 221). 
Politics provides the horizon of Levinasian ethics, in which 
the idea is to create a form of political life which repeatedly 
interrupts all totalizing impulses (Critchley 1999, 223). In the 
following passage from The Circle of Reason, which I have already 
referred to on several occasions, ethical and political are fused 
into the same communicative act. Alu is speaking in a mixture of 
languages: 
 
It was like a question, though he was not asking anything, 
bearing down on you from every side. And in that whole 
huge crowd nobody stirred or spoke. You could see that 
silently they were answering him, matching him with 
something of their own. [...] Tongues unravelled and 
woven together—nonsense, you say, tongues unravelled 
are nothing but nonsense—but there again you have a 
mystery, for everyone understood him, perfectly […] They 
understood him, for his voice was only the question; the 
answers were their own. [...] I saw mysteries, all around 
me, one growing out of another, and I could find no grasp 
on them, not the slightest hold [...] and you could feel – if 
such a thing is possible – the silence beginning to stir. (The 
Circle of Reason 279-280) 
 
Here Alu is voicing his political program of waging war on 
money, abolishing the use of money from the Souq. This is 
represented in an amalgamation of ethics and the political: Alu 
uses language, but this language is not identifiable as any distinct 
language which would establish a discursive totality through a 
certain claim to ‗know‘ the world and the other.  
Significantly, the crowd is approached by Alu 
simultaneously as the other and as a group of Thirds (le tiers), as 
conceived in Levinasian ethics (Levinas 1969, 212-213). The 
appearance of the Third simultaneously with the other has to do 
with political equality and justice, which belong to the realm of 
the Said and language: ―the third party looks at me in the eyes of 
the other – language is justice‖ (Levinas 1969, 213). The 
301 
 
relationship between the self and the singular other is not equal, 
because the self is subordinated to the other. But through the idea 
of the Third party, the self simultaneously realizes itself and the 
other as equal individuals just like all the others, with equal 
rights in a political society. At this level, the self and the other are 
equal with all the others in a group. The Third party looks at me 
in the eyes of the other. Consequently, my ethical responsibility to 
the other expands into wider questions of political justice for 
others in a society and for humanity as a whole (Critchley 1999, 
226). We then simultaneously have an ethical, unequal 
relationship with the other and a political, equal relationship with 
all the others. The self and the other are simultaneously 
conceived as participants in an ethical relationship and as others 
in a multitude of people, like everyone else, and with the same 
rights as everyone else. This, then, is how the ethical and the 
political exist at the same time. 
 Levinas elucidates the relationship between the self, the 
other and others as follows:  
 
The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying 
whose signification before the other until then went in one 
direction. It is of itself the limit of responsibility and the 
birth of the question: What do I have to do with justice? A 
question of consciousness. Justice is necessary, that is, 
comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, 
assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and 
thus intentionality and the intellect, the intelligibility of a 
system, and thence also a copresence on an equal footing as 
before a court of justice. (Levinas 1998, 157) 
 
This characterizes the move from the ethical to the political, 
which denotes the move from the Saying back into the realm of 
the Said. The diachronic ethical proximity (the other comes before 
me) is changed into the synchronic political contiguity (every 
other exists at the same time), which ―presupposes both 
thematizing thought and a locus and a cutting up of the 
continuity of space into discrete terms and the whole – out of 
justice‖ (Levinas 1998, 157). Through the idea of the Third party 
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develops the ―birth of representation, logos, consciousness, work, 
the neutral notion being‖ (Levinas 1998, 158; orig. emhasis). So, 
the presence of the Third party introduces into the singular 
relationship of responsibility towards the other the idea of the 
question of universal justice and a society based on this justice. 
This requires returning to the realm of the Said and the world of 
linguistic thematization, consciousness and discursive totalities. 
The co-presence of the ethical and the political is referred to 
as the double structure of community by Critchley (1999, 225). 
For instance, Alu‘s communication in the above scene establishes 
a connection with the people both as individuals (through ethical 
Saying) and as a group (through the political Said). The silent 
answer, something of everyone‘s own, that each person has to 
Alu‘s discursive but unintelligible question, establishes both the 
ethical and the political relationships between individuals. In a 
sense, Alu‘s discourse is within the realm of the political: it treats 
the crowd as a conglomeration of others (or Thirds), who are 
approached discursively. But each individual in the crowd 
addresses Alu as the other in an ethical relationship: their answer 
is within the ‗silent‘ ethical Saying, which is beyond discourse. 
Simultaneously, the people react to Alu‘s discourse as a group: 
the silence begins to stir.  
This doubled communication leads to what Critchley calls 
the justified Said (1999, 228-236). Initially the Said appears as 
entities that are exposed in their essence under the domination of 
discursive totalities. This Said is then deconstructed so that we 
are left with the Saying, the actual ethical residue of the 
relationship with the other, that has been relieved of all totalizing 
discursive burden. But then there remains the movement back to 
the Said, which by now has become the political ‗justified Said‘ 
that has been ―informed and interrupted by the trace of the 
Saying‖ (Critchley 1999, 229). In Ghosh‘s narration, the 
discourses and epistemologies of modernity (the Said as 
discursive totalities) are interrupted, or deconstructed and 
transcended, by the construction of ethical relationships 
(narrative approach of the ethical Saying). But his narrative 
strategy does not stop at the mere deconstruction of discourses. 
The political justified Said, the Said that bears with it traces of the 
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ethical Saying, unfolds as the outcome of the narrative process. 
Alu‘s unintelligible discourse can be realized as an example of the 
‗justified Said‘: its totality has been interrupted by the ethical 
Saying beyond language in the sense that it does not presume 
any specific way of constructing the world in the manner one 
distinct language would. However, even though it is a mixture, 
Alu uses discourse in his address to the group: it is just that this 
discourse has been affected by the ethical prerogative. His 
mixture of languages treats everyone as an equal.  
In Critchley‘s model, deconstruction has an ethical function 
as the interruptor of political linguistic totalities. His argument is 
that 
 
Derridean deconstruction has a horizon of responsibility or 
ethical significance, provided that ethical is understood in 
the Levinasian sense. Deconstruction […] opens an ethical 
space of alterity or transcendence. However, the move that 
deconstruction is unable to make – what I have called its 
impasse – concerns the passage from undecidability to 
decision, from responsibility to questioning, from 
deconstruction to critique, from ethics to politics. (1999, 
236) 
 
The way out of this impasse of the political is to follow Levinas‘s 
move from the other to the Third. This is analogous to the move 
from the responsibility towards the other to the questioning of 
the equality of all the others (both the self and the other as others 
among all the rest), and of the society and the politics; it is the 
move from the anarchy of the ethical responsibility, which is not 
yet justice, to the questioning and criticising of the political order. 
I have already referred to the simultaneous application of 
deconstruction and Levinasian ethics in section III.1.2. in the 
context of The Calcutta Chromosome. To return to the novel from 
the present angle, the hegemonic colonial version of the history of 
malaria research becomes ethically deconstructed in its narration. 
There is the ethical responsibility towards the other, meaning 
Mangala‘s silent and secret group, which demands that this 
group be approached without appropriating it into any 
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discursive frame. The narrative tries to reach this goal by not 
defining, or ‗knowing‘, the group and by presenting only textual 
traces of it. The group is characterized by silence and secrecy that 
transcend the discourse of colonial medical history. But, at the 
same time that the narrative is involved in the act of 
deconstructing the hegemonic version as a result of its ethical 
responsibility towards the eclipsed presence and agency of 
Mangala‘s group, it acknowledges three others that are equals in 
the political sense. These comprise the Western construction (the 
Said: colonial medical history), Mangala‘s group (the Saying: 
subversive, subaltern history) and the narrative itself (the 
justified Said that has been touched by the Saying: the narrative 
as a whole). 
In other words, deconstruction in itself is not justice in the 
political sense, it only opens an ethical space in which 
transcendence can take place. The society in the novel has a 
double structure. There is the ethical duty to acknowledge the 
presence of Mangala‘s group to the extent this is possible in an 
ethically informed narrative as well as to deconstruct the 
hegemonic version of events. But there is also the political right 
for all three versions (colonial medical history, its deconstruction, 
and the novel as a whole) to be acknowledged equally in the 
narrative. Hence the narrative includes the hegemonic version 
(the Said as discursive totality) and the point of alterity from 
which it is deconstructed (Mangala‘s group as the ethical Saying 
not altogether graspable through language). By interweaving 
these two, the narrative process (i.e. the novel as a whole) 
constitutes the move from the Saying to the ‗justified Said‘, the 
just Said that has been interrupted by the ethical Saying. In 
Levinasian ethics, justice can only be reached if the other can be 
simultaneously seen as the Third, representing all the others and 
their right to exist in equal terms. 
It follows that the two-dimensional representative strategy 
of Ghosh, or his ‗politics of ambivalence‘, as Mondal expresses it, 
is revealed as a simultaneous ethico-political mode of 
representation. What has been referred to as the simultaneous 
embracing of modernist universalism and postmodernist 
emphasis on difference, or as ―at times confusing deployment of 
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the lexicons of both liberal humanism and post-structuralism‖ 
(Dixon 1996, 16) varying between Derridean trace and universal 
humanism, turns out to be a narrative strategy that constructs 
human societies as the simultaneous double structure of ethical 
and political relationships: the ethical unequal relationship 
between the self and the other is at the same time the political just 
equal relationship between various others in a society. And the 
political is frequently interrupted by the ethical. It is important 
that this doubleness is not chronological: the ethical relationship 
is always already political, as the Third always looks at me in the 
eyes of the other. This ethically aware discourse does not 
subordinate ethical to the political, the means to the ends, theory 
to practice, or deliberation to action. It manages to narrate these 
poles of modernist binary constructions simultaneously, as it 
were, without defining them as separate and antagonistic. And 
this narrative strategy aspires to globally just universal 
representations while meticulously narrating difference in 
particular circumstances in time and space. 
In conclusion, it does seem that Ghosh is operating on two 
levels simultaneously. His works are ethical and political, 
postmodernist and modernist, deconstructionist and essentialist, 
at the same time. He acknowledges that there are multiple textual 
constructions of the world. These versions can always be 
deconstructed from a point of otherness that lies inside them. It 
seems that Ghosh is attempting to create narrative 
representations that establish connections across culturally 
constructed totalities through ethical relationships ensuring 
agency and voice to all while avoiding the appropriation of this 
voice to any one discourse. He does this by juxtaposing multiple 
representations and deconstructing the hegemonic position of 
certain versions. This transcending of borders inevitably requires 
a certain emphasis on difference, as well as an awareness of 
realities as discursive constructions. In a sense, Ghosh has to play 
the postmodern language games of textuality and of ‗discourse as 
power‘ to be able to avoid discursive appropriation and abstract 
homogenizing of heterogeneous groups and to be able to secure 
the distinctive features of all the varieties in question. But this 
recognition of difference is effected on the basis of ethically 
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conceived relationships that transcend the discursive totalities 
created by representations.  
Consequently, the general feeling of universal humanism in 
Ghosh‘s writing is caused by the fact that he does not merely 
deconstruct hegemonic representations, but does so on the basis 
of an ethical dimension based on the relationship between the self 
and the other. This relationship is represented as existing ideally 
beyond the totalities created by language, knowledge, or 
narration. In the light of the novels examined in this dissertation, 
the significance of this ethical dimension seems to have 
strengthened with the expansion of Ghosh‘s literary output. 
Generally speaking, the career of Ghosh as a writer of fiction can 
be characterized as proceeding from the emphasizing of the 
reality-constructing power of narration (The Circle of Reason, The 
Shadow Lines) to the exposition of the relationality and reality-
obscuring nature of all discursive models (In an Antique Land, The 
Calcutta Chromosome) and finally to an outright distrust of 
language as the builder of ontological totalities like nations, 
religions, sciences, social classes and subjectivities, and as 
incapable of transcending these totalities (The Glass Palace, The 
Hungry Tide).  
The ethical dimension beyond linguistic totalities is 
symbolized by silence in some of Ghosh‘s novels. The alternative 
mode of being achieved in the realm of silence would result in a 
unified, but not homogeneous world, which is not defined 
merely by the power politics distributed by language. This world 
would transcend temporal and spatial distances, as well as 
differences of language or social position, without, however, 
making them vanish. All in all, it would enable the Levinasian 
utopia of the self and the other existing on their own terms 
independently, while still in a close relationship with one 
another. In addition to the awareness of multiple histories, 
agencies and voices highlighted in the novels by Ghosh, this 
change in the way we think of the world may constitute a major 
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